
By: Dr. Adnan Bozan
The Kurdish tragedy is not merely the story of a people deprived of statehood, nor is it simply a series of wars fought by the Kurds against empires, states, and regional powers possessing military, financial, and political resources far beyond their own. At its deepest level, it is the story of a long political history in which a people endowed with the foundations of national identity, the will to resist, and the capacity for sacrifice has been unable to transform its uprisings, revolutions, and partial military victories into a stable political project culminating in the establishment of an independent state. Over the centuries, empires have changed, regimes have fallen, borders have been redrawn, and states have emerged and disappeared. Yet the Kurdish question has remained suspended between an unfulfilled historical right, a popular will that has not found its way to full sovereignty, and political leaderships that have not always succeeded in overcoming their differences and building an inclusive national project.
The question that arises here is not why the Kurds fought, nor why they were subjected to persecution, partition, and denial. These are undeniable realities whose consequences cannot be ignored or underestimated. The more painful question is this: Why have the political defeats of the Kurdish national project continued to recur, even when the Kurds have possessed military, popular, and social strength capable of bringing about substantial change? And why have other peoples, despite facing wars, internal divisions, and foreign interventions, managed at certain historical moments to establish their states or consolidate their political entities, while the Kurdish national project has remained caught between promises, uprisings, broken agreements, and deferred sacrifices?
A historical comparison between the Kurdish experience and those of other peoples requires, first, that we correct a fundamental misconception: it is not true that all revolutions throughout the world have succeeded, nor that all Arab revolutions achieved their objectives. The French Revolution itself passed through periods of violence and turmoil, the restoration of monarchy, and the rise of empire. European revolutions, too, required decades of conflict and social and constitutional transformation before contributing to the establishment of the modern state. As for the Arab uprisings—the Arab Spring—that began in 2011, they succeeded in bringing down regimes or presidents in some countries, but they did not all succeed in establishing stable democratic systems. Some of these experiences instead descended into civil wars, a return to authoritarianism, or the collapse of state institutions. The distinction worth examining, however, is that a number of peoples, after prolonged struggles, managed to transform their revolutionary moments into political institutions or nation-states, whereas the Kurds, despite a struggle extending across successive generations, have not achieved the goal of an internationally recognized independent nation-state. The comparison, therefore, should not be based on the number of battles won by one people or another, but rather on the ability to transform social and military power into political, legal, and institutional power.
To understand this dilemma, we must return to Kurdish history itself, rather than confining our examination to the twentieth century or to the agreements concluded in the aftermath of the First World War. When we examine the era of the Kurdish emirates, we find that Kurdistan was home to political entities possessing varying degrees of autonomy, de facto independence, and military and administrative influence. These included the Emirate of Botan, the Emirate of Soran, the Emirate of Baban, and the Emirate of Bahdinan, alongside other political entities and ruling dynasties that emerged at different historical periods. These emirates had local leaderships, military forces, economic resources, and political relations with the powers surrounding them. At certain times, they were able to administer extensive territories and maintain a degree of independence from imperial centers. Nevertheless, these experiences did not evolve into a centralized Kurdish authority capable of unifying the Kurdish political sphere and establishing an overarching sovereign entity.
The Kurdish emirates operated within the balance of power among the surrounding empires, particularly the Ottoman and Safavid Empires. Their relations with external powers shifted according to political and military interests and circumstances. These emirates were not identical in their structures, objectives, or degrees of independence. Nor had the concept of the modern nation-state yet developed among them in the form it would assume in the twentieth century. It would therefore be inappropriate to impose contemporary notions of nationalism on all these historical experiences or to demand of them what was not possible in their time. Nevertheless, an important political lesson can be drawn from their history: the existence of multiple and powerful Kurdish entities was not, in itself, sufficient to produce enduring Kurdish political unity.
