By: Dr. Adnan Bozan

The Syrian question today is no longer centered on which side has achieved military victory or which actor has succeeded in imposing control over a larger geographical area. These questions, while still relevant, are no longer sufficient to understand the nature of the transformations Syria has undergone in recent years. The Syrian crisis has shifted from being a struggle over power to a crisis in the very concept of power itself, and from a dispute over the state to a reconfiguration of the meaning, functions, and limits of sovereignty. Accordingly, the most pressing question is no longer: who controls the territory? but rather: who actually governs Syria? And how is power produced, exercised, and administered within an exceptionally complex political space?

The prolonged years of war have generated a political, administrative, and security reality that differs fundamentally from the traditional model of the centralized nation-state. Authority is no longer confined to a single institution, political decision-making is no longer issued from one center, and sovereignty is no longer exercised uniformly across the entire territory. Instead, Syria has witnessed the formation of a complex system of power centers in which formal state authorities intersect with de facto authorities, and local interests overlap with regional agendas and international balances of power, rendering the structure of governance far more complex than the mere existence of a central government, local administrations, or competing armed forces.

The Syrian state, as a legally recognized international entity, has not collapsed in the absolute sense; however, it has lost a significant portion of its historical monopoly over the core functions of the state. Its capacity to manage security, monopolize the use of force, regulate the economy, produce legislation, and govern public space has undergone profound transformations imposed by years of conflict. In parallel, new actors have emerged who possess tools of influence and power that are no less significant than those of the state itself—whether military forces, self-administrations, economic networks, local and social structures, or external actors that have become integral to the equation of governance and decision-making.

Therefore, analyzing the Syrian landscape can no longer rely solely on classical state-centric concepts based on the assumption of unified authority, unified decision-making, and unified sovereignty. The Syrian arena today presents a far more complex model in which multiple forms of legitimacy coexist: constitutional legitimacy, de facto legitimacy, military legitimacy, international recognition-based legitimacy, and local administrative legitimacy. Each of these forms possesses distinct instruments of influence and authority, sometimes intersecting and at other times colliding.

In light of this, the question “who governs whom?” transcends the identification of the governing actor and becomes an inquiry into the nature of power production itself, and the mechanisms through which authority is distributed, resources are managed, legitimacy is constructed, and power relations are shaped. Likewise, the question “how is governance exercised?” becomes more significant than “who governs?”, as patterns of governance no longer rely solely on traditional centralization but increasingly rest on a complex network of negotiations, pressures, and mutual dependencies among local, regional, and international actors.

From this perspective, this study seeks to move beyond simplistic readings that reduce the Syrian crisis to a binary struggle between government and opposition or between the state and armed groups. Instead, it offers a structural analysis of governance in contemporary Syria by examining power centers, forms of sovereignty, decision-making mechanisms, and the relationship between formal institutions and de facto authorities, as well as the extent to which external factors contribute to reshaping the Syrian state. The aim is not merely to answer the question of who governs Syria, but to understand the emerging political structure shaped over years of conflict, and to anticipate whether the country is moving toward the restoration of a centralized state model or toward a new configuration based on the plurality of power centers and the redefinition of state, sovereignty, and governance in Syria’s future.

First: The Ongoing Fragmentation of the Power Center and the Reproduction of the Unitary State

The fall of the Ba’athist regime did not lead to the emergence of a new Syrian state based on a social contract and equal citizenship, as many Syrians had hoped. Instead, the country entered a transitional phase that brought with it new structural problems concerning the nature of authority, the identity of the state, and the mechanisms for managing ethnic, religious, and sectarian diversity. Rather than moving toward a pluralistic political system that acknowledges Syria’s complex social reality, the new governing authority has tended to reproduce a unitary state model, albeit with a different ideological foundation—shifting from Ba’athist nationalism to a jihadist Islamist discourse, while maintaining a centralized logic in governing the country.

Instead of building a state that accommodates all Syrian components as equal partners in power, wealth, and decision-making, large segments of society continue to be approached through a logic of suspicion and security-based classification. The binary distinction between “loyal” and “hostile” has been reproduced in new forms, and accusations of separatism, treason, or foreign affiliation have become political tools used to justify military confrontations—much like the previous regime’s reliance on accusations of terrorism or threats to national unity to legitimize its security policies.

