By: Dr. Adnan Bozan

Federalism: From State Crisis to a New National Architecture

At a time when the traditional meanings of sovereignty have collapsed, and the certainties surrounding the modern nation-state have been deeply shaken, Syria stands at a crossroads unlike any it has faced before. It is no longer a question of who rules, but how we are ruled; not about who constitutes the majority, but who has the right to exist. The debate is no longer centered on territorial unity, but rather on the very essence of the state—its legitimacy, foundations, and moral right to govern.

Modern Syria, since its inception, has been a political entity lacking balanced foundations. Born from the womb of a mandate, subjected to colonial structures, it was later inherited by centralized military regimes. Instead of being built upon an inclusive, representative social base, the state was reduced to an authoritarian power that monopolized decision-making and engineered society to fit its interests—not its genuine diversity. From the very moment of independence, the Syrian national project was placed under the guardianship of a lethal trinity: ethnic centralism, security authoritarianism, and identity absolutism.

Within this fragile structure, the state did not protect diversity—it suppressed it. It did not manage difference—it suffocated it. The Syrian state was thus built on the idea that unity can only be achieved by erasing difference, and that citizenship is valid only once the individual renounces their original identity in favor of one imposed from above: “Arab,” “Baathist,” “Pan-Arabist,” “Unionist,” or “Islamist.” These terms were emptied of their meaning and turned into hollow slogans, disconnected from people’s lived experiences, history, and aspirations.

When the great eruption of 2011 arrived, it was not merely a political uprising, but a profound anthropological revolution against the very structure of the state—against accumulated lies, against the reduction of human beings to stereotypical identities that did not represent them. What happened was not a Kurdish revolution, nor a sectarian or regional revolt, but an explosion of long-suppressed identities and a sweeping awakening of peoples who suddenly found themselves outside the center, demanding visibility and governance that reflects who they are—not what is imposed upon them.

Within this context, federalism is not simply an administrative solution, as some may imagine. It is a philosophical and ethical redefinition of the state itself. It is not just the political distribution of power, but a profound correction of how the state views itself and its citizens. It is a new discourse that acknowledges the homeland not as a monolithic unit, but as a mosaic of peoples, languages, religions, and cultures. Recognition of this plurality is the first condition for building a stable and legitimate state.

Only federalism allows for a redistribution of power that prevents monopoly, enhances local governance, and dismantles the centralism that has turned Damascus into a state above the state—a city that devours the country. Only federalism grants every component of the Syrian people the right to manage its own affairs without being asked to relinquish its language, memory, or culture.

Speaking of federalism is not a call for secession—it is a proposal for balanced inclusion. It is not praise for fragmentation, but a vision to construct a plural unity that reflects Syria’s geography and history. It is the only model that does not deny reality but recognizes and organizes it. A model that does not depend on coercive loyalties but builds voluntary allegiance rooted in justice, participation, and equality.

Experience has proven that the Syrian state, in its current form, is no longer viable. The center is incapable of managing the peripheries, and the peripheries are no longer willing to submit. The world around us is changing. Today, states are not measured by their centralism but by their capacity to manage diversity—not suppress it—and to embrace identities, not fragment them. In this sense, federalism is not a step backward, but a leap into the future. It is not a return to tribalism, but the birth of a new social contract written between equals—not between ruler and ruled.

We do not propose federalism as an alternative to the nation, but as a project to save it. Either we reengineer the state in a way that allows all Syrians to be true partners, or we remain prisoners of a homeland crumbling from within, losing its people day after day.

This is where the new story begins:
Not from the center, but from the margins.
Not from a singular identity, but from everyone’s right to be who they are.
And only here may we finally find a homeland unafraid of its diversity—but built upon it.

First: Federalism Is Not Division... But Its Opposite

In the prevailing political discourse, especially in countries accustomed to strict centralized rule, the concept of federalism is often reduced to a ready-made accusation: “division,” “secession,” or even “the dismantling of the homeland.” It is enough for the word to be mentioned in some debates for the specter of national fragmentation, civil war scenarios, and maps torn apart to be invoked. But this perception does not truly reflect the nature of federalism as a political system; rather, it reveals a deep crisis in the understanding of the state and a chronic phobia of plurality and diversity.

Federalism, in its philosophical and political origin, does not mean fragmentation but sharing; it does not establish division but puts an end to it; it does not demolish the idea of the state but redefines it on more just, representative, and participatory foundations. It is a new architecture of the social contract, built on recognizing difference rather than denying it, on organizing power rather than monopolizing it.

1. A Centralized State Is Not Always a Symbol of Unity:

Let us first dismantle this false binary that links centralization with unity, and decentralization with division. Political reality clearly shows that many strictly centralized states—both historically and currently—have been threatened with collapse, not due to a lack of centralization but because of an excess of denial. When the state turns a deaf ear to the demands of its diverse components, and imposes a single identity on a rich and complex diversity, explosion becomes only a matter of time. Former Yugoslavia, Sudan, and more recently Ethiopia, are all examples of states fractured from within—not because they recognized diversity, but because they denied its existence.