Here, one of the most significant historical problems becomes apparent: the issue was not always the absence of Kurdish power, but rather the absence of a political framework capable of bringing that power together and directing it toward a common interest. Relations among the emirates and Kurdish ruling dynasties were marked by rivalry, conflict, and shifting alliances. Some entered into alliances with one regional power against another, while others sought the assistance of an imperial center to confront a local rival. Within this context, the surrounding empires were able to exploit local rivalries and use alliances, military pressure, and political leverage to weaken Kurdish forces one after another.
One of the most revealing episodes of this dilemma occurred during the nineteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire moved toward strengthening administrative centralization and reducing the authority of local powers and semi-autonomous emirates. The Kurdish emirates resisted this policy to varying degrees, but rivalries among princes, local interests, and regional ambitions weakened the prospects for coordination among them. This period ultimately witnessed the decline of the Kurdish emirates and the increasingly extensive subordination of their territories to centralized administration. This outcome cannot be explained by internal divisions alone. The Ottoman Empire had a centralized political project and extensive military and administrative instruments at its disposal. International circumstances and Ottoman-Iranian relations were also changing. Nevertheless, local divisions made resistance to this transformation more difficult and less sustainable.
Perhaps the harshest lesson in the history of the Kurdish emirates is that imperial powers did not always need to confront all Kurdish forces simultaneously. They found in the rivalries among leaders and ruling dynasties a means of expanding their influence. Whenever an emirate weakened as a result of internal conflict or a struggle over power, the imperial center could intervene to curtail or terminate its autonomy. Thus, division was not merely a dispute over borders or influence; in certain cases, it became a contributing factor in the dismantling of the entire local political structure.
At this point, we must address the question of betrayal—not as an emotional label applied to every political disagreement, but as a historical and political phenomenon that deserves analysis and accountability. Political betrayal begins when the interests of a leader, family, party, or narrow group are placed above the general national interest; when foreign alliances become instruments for settling internal scores; and when some decision-makers are willing to sacrifice the fate of a broad national community in order to retain a political position, military influence, or personal privilege. Not every disagreement between two leaders constitutes betrayal, nor does every agreement with an external power necessarily amount to abandoning the cause. Political history is not governed by intentions alone, but also by interests, calculations, and outcomes. The problem emerges, however, when political competition becomes a means of destroying a national partner, and when weakening another Kurd is regarded as a victory in a leader's calculations—even if this gives an external adversary the opportunity to subjugate both sides.
The most dangerous form of betrayal does not necessarily take the shape of an openly declared agreement with the enemy. It may instead be embodied in political decisions that undermine the public interest, internal conflicts that exhaust the people, alliances concluded without assessing their consequences, and positions in which calculations of power take precedence over the fate of the cause. This may be one of the most painful aspects of Kurdish political history. Not all defeats resulted solely from the superiority of adversaries; leadership disputes, conflicting interests, and the absence of mutual trust also contributed to some of them. An enemy confronting a united front must calculate the cost of confrontation. But when it faces rival forces and competing leaderships, it can exploit their divisions and turn them to its own advantage.
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the First World War once again exposed the scale of this dilemma. The Kurdish question entered a new historical phase, becoming closely tied to the redrawing of borders, the distribution of spheres of influence, and the formulation of the political order of the Middle East. The Treaty of Sèvres, signed on 10 August 1920, included provisions in Articles 62, 63, and 64 concerning the preparation of a scheme for autonomy in specified Kurdish-inhabited areas and the possibility of attaining independence under certain conditions and procedures linked to the wishes of the population and a decision by the League of Nations. However, the treaty never entered into force and did not lead to the establishment of an actual Kurdish state. Following the victory of the Turkish national movement and the renegotiation of the international settlement, the Treaty of Lausanne was concluded in 1923 without recognizing the Kurds' right to an independent state or providing a mechanism for implementing the Sèvres provisions concerning autonomy and independence.