In this context, the Syrian coast witnessed large-scale confrontations framed as operations against the so-called “remnants of the former regime.” However, according to multiple human rights reports and testimonies, these operations were accompanied by serious violations against civilians, further deepening societal fragmentation and reproducing cycles of fear and retaliation instead of initiating a process of transitional justice and national reconciliation.

This crisis has not been limited to the coastal region; it has extended to the Suwayda Governorate as well, where tensions escalated between the new authority and local actors. The official discourse accused certain groups of seeking to divide the country, while local actors framed their demands as relating to local governance, political rights, and community security. Armed confrontations and accompanying violations have further widened the rift between the center and local society, weakening prospects for trust-building between the state and its citizens.

In the Kurdish regions, the crisis has been even more complex. Since the events in the Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighborhoods of Aleppo, and continuing through ongoing tensions in northern and eastern Syria, the official discourse has tended to view Kurdish political and military actors through a purely security-oriented lens, using labels such as “separatists” or “Qandil affiliates,” rather than addressing the Kurdish issue as a political and national question related to constitutional recognition, collective rights, and democratic self-administration. Critics of this approach argue that such a discourse has obstructed political dialogue and maintained relations between the center and Kurdish regions within a logic of confrontation rather than negotiation and settlement.

Accordingly, the fall of the previous regime did not end the fragmentation that has affected the Syrian territory. Instead, the country has entered a new phase that continues to suffer from multiple centers of influence, persistent societal divisions, and the absence of an inclusive national project capable of accommodating Syria’s diverse components. Effective power remains distributed among multiple actors, trust between the center and the periphery remains weak, and security-based solutions continue to prevail over political ones. As a result, the geographical unity of Syria does not necessarily translate into political or institutional unity.

Thus, the Syrian crisis in its current phase is no longer merely a crisis of political change; it has become a crisis of state structure and political identity. The question is no longer: who governs Damascus? but rather: can any authority, regardless of its ideological foundation, govern Syria through exclusion and monopoly of power in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-sectarian society? Or does stability require a transition toward a democratic, pluralistic, and decentralized model that recognizes diversity as a foundation of the state rather than a threat to its unity?

Second: Who Governs Syria? The Multiplicity of Decision-Making Centers and the Erosion of National Sovereignty

The question in Syria today is no longer concerned solely with who holds power in Damascus, but rather with who truly possesses political decision-making authority. Governance, in its constitutional sense, is not limited to administering institutions or issuing administrative decisions; it denotes the possession of an independent sovereign will capable of shaping both domestic and foreign policy. From this perspective, Syria appears far removed from the model of a state characterized by autonomous national decision-making.

Following the fall of the Ba’athist regime and the rise of the new governing authority, the country did not transition toward the restoration of national sovereignty. Instead, the pattern of interdependence between internal and external factors has persisted, to the extent that Syrian political decision-making in many domains has become more closely tied to regional and international balances of power than to an independent national will. The central authority is no longer able to make decisions in isolation from the calculations of external actors, while other local forces are also linked, to varying degrees, to external alliances and forms of support. As a result, Syria has become an arena where multiple projects and interests intersect.

Accordingly, Syrians alone no longer determine the future of their state. Decision-making centers are now distributed among the governing authority, various local actors, regional stakeholders, and international powers influential in the Syrian file. Decisions related to security, the economy, borders, foreign relations, and even military and administrative arrangements in certain areas are directly or indirectly shaped by these balances of power.

In this context, it is no longer possible to speak of a single political legitimacy monopolizing authority, as is the case in stable states, but rather of competing and overlapping forms of legitimacy, each with its own sources, instruments, and spheres of influence. There exists an official authority managing state institutions from Damascus and seeking to consolidate its political legitimacy; local administrations and de facto authorities that derive legitimacy from on-the-ground governance; military and security actors that influence decision-making by virtue of their control over force; and, in addition, decisive regional and international actors that have become a structural component in shaping Syrian political decisions.