On the other hand, countries that have adopted federalism—even in post-war or forcibly founded moments—have managed to transform this system into a tool of unity rather than division. Germany, for example, emerged from the ruins of World War II not as an oppressive centralized state, but as a federal union distributing power between the center and the Länder (states). Instead of federalism paving the way for Bavarian or Saxon secession, it became one of the reasons for Germany’s stability, economic strength, and entrenched democracy.

Switzerland, despite its small geographic size and linguistic and ethnic complexity, chose centuries ago the confederal then federal model to guarantee real representation for the cantons and to maintain civil peace within a society speaking four official languages and belonging to multiple religious sects. Not a single Swiss citizen has demanded separation because the federal state did not impose a forced center but granted a fully integrated role in sovereignty.

The United States is the classical example of a federal system founded from the outset and transformed into a great power without forfeiting its unity. Yet it has never abolished the distinctiveness of its states; it has considered this plurality a source of strength rather than weakness.

2. Federalism: From Logic of Control to Logic of Partnership

What centralized regimes fear is not “division” in the geographical sense, but the loss of absolute control. The centralized system grants narrow elites in the capital the power to control all aspects of political, economic, and cultural life from above, without accountability. Federalism, however, undermines this monopoly and returns power to the people in their regions—those who truly understand their challenges and priorities.

In this sense, federalism is not merely an administrative system but a philosophy of governance. It expresses the conviction that the state is not an apparatus above society but an instrument of it. That the homeland is not built from the top down but from the base upward. That recognizing sub-identities is not a concession but a prerequisite for the birth of an inclusive, open, and plural national identity.

3. Fear of Federalism: An Extension of the Denial Complex

When some demonize federalism, they often do not defend the state but their privileges within it. They fear the state transforming from an exclusive tool in their hands into a participatory space where they lose superiority. They do not see federalism as a guarantee of pluralism but as a threat to their hegemony. The paradox is that what is presented as a defense of “unity” is actually a defense of centralism; and what is condemned as a “division” project is, in essence, a project of justice.

4. Federalism Is Not Just a Right for Components... But a Benefit for the Entire State

Adopting a federal system does not serve only the “minority” components but benefits the entire state and all its parts. When every part of the homeland feels it has a voice, a right to decision-making, and the capacity to manage its own affairs, the chances of rebellion and violence decrease, and the sense of belonging increases. No one belongs to an entity that excludes them; belonging is not imposed but built on participation and recognition.

In the Syrian context, where the centralized state has failed to establish an inclusive social contract, and where a single identity was imposed on a diverse society, returning to centralism cannot be a solution but rather a continuation of the crisis. Federalism in Syria does not mean dividing the state but saving it from erosion and collapse. It is the only formula that allows every component to exist without feeling threatened or dissolved—a formula that embraces history, respects geography, and transforms diversity from a burden into a wealth.

In Conclusion: Unity Is Not the Opposite of Plurality... But Its Organized Fruit

Yes, federalism is not division... but its true opposite. It is a rational and practical response to the danger of fragmentation and the path to turning the fear of difference into constructive energy. Above all, it expresses a new awareness: that the homeland is strongest not when imposed from above, but when built from the base through consensus and partnership.

Because times have changed, and because peoples no longer accept being ruled from afar, the future of any state will no longer be measured by the number of security agencies or the strictness of the center, but by its ability to accommodate plurality, respect the local, and build a unity where no single center monopolizes power but where a just structure emerges from diversity.

Secondly: Syrian Pluralism Demands a Decentralized Solution

Syria, unlike anything seen before, is not merely a geographical spot drawn on a map; it is a complex and composite embodiment of a long history of ethnic, religious, and cultural intertwinements. It is a country that cannot be represented by a single title, nor can it be reduced to one ethnicity, one dominant sect, or one official language. From the Jazira plains to the coast, from Jabal al-Arab to Wadi al-Nasara, identities coexist side by side, affiliations intertwine, and layers of diverse collective memory overlap. Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians, Syriacs, Armenians, Turkmens, Circassians, Yazidis, and others… all are not “minorities” on the margin of a presumed “majority” identity, but original partners in shaping Syrian history and forming its deep social fabric.

While this pluralism has at times been a source of richness, diversity, and prosperity, the centralized state that emerged after independence — and later entrenched under the rule of the former Baath regime — sought to suppress this diversity and transform it into a threat. Centralization was not only an administrative choice but an ideological project that excluded the different, marginalized subordinate identities, and imposed a singular conception of homeland and citizenship.

1. Nationality versus Pluralism: Failures of the Centralized State
   The Arab nationalist project, despite its progressive and unifying slogans, gradually slipped into a “nation-state” model with a single identity, resulting in explicit denial of the rights of non-Arab Syrians. The Kurds, as the country’s second largest ethnic group, were denied citizenship, their language was banned from education, their cultural symbols persecuted, and the names of their villages and towns changed in an attempt to “Arabize” both geography and history. The Assyrians and Syriacs, who have preserved some of the world’s oldest languages, were forced to learn under curricula that do not even acknowledge their existence. The Armenians, who sought refuge in Syria after the Ottoman genocide, faced cultural and political marginalization despite their significant contributions to modern Syrian life.