The Kurds thus found themselves facing a new geopolitical reality in which their territories were divided among Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, within political borders over whose formation they had no decisive influence. This outcome was not merely a detail in the history of international treaties; it marked a fundamental turning point in the future of the Kurdish question. The national struggle became dispersed across four states, each with its own political system, security interests, laws, and national policies. Over time, Kurdish political movements developed in each part under different circumstances, making it increasingly difficult to formulate a unified strategy that could transcend borders and reconcile shared objectives with the distinct political and legal realities of each part.
Nevertheless, the responsibility of international powers for this outcome does not absolve the Kurdish political movement itself of scrutiny. The international system does not grant peoples their rights simply because their causes are just, nor do national aspirations become states merely because they are mentioned in a treaty or international document. Statehood requires political leadership with a clear project, institutions capable of governing the people, coherent political representation, and the ability to navigate international balances of power without becoming entirely dependent on them. The period following the First World War presented a complex historical opportunity in which international interests intersected with the weakness of Kurdish political representation and the fragmentation of decision-making centers. Kurdish forces failed to transform the provisions of the international settlement into a stable political reality.
During the twentieth century, the same dilemma recurred in different forms. Kurdistan witnessed numerous uprisings and revolutions, and leaders emerged with considerable popular and military support. Yet the Kurdish struggle often continued to operate according to separate geographical and political calculations. In Iran, the Republic of Kurdistan was established in Mahabad on 22 January 1946 under the leadership of Qazi Muhammad. It was an important political experience in the history of the Kurdish national movement, representing an attempt to establish a political entity with institutions, an administration, and national symbols. However, it lasted only a short time and came to an end in December of the same year, following the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the return of the Iranian army to the region. Mahabad was not merely a military defeat; it was a harsh test of the Kurdish project's ability to build a political entity in a regional and international environment that offered no genuine guarantees of its survival.
The experience of Mahabad exposed the fragility of reliance on external protection, because an international power that opens a political window at a particular moment may close it when its priorities and interests change. It also demonstrated that establishing a political entity requires more than declaring a republic, raising a flag, and forming institutions. It requires defensive, economic, and diplomatic capabilities, as well as balanced regional relations that ensure at least a minimum capacity for survival. Nevertheless, the fall of Mahabad should not be reduced to internal mistakes, since the military and political balance of power was profoundly unequal, and Iran regained control of the region after the Soviet position changed and the circumstances that had enabled the republic's establishment came to an end.
In Iraq, the experience was repeated in a more complex form. The Kurdish armed movement went through periods of strength and weakness. On 11 March 1970, an agreement was concluded between the Iraqi government and the Kurdish movement, incorporating arrangements for autonomy and recognition of Kurdish national rights. However, it was not implemented in a manner that resolved the fundamental disputes over the boundaries of the autonomous region, the powers of its administration, political representation, and the questions of Kirkuk and mixed-population areas. Armed confrontations erupted in 1974, while the Kurdish movement was relying on Iranian support that was not founded on a lasting commitment to the Kurdish national project.
When Iran and Iraq signed the Algiers Agreement on 6 March 1975, the regional equation changed decisively. Iran terminated its support for the Kurdish armed movement in Iraq, and the Peshmerga's ability to continue confronting the Iraqi army declined. The revolution consequently ended with the collapse of its military front and the displacement of large numbers of civilians and fighters. Here lies a lesson that must not be ignored: a long-term liberation project cannot be built upon alliances whose continuity the national movement has no ability to secure, nor upon understandings that make the fate of the cause dependent on settlements between rival states.
Yet history cannot be understood merely by mentioning the Algiers Agreement or the withdrawal of Iranian support. The issue also requires examining the nature of relations among Kurdish leaders, the disputes that emerged at different stages, and the way political competition evolved into conflicts within the Kurdish political sphere. The previous experience, with all its losses and sacrifices, could have become a foundation for rebuilding a more independent and cohesive national strategy. However, political divisions persisted and, in subsequent periods, became one of the factors weakening the Kurdish movement and undermining its ability to present itself as an inclusive national project.
