By Dr. Adnan Bozan

The developments unfolding in Syria can no longer be understood solely through the lens of the internal struggle for power or through discussions about rebuilding state institutions following the fall of the former regime. Rather, they call for a deeper analysis that moves beyond the current political landscape to examine the nature of the geopolitical transformations that may redraw the country’s map and redefine its spheres of influence. The issue is no longer confined to the identity of the new ruler or the form of the political system to be established in Damascus. It has become closely tied to the future of Syria’s geography and the redistribution of power and sovereignty among regional and local centres, amid the intersecting interests of the United States, Turkey, and Israel. From this perspective, the current developments cannot be separated from the possibility that Syria may be moving from a phase of conflict over who governs the country to one in which the country itself is being reshaped.

In an earlier analysis, I pointed out that Syria might be heading towards a new military confrontation, and that the next war would not necessarily remain an internal conflict. Regional and international calculations could become intertwined, turning such a confrontation into an entry point for reorganising spheres of influence. I had also anticipated that southern Syria would be among the first regions to undergo profound transformations, with repercussions potentially extending to the outskirts of Damascus and possibly leading to a change in the capital’s position as the country’s political and administrative centre. Today, amid growing leaks concerning the relocation of government and sovereign institutions to other Syrian cities, certain indications deserve closer examination. Among them is a report published by a Turkish newspaper, citing an unnamed Syrian government official, which suggested that the government was considering relocating some ministries to Aleppo and the Ministry of Defence to Hama. Although this information alone does not amount to an official decision, its political significance deserves to be examined within the broader context of the transformations taking place across the country.

In my assessment, references to Aleppo and Hama should not be treated merely as an administrative measure or an attempt to ease the burden on the capital. They should instead be considered within the broader possibility of redistributing centres of power across Syria. Damascus, which for decades served as the centre of political, military, and security decision-making, may face a different reality if developments in its southern surroundings bring about geographical and security changes that diminish the central government’s ability to exercise its authority. From this perspective, relocating ministries to Aleppo and the Ministry of Defence to Hama could form part of wider transitional arrangements. Meanwhile, Homs emerges as the most significant geographical and political candidate to become the new seat of government, should the anticipated transformations ultimately lead to a restructuring of the Syrian state.

Homs occupies a strategic position at the heart of Syria’s geography. It connects Damascus with the coastal region, Hama, and Aleppo, while also serving as an important link between the country’s central, northern, and western regions. Consequently, the possibility of transferring the centre of power there, should Damascus become unable to function as an effective political and security capital, cannot be dismissed. The redistribution of institutions among Aleppo, Hama, and other cities could ultimately pave the way for Homs to become the political centre of a new Syrian state with a Sunni majority, while other regions adopt different forms of administration, governance, and security affiliation. I do not present this as an announced decision or an established fact, but rather as a scenario inferred from Homs’s geographical position and the nature of the potential transformations in the structure of the state.

Southern Syria, meanwhile, represents one of the most sensitive arenas in the potential reconfiguration of influence, given its direct connection to Israeli security calculations. Israel does not approach the south merely as a border area requiring temporary military arrangements. Its actions, security demands, and interventions on the ground raise the possibility of imposing a long-term political and security reality, whose implications could extend beyond the concept of a buffer zone to redefining the nature of the authority permitted to exercise influence in that region. In this context, the future of Suwayda, Daraa, Quneitra, and the southern outskirts of Damascus becomes part of a single equation that cannot be separated from the regional and international understandings concerning Syria’s future.

The scenario I place before this emerging picture is the possibility of the formation of a Druze entity in southern Syria, enjoying broad political and security autonomy under the direct or indirect protection of Israel. Such an arrangement could gradually remove parts of the south from Damascus’s effective sphere of control. Depending on the geographical and security boundaries imposed by future developments, this arrangement could extend to areas surrounding the capital, particularly Jaramana and districts south of Damascus. This does not mean that these areas have already become part of a separate entity, nor that any documented agreement has determined their fate. Rather, their geographical location and local demographic composition make them relevant to any potential plan to reorganise southern Syria and the capital’s surroundings.