Religiously and sectarian-wise, a policy of “controlled integration” prevailed: the state declared its sectarian neutrality in discourse but managed sectarian balances within security and political structures to serve the central authority. For example, the Alawites were caught between societal suspicion about their national loyalty and exploitation by the regime as a “protective belt” for its authoritarian structure. The Druze, despite their religious and historical particularities, were denied real space to manage their affairs and marginalized within decision-making circles. Meanwhile, the Sunni majority was consistently accused of “Islamist tendencies,” leading to chronic tensions with the former regime, culminating in horrific massacres such as the Hama events in 1982 and worsening after the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011.

Today, the new authority in Damascus is essentially a reproduction of the same mindset that ruled the country for decades, but wearing a different mask. Instead of the Baath Party, it manifests the same exclusionary and rigid ideology, this time cloaked in an Islamist discourse no less authoritarian than its predecessor.

1. Pluralism Is Not an Emergency Condition... but a Foundational Structure
   Syrian pluralism is not the result of “emergency conditions” or “foreign conspiracies,” as some propagate, but a deeply rooted historical reality that predates the modern state by centuries. It did not begin with Sykes-Picot; it was present in Mamluk Aleppo, in the Jazira, in the Kurdish mountains, and in the Syrian desert. Therefore, any attempt to deny this reality or contain it within a singular central narrative is nothing but political illusion and a postponed national suicide.

In light of this reality, no political solution in Syria can succeed without deep recognition that the country is genuinely plural, not metaphorically so. This recognition must not remain merely moral or rhetorical but must be translated into a constitutional political structure that respects pluralism as a foundational value rather than a threat to be neutralized.

1. Decentralization: From Pluralism to Partnership
   Political decentralization — foremost among which is the federal system — is not an “administrative detail” but a comprehensive governance philosophy that reshapes the relationship between the state and its citizens. It means transferring decision-making from the center to the periphery, from a narrow elite to local communities. It allows each component to express its specificity without threatening national unity but rather reconstructing that unity through acknowledgment of diversity rather than denial.

Federalism does not mean division but organization. It does not call for independent states but for establishing a shared, multi-level state. It is a formula leading to a new social contract that recognizes the Kurds’ right to education in their language, the Assyrians’ right to preserve their heritage, the Alawites’ and Druze’s right to freely manage their religious and cultural affairs, and Christians’ right to live without fear of extremism or the absence of a civil state.

Decentralization does not weaken the state; it fortifies it. It reduces internal conflicts, lowers sectarian and ethnic tensions, and enables each group to feel like a partner rather than a hostage. It gives everyone a reason to belong because it is built from the grassroots, not imposed from above.

1. A New Syria Cannot Be Built from the Ashes of Centralization
   After more than a decade since the Syrian revolution, the fall of the former Baath regime, the rise of Islamist authority, hundreds of thousands of victims, millions of refugees, and entire cities destroyed, it is no longer possible to speak of “returning” to the pre-2011 situation. The centralized model has proven utterly incapable of representing Syrians, managing their diversity, or providing a sustainable governance model. Any attempt to reproduce it — even under new names — is merely postponing an inevitable explosion.

If a new Syria is to be born, it will not be built from the ashes of the center but from the mosaic of its regions. It will not be governed by a single security-minded authority but by multiple minds believing in partnership and pluralism. It will not be based on excluding the “other” but on empowering them.

Conclusion: No Unity Without Justice... And No Justice Without Decentralization
Syrian pluralism is not a “problem” requiring security solutions or forced unifying rhetoric but a foundational reality on which any future national project must be built. Decentralization, as a form of political justice, is not a concession from the “center” but an acknowledgment that Syria will only be viable if it accepts itself as it is: a diverse, rich, vast country unsuitable for rule by a single voice or a single identity.

Federalism, or any advanced form of decentralization, is not a Kurdish demand or a matter exclusive to minorities but a national public interest. It is the only guarantee of true Syrian unity, not imagined unity. A just state is not built on denial but recognition; not on exclusion but participation; not on domination but balance.

Therefore, Syrian pluralism can only tolerate one solution: a decentralized, democratic solution that guarantees rights and establishes a homeland worthy of all its components… without exception.

Third: The Centralization of the Syrian State Is the Mother of All Crises

Since the moment of independence in 1946, the Syrian state entered a frantic race to build a modern state model. However, this construction was based on a strict centralizing logic that gradually, then rapidly, established the monopoly of power, wealth, and decision-making in the hands of the capital, Damascus, and in the hands of a narrow elite revolving around political and military authority. This centralization was not merely a technical administrative choice that could be justified within the founding stages; rather, it transformed into a deeply rooted institutional structure and a political ideology that sought to impose "unity" from above by reducing differences, marginalizing diversity, containing the periphery, and even repressing it when necessary.

With the Baath Party’s coup on March 8, 1963, centralization evolved from a structural phenomenon into a totalitarian system based on merging the state with the party, the party with security, and security with the leader. Everything came to be managed from the capital—not only geographically but symbolically and practically. Damascus was no longer just the center of decision-making but became the center of identity, legitimacy, belonging, political expression, culture, and religion. From here, the roots of the structural crisis began, which later exploded as a revolution, then descended into civil war, before transforming into a multi-party international and regional conflict.

