By Dr. Adnan Bouzan
In a political and analytical reading of the announced understanding agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the interim Damascus authority, it can be said that this agreement has failed to yield tangible results since the moment it was announced—neither in substance nor in outcomes. It was born burdened with ambiguity and confusion, confined within a coercive context that makes it closer to a temporary, forced arrangement than to a stable and viable political agreement.
The most striking feature of this agreement is the clear confusion surrounding its provisions. The points were formulated in broad and vague language, lacking specificity and precision, and devoid of clear implementation mechanisms or binding legal and political guarantees. This ambiguity opened the door to contradictory interpretations by both parties, stripping the agreement of any practical substance and turning it into a document more susceptible to political instrumentalization than a genuine framework for resolution.
Politically, the agreement emerged as a result of escalating military pressures and overt attempts to contain the situation on the ground rather than address the root causes of the crisis. The interim Damascus authority continues to view the SDF as a security file subject to liquidation once the balance of power shifts, not as a political partner with the legitimacy to represent a broad segment of Syrians. Hence, the agreement reflects not a mutual will, but rather a profoundly imbalanced power equation.
In this context, the role of the United States—presumed to be the principal ally of the Kurds—cannot be ignored. Yet its recent political conduct suggests an attempt at a gradual withdrawal from its commitments toward its Kurdish allies, pushing them toward unequal understandings with Damascus as part of a broader reordering of regional priorities. Accordingly, this agreement can be read as one of the outcomes of American pressure, rather than as a guarantee for the protection of the Kurds or their political and military gains.
The most dangerous aspect of this agreement is the absence of any real guarantees to protect Syrian Kurds. The historical experience with the Damascus authority—marked by policies of denial, repression, and exclusion—offers no grounds for confidence in general promises lacking constitutional and legal framing. Indeed, field and political indicators suggest that the agreement may open the door to far more dangerous scenarios, potentially reaching the level of massacres or widespread campaigns of repression, under the pretexts of “restoring sovereignty” and “reasserting state authority.”
From this standpoint, it can be firmly stated that this agreement, in its current form, will not lead to a satisfactory outcome for either party, particularly not for the Kurdish side. It neither recognizes the national and political rights of the Kurds nor lays the foundation for a genuine partnership in Syria’s future. Instead, it leaves the Kurds in the position of a party expendable at the first regional or international bargain.
The danger lies not only in the failure of the agreement itself, but in what may follow that failure: a state of political and military exposure that places Syrian Kurds before bloody possibilities amid international silence and regional complicity. Thus, warning of potential massacres is not emotional rhetoric, but a realistic reading of a fragile political trajectory built on coercion rather than justice.
In conclusion, any agreement that is not founded on explicit recognition of rights, does not rest on clear constitutional guarantees, and does not emerge from a balanced political will, will remain a temporary and collapse-prone arrangement. Unless the relationship between the Kurds and the Syrian state is redefined on the basis of partnership, democracy, and pluralism, such agreements will be nothing more than transient stations on the road to a deeper crisis—one whose price Syrian Kurds may pay in existence and in blood.