The significance of this possibility becomes clearer when considered in the context of American diplomatic contacts concerning relations between Damascus and Tel Aviv. The meeting between US President Donald Trump and Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa in Washington, together with contacts concerning security arrangements between Syria and Israel, places the Syrian file within a broader negotiating process in which security and political considerations intersect. From this perspective, I raise the possibility of undisclosed understandings or arrangements being negotiated behind the scenes, potentially extending beyond the issue of halting military escalation to the redistribution of spheres of influence. As for the claim that a fully concluded secret agreement exists between al-Sharaa and Israel, under American auspices, providing for the placement of the south and parts of Damascus under the influence of an Israeli-protected Druze entity, this remains a possible political inference within the framework of this analysis, not an established fact supported by a document or official announcement. Nevertheless, the absence of an official announcement does not diminish the importance of examining the developments that could lead to such a scenario.

At the same time, the future of Syria’s coastal region cannot be separated from the process of restructuring the state. Latakia and Tartus constitute a geographically and strategically distinctive area, with particular demographic, economic, and military characteristics. Their location on the Mediterranean coast also gives them significance that extends beyond the boundaries of local administration. From this perspective, the possibility emerges that these two governorates could become a special region with extensive administrative, political, and security powers, perhaps under arrangements granting it de facto autonomy from the central government while maintaining formal constitutional and economic ties with the Syrian state. The coast would thus become more than a region with local administration; it could form part of a system of territories among which effective power is distributed according to domestic balances and external guarantees.

Northern Syria, particularly the Kurdish regions, represents the issue most closely connected to Turkish strategic calculations and the future of the Kurdish question in the region. Turkey does not view this issue solely through the lens of preserving Syria’s territorial unity. Rather, it approaches it from the perspective of its national security and its opposition to the emergence of an independent Kurdish entity possessing political, military, and geographical foundations capable of developing further. Accordingly, any future arrangement for a Kurdish region in northern Syria is likely to become a subject of negotiation among Ankara, Washington, and Damascus, and will remain closely tied to Turkish conditions concerning the Kurdish political and military structures.

Within this framework, I believe that one possible scenario involves the establishment of a Kurdish region with self-administration and constitutional and administrative powers, while remaining within a political and security framework whose boundaries are influenced by Turkish power. This could be accompanied by the dismantling of the armed structure of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the reformulation of the Kurdish political project in accordance with the new regional arrangements. Such a process might be presented as a settlement of the Kurdish question in Syria. Its fundamental dilemma, however, lies in the possibility that national and political demands could be reduced to administrative rights confined within the borders of the Syrian state, without full recognition of the Kurds’ national and constitutional rights.

This is why developments concerning Abdullah Öcalan and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party carry significance that extends beyond the question of ending armed conflict. Negotiations with Turkey and discussions about disarmament and the party’s future restructuring may form part of a broader process aimed at redefining the Kurdish file across the region. Such a process could enable Ankara to achieve its security objectives while simultaneously opening the way for new arrangements in northern Syria. Reports concerning Öcalan’s status on İmralı Island and his potential role in the coming phase should also be examined within the broader political context, rather than through the limited descriptions commonly used to characterise his legal or detention status. The fundamental issue is the nature of the role he may play in reshaping the Kurdish movement and bringing the armed conflict to an end.

Here, however, a distinction must be made between ending armed activity and ending the Kurdish question. The former is a security and political measure; the latter cannot be achieved through a decision or an understanding between governments. The Kurdish question is rooted in national, historical, political, and constitutional rights that cannot be reduced to the issue of weapons, nor can it be transformed into a mere security file managed by Ankara according to its own interests. Therefore, the possibility of establishing a Kurdish region under Turkish influence in exchange for ending the armed project raises a fundamental question about the nature of any proposed settlement: will it open the way to recognising and constitutionally safeguarding Kurdish rights, or will it serve as a means of containing the Kurdish national project and redefining its limits in accordance with regional power balances?