Manifestations of Centralization: The Triptych of Exclusion (Economic, Political, Cultural)

1. Economic Marginalization: The Center Devours the Periphery
   Administrative centralization translated into an unfair distribution of resources and wealth. Wealthy regions like the Syrian Jazira (Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, Hasakah)—which are the backbone of the agricultural and oil economy—were subjected to systematic policies of neglect and economic hollowing. The revenues from these resources were not invested in developing the producing regions; instead, they were transferred to the center, where they were redistributed to serve the interests of the ruling authority and its security apparatus.

Even major cities like Aleppo, despite their large population and economic weight, were managed from Damascus without having authority over their economic destiny or development priorities. Thus, the peripheries were emptied of their economic functions and transformed into human, military, and financial reservoirs that are exploited when needed and marginalized in times of peace.

2. Political Repression: Geography Treated as a Threat
   Development demands from marginalized regions were not treated as constitutional rights but met with accusations and suspicion. Any regionalist discourse or demand movement was criminalized as a threat to “national unity” and labeled separatist or traitorous.

Provinces were subjected to a permanent state of exception represented by appointing governors from the center, the dominance of security agencies, and the presence of nominal local councils lacking real authority. A national narrative was built that made the center synonymous with the nation, and the periphery a danger that must be contained or tamed. Consequently, the right to political representation, self-administration, and peaceful constitutional expression of demands were confiscated.

3. Cultural Exclusion: Forced Unification of Identities
   One of the most dangerous manifestations of centralization was the attempt to impose a single national identity in a country with multiple ethnicities, cultures, and languages. Under the slogan of “national unity,” the use of non-Arabic languages in education, media, and culture was banned.

The Kurds, who are the country’s second-largest ethnic group, were denied their most basic cultural rights; hundreds of thousands were stripped of citizenship under the “Arab Belt” project. The Syriacs and Assyrians, holders of some of the oldest Semitic languages, were excluded from recognition as indigenous peoples and their cultural heritage was marginalized. The same applied to Armenians, Circassians, Turkmens, and Yazidis, whose identities were diminished in favor of a national narrative based on Arabization and Arab national affiliation.

These policies were neither spontaneous nor accidental but institutional and planned, issued through laws, curricula, and legislations aimed at cultural Arabization and dissolving particularities into a centralizing framework imposed from above.

Centralization as a Structural Cause of the Revolution and Crisis

The social explosion witnessed in 2011 was not merely a transient protest against political tyranny; at its core, it was a rejection of the centralized state model that reduced sovereignty to the capital, national interest to a narrow faction, and public decision-making to a closed security apparatus.

The absence of justice in resource distribution, the deprivation of communities from genuine political participation, and systematic cultural exclusion all formed a cumulative anger that first erupted in the peripheries and countryside before spreading to the cities.

Continuing the centralized system after these sacrifices is essentially reproducing the same structural causes that triggered the revolution. It is impossible to speak of “reform” or “national reconciliation” while the central structure— the solid base of tyranny, repressive legitimacy, and all forms of discrimination and marginalization— remains intact.

The Constitutional Alternative: Decentralization as a Political and Legal Way Out

From a constitutional perspective, excessive centralization contradicts the principles of democracy, equal citizenship, and fair development. A state governed from a single center that monopolizes legislation, execution, and wealth cannot be democratic.

The logical and political alternative is to transition to a genuine decentralized model based on the distribution of powers across levels of governance (local, regional, national). This requires radical constitutional reform recognizing the rights of local communities to self-administration, education in their languages, balanced development, and equal political representation.

Federalism may be one of the solutions, provided it is not a formal federalism imposed from above but arises from social and historical agreements built on partnership and equality in rights and duties.

Conclusion: Dismantling Centralization Is a Condition for the Survival of the State

Insisting on reproducing centralization, even if it changes its form, is a suicidal path leading to further explosion and division. If the Syrian state wants to remain united, it must transform from a state based on “coercive unity” to a state based on “voluntary partnership”; from a single-decision state to a state of democratic pluralism; from a state of exclusion to a state of recognition and representation.

Centralization is no longer just a mistaken administrative choice; it has become an existential threat to the country’s unity and civil peace. There is no reform without decentralization, no justice without recognition, and no homeland without genuine partnership in power, wealth, and identity.

Fourth: Federalism as a Means to Distribute Power and Wealth – Toward a New Social Contract Reproducing the State from the Bottom Up

Amid the structural crises shaking the Syrian state, federalism emerges not merely as a technical administrative option, but as a profound constitutional and political framework to rebuild the state on the foundations of plurality, justice, and participation. The Syrian historical experience has demonstrated that the centralized model, which monopolized power and wealth in the hands of a narrow elite in the capital, did not lead to stability but was one of the causes of the explosion. Accordingly, rethinking the form and substance of the state is no longer an intellectual luxury but has become an existential condition for the survival, unity, and civil peace of the state.

1. Federalism: The Constitutional Framework for Power Distribution

Federalism is a constitutional system based on distributing authority between the central government and regional or local entities, according to the principle of mutual legislative and executive independence. This ensures a balance of powers and multiple centers of decision-making without undermining the unity and sovereignty of the state. Within this framework, federalism enables:

• Genuine delegation of local authorities in areas such as education, culture, administration, economy, and services, so that each region can make decisions according to its priorities and specificities.
• Democratic distribution of power that prevents political decision-making from being centralized, reduces the risks of tyranny, and opens space for broad participation of local and community actors.