The most dangerous development that can befall any national liberation movement is its transition from confronting an external adversary to confronting itself. When the party becomes a substitute for the homeland, the leader a substitute for the institution, and organizational loyalty a substitute for national belonging, the cause loses its ability to produce leadership that transcends partisan boundaries. When military, administrative, and economic institutions are divided among competing centers of influence, the unity of the people and the national decision-making process are placed at risk, even if national slogans remain prominent in political discourse. This is why Kurdish division is not merely an organizational problem or a disagreement among political parties; it is an issue directly connected to the future of state-building itself.
This dilemma becomes even more evident when we examine the experience of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq following the 1991 uprising. Under exceptional regional and international circumstances, the Kurds succeeded in establishing a de facto self-governing administration, holding elections, and creating a parliament, a government, and administrative institutions following the 1992 elections. This was a major historical step because it moved part of the Kurdish struggle from armed resistance toward institution-building and the exercise of governance. However, this experience became embroiled in internal conflicts that escalated into armed clashes between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan beginning in 1994. These clashes intensified into a Kurdish civil war in the mid-1990s, with regional interventions further complicating the conflict. The confrontations eventually ended with the 1998 Washington Agreement, but administrative and political division continued for many years, leaving the region, in practice, divided between two competing authorities and rival party-controlled institutions.
The Kurdish project thus confronted a painful paradox: it had succeeded in securing a political and administrative space that had previously been beyond its reach, yet it had failed from the outset to govern that space through national institutions capable of transcending partisan competition. The internal war was not merely a disagreement
merely a dispute over the administration of power or the distribution of resources; it was a profound blow to national trust, demonstrating how disagreements among forces supposedly struggling for the same objective can become a threat to the gains achieved by the people through their sacrifices.
Perhaps the question that must be raised here is this: How can a political movement call upon the world to recognize its people's right to self-determination while remaining incapable of managing its internal disagreements through political and institutional rules? And how can it demand an independent democratic state if its own decision-making centers do not consistently adhere to the principles of the peaceful transfer of power, accountability, and the separation of partisan interests from the public interest? A state is not merely a flag to be raised, a parliament to be inaugurated, or a government bearing a national name. It is a system of institutions and legal rules that ensures the continuity of authority and society regardless of the identities of those who hold power. If institutions remain tied to the person of a leader or to a particular party, they remain vulnerable to fragmentation whenever the balance of power among competing leaders shifts.
The experience of the referendum on the independence of the Kurdistan Region on 25 September 2017 provided another example of the gap between national aspirations and political strategy. The referendum expressed a broad popular desire for independence, but it was held in an exceptionally complex regional and international environment, amid opposition from the Iraqi federal government and neighboring states, and without an international consensus capable of ensuring a transition from the referendum's outcome to substantive negotiations on independence. Internal Kurdish divisions, differing positions among political forces, and the absence of an agreed vision for managing the subsequent phase further weakened the ability to transform the popular mandate into a sustainable political achievement.
Following the referendum, Iraqi federal forces regained control of Kirkuk and other disputed territories in October of the same year. This outcome did not demonstrate that the Kurdish people lacked the desire for independence. Rather, it revealed that popular will, however extensive, requires unified leadership and a political, diplomatic, economic, and legal plan that precedes the announcement of decisive steps, rather than leaving their consequences to the balance of power at a particular moment. A referendum, in itself, expresses a political will, but it does not automatically establish a state, compel the international community to recognize it, or independently resolve the legal, constitutional, and geographical complexities associated with secession.
These events raise an even more painful question: Has the Kurdish political movement learned from its previous experiences? Have historical defeats become an impetus for reconsidering the nature of leadership and strategy, or have they, in many cases, been reduced to partisan memories for which each side blames the other? The problem is not that political interpretations of history differ, but that independent national mechanisms for investigation, review, and accountability are lacking. A people that does not hold its leaders accountable for decisions of historic consequence, and does not reassess the mistakes that led to the loss of territory, opportunities, and sacrifices, may find itself confronting the same mistakes under new names and different flags.
