By: Dr. Adnan Bozan

The transformation the world is experiencing is no longer defined merely by the growing number of wars, but by a fundamental change in the very nature of the international system. The boundaries separating war from peace, the local from the regional and international, and the military from the economic have become increasingly fragile. Conflicts are no longer managed by armies alone, but also through energy, food, technology, sanctions, maritime routes, cyberattacks, and hybrid warfare. The real question, therefore, is no longer whether we are facing another world war, but whether the world has already entered a phase of reshaping the balance of power, the rules, and the borders that have governed the international system over recent decades.

First: The World Is Moving from Relative Stability into an Open-Ended Transitional Phase

The international system is no longer governed by a single center of power capable of controlling all crises, yet it has not reached a stable multipolar order with clear rules for managing competition. We are facing a transitional phase between an order that is eroding and another that has not yet been born. In such periods, the risks of miscalculation increase, as major powers test one another's limits while regional powers seek to expand their room for maneuver.

For this reason, current crises should not be viewed as isolated events, but as components of a broader process whose defining feature is the redistribution of global power.

Second: The European Risk Lies Not Only in the Possibility of Direct War

September 2026 witnessed growing European concerns about the extension of the Russian-Ukrainian war into NATO's security environment. A NATO fighter jet shot down a drone that had entered Lithuanian airspace, while European intelligence agencies warned of the possibility of Russian escalation or attempts to test the limits of Western deterrence. At the same time, other assessments indicate that Moscow may intensify hybrid warfare—from sabotage and cyberattacks to attacks against critical infrastructure—without this necessarily meaning that a large-scale Russian attack on a NATO member has become imminent or inevitable.

This is where the real danger lies: war can begin affecting states before military war itself actually begins. Increased defense spending, the protection of energy networks, the rebuilding of military industries, and the securing of ports, undersea cables, and critical infrastructure all indicate Europe's movement toward a long-term security-oriented economy.

Third: Modern Warfare Sometimes Begins with Corridors and Markets

Control over territory is no longer the only measure of power. Straits, ports, pipelines, undersea cables, and supply chains have become integral components of national security.

The disruptions in the Middle East during 2026 demonstrated how the closure or disruption of strategic corridors can rapidly turn into a global crisis. The International Monetary Fund noted that disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz produced a major shock in energy markets, with roughly 25 to 30 percent of global oil supplies and a significant share of liquefied natural gas trade normally passing through the strait. The rerouting of shipping also increases transportation and insurance costs while placing pressure on trade and food markets.

Economic geography has therefore become part of military geography.

Fourth: The Middle East Is Not a Collection of Separate Wars, but an Interconnected Conflict System

Iran, Israel, the Gulf, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Türkiye, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean are not entirely separate files; rather, they intersect within a single interconnected security system.

An escalation in one of these arenas can rapidly alter the calculations of the others. The danger, therefore, lies not only in the expansion of any particular war, but also in the possibility that crises will spill from one arena into another, transforming the region into a network of conflicts that becomes increasingly difficult to separate or contain.

For this reason, the Middle East may be among the regions most affected by any global transition from a system centered on deterrence toward one defined by the redistribution of power.

Fifth: Iraq Represents a Test of the Meaning of Statehood and Sovereignty

The Iraqi question is no longer simply about the existence of armed factions, but about who possesses the state's strategic decision-making authority: the government, armed forces and factions, or regional networks with which they intersect.

If Baghdad succeeds in consolidating the state's monopoly over weapons and its authority over decisions of war and peace, Iraq could enter a period of greater institutional stability. If, however, strategic decision-making remains divided between state institutions and armed forces connected to regional conflicts, Iraq will remain vulnerable to becoming an arena for settling disputes that extend far beyond its own borders.

Iraqi sovereignty, therefore, cannot be measured solely by the security of its borders, but also by the state's ability to monopolize political and military decision-making within its territory.

Sixth: Syria Will Remain One of the Major Arenas for Reshaping the Middle East

Syria's importance lies above all in its geographic position. It sits at the intersection of Türkiye, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and the Mediterranean, and therefore its future is not determined in Damascus alone. It is also influenced by developments in Ankara, Baghdad, Tehran, Tel Aviv, Moscow, and Washington.

During periods of regional transformation, fragile states can become more important rather than less, because political and security vacuums attract external powers, while strategic corridors, resources, and border regions become focal points of competition.

Syria's future, therefore, will be part of the struggle over the shape of the next Middle East, rather than merely the outcome of the Syrian internal crisis.

Seventh: Türkiye Faces an Increasingly Complex Geopolitical Equation

Türkiye lies at the intersection of Europe, the Black Sea, and the Middle East, and occupies a central position in questions of energy, trade corridors, strategic straits, and regional security.

Its future, therefore, will not be determined solely by tensions with Greece or Israel, but also by its position within the Russian-European rivalry, the future of the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean, and the evolving networks of energy and transportation.

The Eastern Mediterranean could become an arena where competition over energy, water, maritime boundaries, and military alliances increasingly intersects.

Yet existing tensions should not be transformed into predetermined outcomes. The existence of causes for conflict does not necessarily mean that war will occur, just as conflicting alliances do not eliminate the instruments of deterrence, negotiation, and containment.

Eighth: Kurdistan May Enter a New Phase if the Regional Structure Changes

Major international crises do not automatically produce new states, but they often reopen questions that had previously been frozen or marginalized.