Constitutionally, federalism requires substantial amendments to the legal structure of the state, through which sovereignty is redefined as a shared multi-level sovereignty encompassing both the central state and regional entities simultaneously. This demands drafting a new constitution based on an equal social contract among all components, not on dominance and hegemony.

2. Federalism as a Mechanism for Achieving Justice in Wealth Distribution

One of the most prominent structural crises in the Syrian state is what can be called the “imbalance in wealth distribution,” where the central authority monopolized economic returns and redirected them to serve its political and security interests at the expense of balanced development. In this context, federalism is not merely a tool for managing plurality but an instrument for achieving economic justice through:

• Recognition of the regional right to local wealth, whereby oil, agricultural, and industrial revenues are primarily used to serve the communities that produce them.
• Establishment of local and regional development funds managed transparently and subject to popular and institutional oversight, limiting corruption arising from centralized economic decision-making.
• Stimulating the local economy by empowering regional authorities with legislative and tax regulatory powers appropriate to their needs, enhancing production and employment opportunities.

Thus, the economy transforms from a tool of centralized domination into a lever for social justice and balanced development.

3. Federalism as a Guarantee for Representation and Accountability

In a centralized state, power is isolated from society, making accountability mechanisms weak and fragile. Federalism enables:

• Establishment of democratic local governance structures that are elected and close to citizens, responding directly to their needs.
• Strengthening popular oversight and accountability through independent regional legislative councils with real powers, subject to periodic accountability.
• Reducing structural corruption resulting from concentration of decision-making in the hands of narrow, unaccountable elites.

In this sense, federalism does not sever the relationship between citizen and state but reshapes it based on proximity and genuine participation, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of the state and citizens’ trust in it.

4. Federalism and the Balance Between Center and Peripheries

One of the most problematic issues in Syria’s political history is the skewed relationship between center and periphery. Peripheral regions have long been viewed as security threats rather than political partners. Federalism restores the status of the peripheries by:

• Achieving a vertical balance between the center and regional entities, redistributing sovereign functions (defense, foreign policy, currency) while guaranteeing independence in local policies.
• Preventing the return of tyranny by breaking the monopoly on decision-making and multiplying legal centers of power, thus disrupting any party’s ability to monopolize rule.
• Rebuilding a plural national identity that recognizes all linguistic, cultural, and religious components and integrates them within a national framework based on partnership, not erasure.

5. Toward a Syrian Federalism: Legal and Political Preconditions

The transition to a federal system in Syria cannot be an elite or superficial decision but must rely on clear legal and political foundations, including:

• Drafting a new democratic constitution that recognizes ethnic and cultural pluralism, guarantees political and civil rights, and defines mechanisms for distributing powers and wealth.
• Launching an inclusive national dialogue involving all components (Arabs, Kurds, Syriacs, Turkmens, Assyrians, and others) to formulate a new social contract based on pluralism and equality.
• Restructuring state institutions on a decentralized basis, including judiciary, police, education, and natural resources.
• Securing international and regional guarantees to ensure respect for the federal model and protect it from attempts at abortion or regression.

6. Federalism Does Not Mean Division

In response to fearmongering narratives, it must be emphasized that federalism does not mean secession or disintegration of the homeland. Rather, it means reorganizing the state on the basis of justice, plurality, and balance. Many unified democratic states such as Germany, Switzerland, Canada, and India adopt federal systems and derive their stability and strength from this model.

Federalism does not weaken the state; it fortifies it against fragmentation and division. It does not fracture society but enables it to express its diversity within a single constitutional structure.

Conclusion: Federalism as a Condition for Building a New Syria

The new Syria we aspire to cannot be built on the ruins of the old centralized state but on a democratic, decentralized basis that redefines the relationship between state and society, authority and citizen, center and periphery. Federalism, in this sense, is not a narrow regional demand but a comprehensive national project that restores to the Syrian people their right to be free, equal, and active actors within a pluralistic and open homeland.

If centralization confiscated the state for decades, federalism is what returns it to its true owners: the people in all their diversity.

Fifth: Federalism Does Not Eliminate the Center, but Redefines It – Towards a Participatory Center Emerging from Collective Will, Not Monopoly of Power

Among the most misunderstood—intentionally or ignorantly—concepts in Arab political discourse in general, and Syrian discourse in particular, is the concept of federalism. It is often portrayed as the antithesis of a centralized state, a threat to territorial unity, or a prelude to fragmentation into sectarian or ethnic entities. However, such a view conceals a deep conceptual flaw and lacks an accurate understanding of federalism as a political and constitutional model to reconstruct the center, not to dismantle it; to redefine sovereignty, not to abolish it; to found an inclusive state, not a coercive one.

In this context, federalism is not understood as a concession of the “center,” but rather as a liberation of the center from the hegemony of an elite, a region, or a sect. It aims to reconfigure the center as a democratic, participatory nucleus emerging from all components of society and representing the collective national interest—not narrow factional ones.

1. From “Center of Domination” to “Center of Consensus” – A Conceptual Comparison

In a traditional centralized state, the “center” performs the function of absolute supervision and control. It is considered the source of all authority, the exclusive domain of sovereignty, and the origin of legislation and decision-making. This often results in the domination of a narrow elite over the state apparatus and turns power into a top-down, detached force, alienated from the people.