It is essential here to move beyond an emotional interpretation of history, one that portrays every defeat as a foreign conspiracy and every failure as the result of internal betrayal. Either interpretation, when elevated into an absolute explanation, obstructs the ability to understand what has happened. The Kurds have indeed been subjected to policies of national denial, military repression, forced displacement, demographic engineering, and campaigns of extermination. These realities were not the product of their internal disagreements. Moreover, the states that divided Kurdistan possessed enormous military, legal, diplomatic, and economic instruments and, at various stages, worked to prevent the emergence of an independent Kurdish entity. Yet acknowledging these facts must not become a means of exempting Kurdish leaderships from their historical responsibilities. There is a fundamental difference between recognizing an adversary's responsibility for oppressing a people and accepting that the adversary alone explains every political and military failure. The former is an interpretation of history; the latter may become an escape from self-criticism.
This helps explain why certain national movements around the world succeeded in transforming resistance into statehood. The success of liberation movements was not based solely on the courage of their fighters, but on their ability to build political institutions, unify military command, formulate an inclusive national discourse, manage international relations in accordance with the national interest, and link armed struggle to a clear political project. Liberation movements in different countries managed, with varying degrees of success and difficulty, to move from resistance to state-building. They did not do so because they were free of divisions or disagreements, but because, at decisive moments, they were able to place the national project above organizational and personal interests and establish mechanisms for resolving or containing disputes before they escalated into conflicts capable of destroying their achievements.
In the Kurdish experience, however, the relationship between the national movement and partisan organizations has remained complex. In many instances, political parties have been more than instruments for expressing political diversity; they have evolved into competing centers seeking control over national decision-making. Each party has consequently developed its own calculations, external relationships, and separate vision for the future of the Kurdish cause. This has weakened the possibility of building a comprehensive Kurdish strategy that treats Kurdistan as a national question extending beyond the boundaries of its four parts. This does not mean that all Kurdish parties are alike or that all leaders bear equal responsibility. Historical analysis requires fairness and a distinction between different periods, individuals, and circumstances. It does mean, however, that the Kurdish movement, across its various currents, has so far failed to produce an inclusive political framework with sufficient moral and institutional authority to manage strategic disagreements and prevent them from turning into internal confrontations.
Another crisis is evident in the nature of the relationship between the Kurds and international powers. Various Kurdish movements have dealt with the United States, Russia, the former Soviet Union, Iran, Turkey, and other states according to the requirements of the conflict at each particular stage. International relations are not governed by permanent alliances, and there is nothing inherently wrong with a people under threat seeking external support. The strategic mistake begins when such support becomes a substitute for independent national decision-making, and when leadership abandons the development of its own capabilities in exchange for unwritten political assurances or temporary understandings. States do not establish alliances on the basis of national sentiment, but rather according to interests, security, economic considerations, and balances of power. A state may support a Kurdish force against a regional rival and then abandon it once it reaches an agreement with that rival or its military and political priorities change. The experiences of Mahabad, the Algiers Agreement, and other episodes have demonstrated that reliance on external support without an independent strategy leaves a national movement exposed whenever the balance of interests shifts.
The question, therefore, is not merely why the world abandoned the Kurds, but why Kurdish leaderships have been unable to construct a political equation in which the interests of international and regional powers intersect, at least partially, with guarantees of the Kurdish people's rights. Why have they failed to turn Kurdistan's geographical position and its political, economic, and security significance into durable negotiating leverage? Geography is not a predetermined sentence of defeat, just as it is no guarantee of victory. A region situated between competing powers may become a source of opportunity if its leadership knows how to manage the balance of power. It may, however, become a permanent arena of conflict if local forces are incapable of establishing independent decision-making.