Thus, the Syrian crisis is no longer merely a conflict between internal authorities; it is also a crisis of national sovereignty. Political authority does not fully monopolize decision-making, local actors do not operate independently of their regional and international environment, and external balances have become an integral part of the political system rather than merely an external pressure upon it.

Therefore, the real question is no longer: “Who governs Syria?” but rather: “Who produces Syrian decision-making?” Governance is not measured by the number of institutions controlled by authority, but by its ability to exercise sovereign decision-making freely and independently. As long as national will remains dispersed among internal and external centers of influence, Syria will continue to experience a crisis of statehood more than a crisis of government, and a crisis of sovereignty more than a transitional political crisis.

Third: The State Between Idea and Practice… From the Nation-State to a Politics of Exclusion

The Syrian experience, particularly in the post-Ba’athist period, reveals a profound paradox between the state as a political idea grounded in equal citizenship and the rule of law, and the state as it has historically been practiced as an instrument for monopolizing power and excluding dissenting actors. The Syrian crisis has not been, at its core, a crisis of individuals or governments, but rather a crisis of state structure—one that was established over decades on the basis of extreme centralization, the denial of ethno-religious and sectarian plurality, and the conflation of national unity with the unity of political authority rather than the unity of society.

It was widely hoped that the fall of the previous regime would open an opportunity to reconstitute the Syrian state on a new social contract that recognizes all its components and establishes a democratic pluralistic order based on equal citizenship, decentralization, separation of powers, and respect for rights and freedoms. However, the trajectory of the new phase, according to this reading, has tended toward the reproduction of the same underlying logic that governed the Syrian state for decades, albeit with a different ideological foundation. Instead of Ba’athist nationalism, a jihadist Islamist discourse has emerged, while the mechanisms of governance continue to rely on the monopolization of power, the rejection of political partnership, and the treatment of plurality as a threat to be contained rather than a national reality to be managed.

This approach has been reflected in the way various Syrian regions and communities have been addressed, where security and military logics have prevailed over political engagement. Accusations such as “remnants of the former regime,” “separatists,” and “Qandil affiliates,” among other political and security labels, have been used as justifications for military confrontations, rather than serving as entry points for a comprehensive national dialogue aimed at addressing the root causes of the Syrian crisis.

As a result, the state in its new configuration has failed to become an inclusive framework for all Syrians. Instead, it remains a site of contestation for large segments of society, as political practice, according to this analysis, continues to be governed more by the logic of dominance than by consensus, more by the imposition of authority than by the construction of legitimacy, and more by the subjugation of actors than by their inclusion in decision-making processes.

From this perspective, the Syrian state can no longer be defined solely as an institution that monopolizes the legitimate use of force or administers a territory. Rather, it has become a contested concept regarding its very nature and function. Is the state a centralized authority that imposes its will on a pluralistic society? Or is it a political contract that brings together ethnicities, religions, and sects within a democratic system that guarantees equal partnership? And is national unity achieved through centralization and exclusion, or through recognition of diversity and its transformation into the foundation of political stability?

These questions reveal that the current Syrian crisis is not merely a crisis of governance or political transition, but a crisis in the very definition of the state itself. As long as the state is practiced as an authority of a particular faction or ideology rather than as an inclusive framework for all citizens, it will remain unable to produce a stable national legitimacy. Consequently, the struggle will continue to revolve around the monopolization of power rather than evolving toward the construction of a state in which Syrians collectively participate in governance and in shaping their future.

Fourth: The Challenge of Rebuilding Authority and Reintegration of Syrian Political Geography

Syria, in its current phase, faces a central challenge that goes beyond the mere reunification of institutions or the repair of the state’s administrative structure. It fundamentally concerns the redefinition of the very form of authority within a political geography that remains multi-centered and functionally fragmented. The question of “reintegration” cannot be reduced to a technical or administrative process aimed at unifying governmental structures; rather, it is, at its core, a structural political process that directly affects the nature of the future state, the limits of its sovereignty, and the mechanisms through which its legitimacy is produced.

In the context of the continued de facto plurality of governance levels, the overlap between central and local authorities, and the persistence of regional and international actors as an integral component of political decision-making, the question of rebuilding authority becomes an open inquiry into the possible political model for Syria, rather than a mere project of reproducing a previous model in an adjusted form.