In contrast, in a federal state, the “center” is not abolished but redefined as a federal center that includes representatives from regional entities. It is based on the principle of consensus, not domination; partnership, not subordination. In this transformation, the state shifts from a “closed pyramid” to an “open circle,” where sovereignty is distributed across multiple levels, and the relationship between the state and its components is reorganized as a flexible and balanced social contract.

2. The Functions of the Center in a Federal State – Sovereignty as a Participatory Function

Federalism does not mean that the state abandons its center. Rather, it redefines the functions of that center within clear constitutional limits. Under this model, the federal (central) government retains a set of sovereign powers, exercised in the name of and with the consent of all citizens, most notably:

• Foreign policy: Representing the state in international forums and managing diplomatic relations and treaties, with consultation from regional components, especially on issues that affect their vital interests.
• National defense: Managing the armed forces as a unified federal power, with the possibility of regional security forces operating under joint oversight through defined mechanisms.
• Currency and monetary policy: Issuing the federal currency and managing monetary and fiscal policy, while ensuring fair financial distribution among regions based on equitable development standards.
• Unified citizenship and federal standards: Including fundamental freedoms, education standards, and human rights—while allowing regions to develop their own legislation, provided it does not contradict the general principles of the federal constitution.

In this way, the center is no longer an imposed authority, but a unifying federal institution, governed by all and for all.

3. The New Shape of the Center – From Bureaucracy to Federal Representation

Key features of the redefined center in a federal system include:

• A bicameral federal parliament: One chamber represents the population based on size, and the other represents regions equally or proportionally, preventing populous regions from dominating national decision-making.
• A federal constitutional court: Responsible for resolving disputes between the center and the regions, overseeing the balance of powers, and ensuring compliance with the constitution.
• An elected federal government representing all: Subject to parliamentary accountability, with attention to national diversity in terms of ethnicity, religion, and language.
• A Federal Council of Regions: An executive-consultative body that includes representatives from regional governments and coordinates and formulates federal policy through consensus.

4. Center-Region Relations – Balance, Not Subordination

In a federal system, regions are not subordinate administrative units but genuine partners in national decision-making. The relationship between center and regions is based on:

• Constitutional power distribution: Clearly defining the jurisdiction of each level of governance, with the center restricted from overreach except in emergencies under strict conditions.
• Fair and participatory funding: Regional contributions to the national budget are determined based on equitable standards, and resources are redistributed to ensure corrective justice and balanced development.
• Effective regional representation: Regions are granted real institutional tools to influence federal decisions, beyond mere symbolic consultation.

5. A Federal Syria – Rebuilding the Center from the Margins

In the Syrian context, redefining the center must begin with dismantling the centralized security state that has dominated for decades and building a new political center rooted in the collective will of all Syrian components.

• From Exclusive Damascus to Shared Damascus: The capital must transform from a command center ruling over all to a shared center governed by all. Damascus should no longer symbolize power monopoly but become a federal capital reflecting Syrian diversity in its political and cultural institutions.
• The Center as Guarantor, Not Guardian: In a democratic federal state, the center's role is to guarantee national unity and protect pluralism, not to impose uniformity or exclusion. Its role is to provide a common framework—not to exploit it for dominance.
• Multilevel Sovereignty: Sovereignty no longer means decision-making monopolized at the top of a pyramid. It now entails shared participation in decision-making at multiple levels, expanding the base of legitimacy and enhancing balance between center and periphery, nationhood and particularity, state and society.

Conclusion: Towards a Bottom-Up Center, Not a Top-Down One

In a federal system, the center is not a rigid top-down structure, but a dynamic entity emerging from popular will, shaped continuously by consensus and democracy. It is a center that guarantees unity—not through violence or monopoly—but through partnership, representation, and accountability.

In Syria’s future, there will not be one center above all, but a shared center representing all. This is not a threat to the state—but a prerequisite for its survival, justice, and renewal. A strong state is not one that hoards power, but one that organizes, distributes, and subjects it to democratic oversight.

In this sense, federalism is not a disintegration project, but an advanced model for rebuilding national unity on new foundations:

• Unity through will, not coercion,
• Unity through diversity, not assimilation,
• Unity through participation, not guardianship.

Only through this vision can Syria seize its historic opportunity to transition from collapse to foundational rebirth.

Sixth: Federalism Saves Syrian Identity from Erosion – Toward an Inclusive National Pact That Ends Denial and Founds Recognition

Syrian identity has never been a settled matter or defined by mutual consensus among the country’s diverse components. Since the founding of the modern Syrian state after the French Mandate, identity has been the subject of constant conflict between forces of forced assimilation and those of coerced fragmentation. The borders of modern Syria were drawn without genuine internal consensus among its peoples, while the central authority, from the 1950s until today, has imposed a singular, often Arab-centric national identity at the expense of the ethnic, religious, and linguistic pluralism that defines the Syrian fabric.

This led to a deep contradiction between the "imposed official identity" and the "actual communal identities," resulting—under marginalization and repression—in the resurgence of partial identities as defensive responses from excluded and denied groups.

With the outbreak of the Syrian revolution and the ensuing devastating war, the fragility of the state’s concept of national identity was exposed, while ethnic, sectarian, and regional identities erupted within a broader social and political collapse, threatening both the unity of the country and the structure of the state itself.