Another problem that cannot be overlooked concerns the nature of Kurdish political consciousness. Kurdish history has produced a rich collective memory of resistance, sacrifice, and heroism, but it also needs a critical historical memory capable of examining mistakes and misguided choices. It is not enough to write about the leaders who resisted; we must also examine the decisions they made, the agreements they signed, the alliances they chose, the opportunities they squandered, and the consequences that followed. Criticizing historical leadership is not an insult to history. On the contrary, the sanctification of political figures and their transformation into untouchable symbols who cannot be held accountable may be one of the reasons failures continue to be reproduced. Peoples seeking to build states do not need leaders portrayed as incapable of making mistakes; they need institutions capable of identifying mistakes, correcting them, and holding those responsible to account.
The Kurdish people have paid an enormous price for the absence of statehood. Yet they have also paid internal costs as a result of political and social fragmentation and the transformation of certain organizational disputes into conflicts that have extended beyond politics into armed confrontation. The tragedy is that a Kurdish fighter standing in the mountains to defend the land and dignity of the people may, at certain stages, find himself facing another battle that does not serve the objective for which he originally took up arms, while leaders compete over influence, representation, and decision-making authority. The blood of the fighters does not belong to political parties, the sacrifices of society are not the personal political capital of leaders, and the national cause must never become the property of an organization or a family inheritance.
Perhaps what the Kurdish project needs most is a transition from a culture of perpetual revolution to a philosophy of state-building. Revolution can open the way, but it cannot build a state on its own. Resistance can protect a people in a moment of danger, but it cannot replace law, institutions, the economy, or public administration. A leader may guide a historical phase, but cannot serve as a substitute for the political system. If the establishment of a Kurdish state is to move from a historical dream to a viable project, it requires redefining the relationship between party and homeland, leadership and institution, military power and political decision-making, national identity and citizenship, and national aspirations and the requirements of international law.
This requires the development of a Kurdish political vision that transcends the logic of fragmented parts without disregarding the distinct political and legal circumstances of each part of Kurdistan. It also requires the establishment of democratic representative institutions, clear rules governing the transfer of power, the removal of partisan and economic interests from the institutions of society, and the creation of national mechanisms for resolving disputes. The project also needs a long-term diplomatic strategy that does not change with every shift in leadership or alliances, as well as a political discourse capable of addressing the international community in the language of rights, law, and self-determination, rather than relying exclusively on the language of historical victimhood. Victimhood gives a cause its moral dimension, but it is not, by itself, sufficient to establish a state.
The Kurdish cause does not suffer from a lack of sacrifice, courage, or popular desire for freedom and independence. Above all, it suffers from a historical gap between national will and the ability to translate that will into a political and institutional system. The Kurds have possessed many of the elements necessary for resistance, but they have not always possessed the political unity required to turn resistance into a sustained national project. Perhaps this is the greatest contradiction in their history: a people that has managed to preserve its identity despite centuries of pressure and attempts at assimilation and denial, yet has so far been unable to transform that identity into an internationally recognized independent state.
History does not offer peoples an endless succession of opportunities, and an opportunity lost through division may never return under the same conditions. Each Kurdish generation has inherited from the one before it an unfinished dream, sacrifices that have not been transformed into sovereignty, and political promises that have never become reality. If the Kurdish political movement continues to treat history merely as a record of past heroism, without making it a field for reassessment, accountability, and learning, future generations may inherit the same problem, regardless of changes in party names, leaderships, or international circumstances.
Therefore, the question the Kurds must confront in examining their history should not be limited to: Who divided Kurdistan? Who fought our revolutions? Who abandoned us? It must also include the following questions: Why were we unable to protect our unity when the opportunity existed? Why did we allow personal, partisan, and family disputes to take precedence over our national destiny? And why did the experiences of the Kurdish emirates, modern revolutions, the Republic of Mahabad, and the experiment in self-government in Iraq fail to become foundational lessons for building a more cohesive political project?