When these issues are considered together, the importance of the American role in managing the contradictions among Ankara, Tel Aviv, and Damascus becomes clear. The United States seeks to establish political and security balances that preserve its interests and influence while preventing Syria from becoming an open arena for regional confrontation. Turkey seeks to reorganise northern Syria and eliminate what it perceives as threats associated with the Kurdish military presence. Israel, meanwhile, is working to impose new security equations in the south, while the current Syrian government needs international recognition, political and economic support, and the consolidation of its authority. These intersecting interests could create opportunities for gradual understandings under which each party receives guarantees or gains in a particular region in exchange for concessions on other issues.

From this perspective, it is possible to envisage a new Syrian political map divided into four principal spheres: a southern region with a distinct Druze character and security arrangements linked to Israel; a coastal region with a special regional status; a Kurdish north governed through an administrative and political framework shaped by understandings with Turkey; and a central inland region with a Sunni majority, whose seat of government could move from Damascus to Homs, while military and administrative institutions are distributed among Hama, Aleppo, and other cities. This scenario does not necessarily imply the emergence of four independent states or the drawing of new international borders. Rather, it could take the form of regions enjoying varying degrees of self-government and security autonomy, while the Syrian state remains legally unified in appearance but fragmented in terms of its actual centres of decision-making.

This is where the most important point in interpreting current developments lies: the potential partition of Syria may not come through an explicit political declaration or a publicly announced international agreement. Instead, it could emerge through the gradual imposition of accumulated realities, beginning with security arrangements, evolving into local administrations and expanded political powers, and ultimately resulting in entities tied to external powers through guarantees and strategic relationships. At that point, Syria’s borders may remain unchanged, and a single flag may continue to fly over official institutions, yet military, security, and political decision-making will be distributed among multiple centres. Damascus may no longer be able to exercise its authority equally across the entire Syrian territory.

In this context, the leaked reports concerning the relocation of ministries and sovereign institutions acquire additional significance, particularly the report published by the Turkish newspaper on 3 November 2026, which referred to the transfer of several ministries to Aleppo and the Ministry of Defence to Hama, alongside other circulating proposals concerning the distribution of state institutions among different Syrian cities and regions. If these reports prove accurate, they open the door to an interpretation that goes beyond the administrative reorganisation of government and points towards the possible redistribution of centres of power. The question is no longer simply why a ministry might be moved from Damascus to Aleppo or Hama. The more fundamental question is what kind of state is being prepared through this institutional redistribution, and whether it represents a prelude to transferring the seat of government to Homs, amid the changing position of Damascus within the new security and political equation.

Taken as a whole, what I see in these developments is the possibility that Syria may move away from the model of a centralised state in which the capital monopolises political and military decision-making, towards a model characterised by multiple centres of power and spheres of influence. Under such an arrangement, the central government could retain control over some institutions, while other regions enjoy different political and security powers and arrangements, shaped by the interaction of local interests and external guarantees. This transformation could pave the way for de facto partition without requiring any formal declaration, because the division of decision-making may precede the division of territory, and the fragmentation of sovereignty may occur before the maps themselves are changed.

Accordingly, the proposed relocation of ministries to Aleppo and Hama, the possibility of transferring the seat of government to Homs, and the future of the south, the coast, and the Kurdish north should not be read as a collection of separate developments. They should instead be understood as elements of a single landscape in which geography intersects with politics, security with international interests, and local settlements with regional projects. Syria may be approaching a phase in which it is not merely the governing authority that changes, but also the very nature of the state, the boundaries of its sovereignty, and the distribution of its centres of decision-making.

What is most troubling about this trajectory is not simply the possibility of changing the capital or establishing new regions. It is the risk that Syria could become a space in which external powers redistribute influence without granting Syrians a genuine role in determining the future of their own country. A state whose geography is reshaped through understandings reached by others may retain its name, borders, and flag, yet gradually lose its ability to make sovereign decisions independently.

We may never witness an official declaration announcing the partition of Syria. Yet we may witness the consolidation of its de facto fragmentation through multiple regions and centres of influence, each with its own security and political arrangements and external affiliations. At that point, the question will no longer be who governs Damascus, or where government ministries are relocated. The real question will be: what remains of the Syrian state itself? Will Syria continue to be a single state governed by one sovereign decision-making authority, or will it become a geographically unified country on the map, yet politically and practically fragmented?

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