However, the solution does not lie, as some claim, in restoring authoritarian centralism or erasing distinct identities, but rather in refounding national identity on more just, inclusive, and pluralistic foundations. Here, federalism emerges not as a threat to national identity, but as a constitutional and political framework that redefines and saves it from erosion by acknowledging its structural diversity.

1. National Identity Is Not a Negation of Sub-identities, but Their Inclusive Framework

The structural flaw in the conception of Syrian identity lies in the regime’s assumption that national identity is only complete through the denial of sub-identities—whether ethnic, religious, linguistic, or cultural. This notion stems from a classical European nation-state model, which was imported to the Arab East in a distorted form, ignoring the fact that Syria has never been a homogeneous nation-state but rather a diverse civilizational space where communities have coexisted within complex, interwoven patterns.

While some nationalist ideologies claim that recognizing sub-identities threatens the “unity of the nation,” the Syrian experience—like those of Iraq and Lebanon—proves that it is repression, not diversity, that fragments national identity. Identities are built through recognition, not denial, through partnership, not exclusion.

In this context, federalism offers a practical legal model that bridges local or ethnic affiliations with national belonging—without making one negate the other.

2. Federalism as a Constitutional Framework for Identity Pluralism Within Political Unity

Contrary to common misconceptions, federalism does not mean the disintegration of the state or the undermining of sovereignty. It is a constitutional system that enables power-sharing across multiple levels within a higher political unity—the federal state. This model allows each component to express its distinct identity within a common national framework, founding a new legitimacy based on "mutual recognition," rather than "coercive subjugation."

In this light, constitutional recognition of ethnic, religious, and linguistic identities (Kurdish, Assyrian, Yazidi, Druze, Circassian, and others) does not threaten the national pact—it enriches and reinforces it. These identities become sources of strength for a broader, inclusive Syrian identity rather than tools of fragmentation.

Federalism provides regional institutions that reflect the cultural, social, and linguistic particularities of each region—while remaining within the national framework. It ensures that one can be both Syrian and Kurdish, or Assyrian and Syrian, or Druze and Syrian—without contradiction—because the relationship between these identities becomes one of mutual enrichment rather than hierarchy or erasure.

3. Protecting National Identity from Erosion Through Fair Representation and Institutional Pluralism

The chronic denial of Kurdish identity, the marginalization of the Assyrian language and culture, and the erasure of Yazidi history have alienated vast segments of the population from the “official national identity,” which has appeared as a top-down, exclusionary ideological project.

Under a federal system, state institutions are restructured to reflect this diversity—becoming a host for identities, rather than an instrument to impose a single one. This is manifested through:

• Fair political representation in a federal parliament that respects demographic and cultural diversity.
• Constitutional recognition of multiple official languages, allowing Kurdish or Assyrian, for example, to be official languages in their regions.
• A pluralistic educational system that teaches local history and culture alongside national curricula.
• Constitutional guarantees of religious and intellectual freedom, protecting beliefs and sects from discrimination or exclusion.

This institutional diversity does not fragment identity but rather strengthens it, as every group feels that the state acknowledges its uniqueness and involves it in shaping the national destiny.

4. Federalism as a Tool to Transcend Isolationist Identities

When a Kurdish, Assyrian, Druze, or Alawite citizen is denied their cultural and political rights, they retreat into their community in search of recognition and protection. This produces closed identities, sectarian conflict, and social fragmentation.

In a federal system, sub-identities are no longer perceived as threats to the nation but as integral parts of it. These identities are stripped of their “self-defense posture” and granted constitutional legitimacy, making them components of the nation, not adversaries to it.

Thus, identities shift from instruments of protest and division to recognized cultural contributors integrated into the state’s structure.

5. A New Syrian Identity – An Identity of Recognized Pluralism

What Syria needs is not an identity that melts differences away, but one that acknowledges them and builds upon them. This is precisely what federalism offers: a national identity not based on a single ethnicity or sect, but on a constitutional pact rooted in equality, citizenship, and shared governance.

This is neither a singular ethnic identity nor an isolated minority identity. It is a pluralistic constitutional identity—embodied in institutions, reflected in public policy, and foundational to a genuine sense of belonging for all citizens, without exception.

This is the identity of “integrated pluralism” or “unity in diversity,” where recognition does not mean fragmentation, but empowerment through equality and mutual respect.

Conclusion: Federalism as a National Vehicle for Identity, Not a Tool to Dismantle It

Contrary to what its opponents claim, federalism does not dismantle Syrian identity—it is the only viable political and legal framework capable of saving it from dissolution and extinction. It ends decades of denial and transforms partial affiliations from tools of conflict into national tributaries that enrich the Syrian common.

Instead of reverting to a failed authoritarian centralism, Syria’s future lies in embracing a democratic federalism that reshapes the center through the peripheries, and redefines national identity through inclusion—not exclusion.

Only through this approach can Syria build a truly inclusive national state—not through coercion, but through recognition; not through guardianship, but through partnership; not through denial, but through fair representation.

In this balance, a new, resilient, and flourishing Syrian national identity can emerge—broad enough to embrace everyone, without exception.