This is where the significance of the Kurdish question becomes particularly important.

If relations among Türkiye, Iraq, Syria, and Iran change, and if alliances and security arrangements in the Middle East are reconfigured, it will become increasingly difficult to keep the Kurdish question outside discussions about the future of the region.

But opportunity does not guarantee an outcome. Crises open windows; they do not build projects.

If the Kurds enter a period of international transformation divided among themselves, their cause may become a bargaining instrument in the conflicts of others. But if they enter it with a clear political vision, institutional representation, a negotiable political project, and the ability to engage with international law and interests, regional transformation could become a genuine political opportunity.

Here lies the distinction between a people that possesses a cause and a people that possesses a project.

Ninth: The Economy and Food Have Become Part of Global Security

War may begin on the battlefield, but it reaches ordinary people through prices. Rising energy costs increase transportation and production costs. Higher fertilizer prices raise the cost of agriculture. Disruptions to maritime routes increase shipping and insurance costs. The shock then moves from the port to the factory, from the factory to the market, and from the market to the household.

In August 2026, the Food and Agriculture Organization's Food Price Index rose by 1.9 percent compared with July, while the cereal price index increased by 2.2 percent. The organization linked these developments to supply concerns, weather conditions, geopolitical tensions, and disruptions to trade.

Yet a food crisis does not begin when food runs out. It begins when food exists but becomes economically inaccessible. At that point, energy, food, water, medicine, and fertilizers become components of national security rather than merely economic concerns.

Tenth: In the Twenty-First Century, Power Has Become the Capacity to Withstand Shocks

The most powerful state is not necessarily the state with the largest army, but the state capable of continuing to function when exposed to major shocks.

Who can produce energy? Who can secure food? Who controls technology? Who can protect its networks? Who possesses resilient supply chains? Who can finance a war or withstand sanctions? And who can preserve the cohesion of its society?

These questions may become more important than the size of a military arsenal alone. Modern power has become a network combining the military, economy, technology, energy, information, and social resilience.

Eleventh: The World Is Moving Toward a More Competitive Multipolarity

The next world will not necessarily be a new version of the Cold War. Russia is seeking to expand its security sphere; China is strengthening its economic, technological, and strategic presence; the United States is seeking to preserve its ability to shape the international system; Europe is searching for a more autonomous security framework; while regional powers are attempting to exploit emerging spaces of opportunity.

We may therefore move from a world with a dominant center toward a form of competitive multipolarity: states cooperating economically while competing in security matters, aligning on one issue while disagreeing on another. Such a system may be more flexible, but it is also less predictable.

Twelfth: The United Nations Will Not Disappear, but Its Ability to Manage Competition May Face Greater Pressure

The central issue is not whether international institutions will survive or disappear, but whether they will be able to enforce their rules when those rules collide with the interests of major powers. As a result, greater reliance may develop on bilateral and regional agreements, understandings among major centers of power, and temporary security arrangements.

A new international order, if one emerges, will not be created at a single conference. It will develop gradually through wars, agreements, alliances, economic crises, and technological transformations.

Thirteenth: The Most Dangerous Scenario Is Unintended Escalation

No major power may actually want a world war, yet a chain of limited decisions can still produce an escalation that becomes increasingly difficult to contain.

An aerial incident, a limited strike, a retaliatory response, mobilization, an attack on a military base, the involvement of one ally, followed by the involvement of another—this is how a crisis that might initially have been contained can become an autonomous cycle of escalation.

The greatest danger in the coming phase may therefore not be the decision to go to war itself, but the loss of the ability to control the trajectory of escalation.

Fourteenth: The New World Will Not Be Shaped by War Alone

War may destroy an existing order, but it does not guarantee the emergence of a more stable one. It may weaken borders, but it does not guarantee more just borders. It may open a window for a people, but it does not guarantee that the people will possess the capacity to seize that opportunity.

The decisive factor in major transformations is therefore not the scale of disorder alone, but who possesses the project, the institutions, and the political capacity to negotiate when the pieces of the international system begin to be rearranged.

This is where the Kurdish question acquires particular significance. International transformations do not hand peoples a ready-made future; they open possibilities before them. Their political organization and institutional capacity determine whether those possibilities can be transformed into reality or lost amid the conflicts of others.

Conclusion: The World Is Not Approaching Its End, but the End of an Era

We are not necessarily witnessing the end of the world, nor can it be asserted that a comprehensive world war will erupt, that the borders of particular states will collapse, or that specific powers will prevail. What can be said with greater confidence is that the international system is undergoing a profound period of strategic reassessment.

Power is no longer merely military; it has become energy, food, technology, transportation corridors, data, economic capacity, and resilience. Sovereignty is no longer simply control over borders; it also means the ability to protect the state, its people, its economy, and its critical infrastructure. War does not always begin with a formal declaration. Alliances are no longer as fixed as they once were. Borders may remain legally unchanged while the balance of power that gives them political meaning undergoes profound transformation.

The coming years, therefore, may not necessarily be years of world war, but they may be years of profound restructuring of the international system.

The real historical question is not: Who will win the next war?

It is: Who will be prepared when the world begins writing its new rules?

In moments of great transformation, it is not enough for peoples to possess a cause; they need a project. A project alone is not enough; it requires institutions. Institutions alone are not enough; they require the political capacity to transform rights into negotiating power and a meaningful position within the emerging international order.

And this, precisely, is where the difference begins between those who wait for history and those who prepare themselves to shape it.

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