Should “reintegration” be understood as the recentralization of authority under a stronger and more cohesive political center capable of control and domination?
Or does it point toward constitutional recognition of multiple levels of governance, allowing for the distribution of powers within a decentralized framework that accommodates local specificities and mitigates the logic of central monopoly?
Or will the empirical trajectory ultimately impose a hybrid and complex formula in which centralization intersects with forms of political and administrative decentralization, thereby redefining the very concept of the state as a network of interwoven authorities rather than a unitary sovereign entity?

The absence of a clear theoretical and political resolution to these questions renders any discourse on the “unity of the Syrian state” closer to an ongoing project under formation than to a consolidated political reality. Unity, in the Syrian context, is no longer a matter of geography or borders; it has become a question of governance structure, power distribution, and the reconstruction of legitimacy capable of accommodating existing diversity rather than reproducing its crises.

Accordingly, the future of the Syrian state depends on answering a fundamental question that transcends administrative structures and reaches the deeper political foundation of the state: can Syria produce a governance model that recognizes plurality as a constitutive principle, or will it remain trapped in attempts to reproduce a singular center of power under different guises, with ongoing tension between the center and the periphery?

Fifth: Power as a Fluid Process Rather Than a Fixed Entity

In the current Syrian context, power can no longer be understood as a fixed and centralized political entity that can be located within a single institution or governing authority. Instead, it has evolved into a continuous dynamic process of producing influence and redistributing it within an intensely interwoven and complex political space. Governance is no longer exercised from a single vertical center; rather, it operates through multi-layered networks in which formal institutions intersect with local actors, security considerations overlap with political balances, and domestic dynamics intertwine with regional and international interventions.

The instruments of power vary according to the political geography within the country, as patterns of governance and mechanisms of administrative and security control differ from one region to another in accordance with local power balances and the nature of dominant actors on the ground. Likewise, the mechanisms of political and administrative decision-making are continuously reshaped by security and military transformations, which remain a decisive factor in structuring the public sphere and defining the boundaries of political action.

In this context, power can no longer be conceptualized as a closed structure or a unidirectional sovereign apparatus. Rather, it should be understood as a fluid network of relationships that is continuously formed through the interaction of multiple levels: the local level, with its de facto authorities and civil administrations; the regional level, through support, pressure, or direct influence; and the international level, which imposes negotiation frameworks and political and economic balances that reshape Syrian decision-making trajectories.

Accordingly, the Syrian case demands an alternative analytical approach that moves beyond the conventional question of “who governs?” toward a more complex and precise inquiry: “how is power exercised?” and through which networks of actors, institutions, and power balances is political decision-making produced and redistributed? Understanding power in Syria today cannot be separated from grasping its multi-layered network structure, nor from recognizing its fluid and evolving nature, which renders it closer to an ongoing process of negotiation, conflict, and reconfiguration rather than a stable or finalized system of governance.

Conclusion: The State Before Governance

In conclusion, it becomes evident that the Syrian predicament is not merely defined by the multiplicity of actors competing over the exercise of power or the fragmentation of decision-making centers. Rather, it reflects a deeper crisis concerning the very nature of the state itself and its capacity to be defined as a coherent and stable framework for organizing society and producing political legitimacy.

What is unfolding in Syria today cannot be understood simply as an incomplete transition from one political system to another. It should instead be interpreted as a moment of reconstitution of the very concept of the state, in which its boundaries, functions, and sources of legitimacy remain subject to ongoing contestation. The relationships between center and periphery, between society and authority, and between domestic and external actors remain structurally unresolved and lack a stable institutional settlement.

For this reason, Syria stands not only at a political crossroads concerning who governs and who opposes, but at a far deeper and more consequential crossroads concerning the question of the state itself: What is the Syrian state today? Is it a unified sovereign entity capable of monopolizing decision-making? Or is it a fluid structure in which power is distributed across multiple levels of actors? Or is it still in an open-ended process of redefinition, yet to settle on its final institutional form?

From this perspective, the question that best encapsulates this study becomes more precise and profound than ever:

Syria at the Crossroads of the State: Who Governs Whom? And How?