Acknowledging internal mistakes is neither a concession to adversaries nor a disparagement of the sacrifices made by martyrs. It is a prerequisite for political maturity. An external adversary may win a battle, impose an agreement, or redraw borders, but it cannot, on its own, explain why internal divisions keep recurring, why leaderships fail to agree on even the minimum requirements of national interests, or why political disagreements sometimes turn into conflicts that weaken society itself. Blaming others for every failure may temporarily ease the political conscience, but it does not create a different future.
Perhaps the time has come for Kurdish political thought to raise a question more daring than all those posed before: Have the Kurds throughout their history been victims solely of the policies of others, or have they also, at certain historical moments, been victims of their own political failures? A fair historical answer is that they have been victims of both. Yet acknowledging the latter is an essential starting point for changing the future. Peoples cannot always choose their adversaries, but they can choose how to organize themselves, how to manage their disagreements, how to protect their interests, and how to prevent their leaders from turning the national cause into an arena for personal and partisan competition.
A state does not emerge from the barrel of a gun alone, nor from an international agreement alone, nor from a national discourse, however powerful it may be. A state emerges when popular will meets conscious political leadership; when identity is translated into a legal project, sacrifices into institutions, resistance into strategy, and disagreement into democratic pluralism rather than internal armed conflict. If the Kurds fail to recognize this reality, they may continue to achieve temporary military victories only to lose their political gains, and to secure historic achievements only to undermine them themselves before their adversaries have the opportunity to dismantle them.
The most dangerous thing that can happen to a people without its own state is not that its enemy defeats it in battle, but that it becomes incapable of protecting its victory when it succeeds. And the greatest danger facing the Kurdish cause is not that others abandon it—history has always shown that the interests of states change—but that its own people abandon the idea of a shared destiny whenever it conflicts with their private interests.
Kurdistan needs a new political mindset more than it needs another revolution: a mindset that understands that an external enemy cannot be confronted through internal division, that a state cannot be built amid competing and conflicting leaderships, and that independence is not a prize granted by great powers to those who raise the banner of liberation. It is a historical project requiring political unity, institutions, popular legitimacy, a realistic strategy, and leadership that understands that the homeland is greater than the party and the people greater than the leader.
The Kurds have lost many historic opportunities, but the greatest loss would be for the next generation to inherit the same causes of defeat and repeat the story of its fathers and forefathers, as though history were nothing more than a succession of revolutions that begin with hope and end in division. History does not ask the Kurds to forget what they have endured, nor to abandon their rights. It demands, rather, that they learn from their experiences, recognize that liberation from the authority of others also begins with liberation from their own mistakes, and understand that building a homeland is achieved not merely by possessing the will, but by being able to organize, protect, and transform that will into institutions and independent political decision-making.
As for the Kurds in Syria, this article will not address their current circumstances, because its subject extends beyond the geographical boundaries of Syria. However, setting aside the history of the Kurds in the other parts of Kurdistan does not mean overlooking the responsibility to examine it critically. Serious mistakes have accumulated throughout the Kurdish political experience. Some resulted from political subordination, the surrender of national decision-making to the will of others, and the acceptance of subordinate roles instead of pursuing an independent project, in addition to the narrowness of political vision and the strategic short-sightedness of most leaderships. External domination alone did not create or perpetuate this reality. Internal policies also contributed to reproducing subordination and division, to the extent that the sacrifices of the Kurdish people were, at many historical junctures, turned into fuel for the conflicts and interests of others. This is one of the painful truths that must be confronted with courage if we are to understand the reasons behind the Kurdish project's setbacks and recurring failures.
The Kurdish cause will not advance simply because the Kurds become more willing to sacrifice; history has already demonstrated that they have never been sparing in their sacrifices. It will advance when they become more capable of safeguarding the outcomes of those sacrifices. Only then can the Kurdish dream move beyond the memory of deferred revolutions toward the horizon of statehood, sovereignty, and a future of their own.