Seventh: Federalism as a Guarantee for Post-War Unity – From Civil Conflict to a Constitutional Political Partnership

Amid the sweeping devastation that has afflicted Syria since 2011, the country's dilemma is no longer limited to armed conflict or political rivalry. Rather, it has become a structural crisis that touches the very nature of the state, the form of governance, and the identity of belonging. After more than a decade of fragmentation, successive de facto authorities, and the entanglement of local, regional, and international conflicts, the “post-war moment” does not appear as a spontaneous beginning of recovery, but rather as a decisive juncture requiring a new architecture of legitimacy and sovereignty—one that acknowledges the shifting realities on the ground and prevents the reproduction of the causes of explosion.

Envisioning post-war Syria as a centralized state based on the old model—where the center dominates the periphery and components are excluded in favor of a singular identity—is nothing short of a recipe for renewed conflict. The identities for which blood was spilled, and the forces that established local legitimacy in the absence of a central authority, will not accept a return to the pre-revolution era, nor to an authoritarian centralism that enforces power through coercion rather than consensus.

In this context, federalism emerges not as a theoretical luxury or a temporary option, but as a political and legal necessity to guarantee the unity of the Syrian state—not on the basis of submission, but on the basis of partnership. It is the only framework capable of accommodating identity, geographic, and political diversity, and transforming it from a battlefield into a governing structure.

1. Federalism Does Not Divide Syria, It Fortifies Its Unity from Within

The official discourse, past and present, from some actors suggests that federalism paves the way for the country’s division—as if unity can only be preserved through centralization. However, Syria’s experience has proven the exact opposite: the more centralization intensified, the greater the distance between the state and society became, and the more the official identity turned into a tool of repression rather than a horizon for belonging. Federalism, by contrast, means recognizing pluralism and translating it into a constitutional structure that allows for power-sharing, fair representation, and mutual recognition.

Federalism does not legitimize division—it organizes diversity. It does not establish separation—it creates constitutional mechanisms to contain it. And contrary to exaggerated fears, it is not a “separatist confederation,” but rather a federal system that maintains unified external sovereignty while redistributing internal powers in a way that promotes balance, justice, and effectiveness.

Countries that have suffered from civil wars or sharp divisions—such as post-WWII Germany, post-2003 Iraq, or Bosnia after the Dayton Agreement—demonstrate that federalism was not a temporary fix, but the permanent framework capable of managing diversity without returning to war.

2. Federalism as a Constitutional Framework to Normalize Political and Legal Pluralism

One of the most significant outcomes of the Syrian war has been the emergence of multiple de facto authorities:

• The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which govern the northeast of the country under a quasi-autonomous model based on self-administration;
• Armed opposition factions controlling areas of Turkish-backed influence with local governance structures;
• The new Islamist-centered regime that controls parts of the center and some provinces, though it has lost its monopoly on sovereignty;
• Former extremist groups (like ISIS), which temporarily imposed chaotic rule and exposed the fragility of the center;
• Foreign military presence (American, formerly Russian and Iranian, and Turkish), managing zones of influence through overlapping interests.

Attempting to reassemble this plurality into a rigid centralized mold ignores reality and risks provoking renewed explosion. Federalism, however, allows for the reorganization of this diversity within national legitimacy, transforming local authorities into constitutional units (regions or administrations) governed by a unifying constitution and an overarching federal authority.

Thus, federalism becomes a tool to normalize political diversity—not to undermine it. Military and political formations are transformed into stakeholders within a constitutional system, not factions in a perpetual battlefield.

3. Federalism as a New Social Contract Ending the Cold War Between Components

Since the early days of the revolution, a “cold war” has raged among Syria’s various components: Arabs and Kurds, Sunnis and Alawites, Assyrians and Muslims, Sunni Arabs and Druze, opposition and regime, and so on. While not always military in nature, this war has revolved around competing claims to legitimacy, overlapping existential fears, and mutual marginalization.

The central authority—whether under the Ba'ath regime or afterward—has failed to build a social contract that gives all components a sense of equal belonging. The result: retreat into narrow identities, proliferation of sectarian or ethno-national salvation projects, and transformation of the state into a weapon wielded by one group against another.

In contrast, federalism offers a historic opportunity to weave a new social contract—one not based on “forced consensus” but on “pluralistic recognition.” In this model, the various components, while rebuilding the state, do so as partners in the nation—not as subjects of the center. This does not mean sectarian quotas, but fair representation that respects population density, cultural specificity, and the historical and geographical distribution of communities.

4. Federalism as a Tool for Security and Institutional Stability

After any war, the state finds itself in a condition of weakness: fragmented institutions, wounded societies, and a collective memory laden with blood. In such moments, what is needed is a system that does not impose its authority by force, but convinces communities to participate and engage.

Federalism, as a pluralistic institutional system, redistributes powers, resources, and representation, and establishes joint security structures through:

• Local security forces affiliated with regional governments, subject to federal oversight, and integrated with the national army—not as instruments of domestic repression;
• Independent judicial authorities at both local and federal levels to prevent monopolization of law and ensure equality;
• A multi-tiered electoral system that guarantees power transition through ballot boxes, not ammunition boxes.

In this way, loyalty to the new political system is strengthened, and local identities shift from tools of rebellion to elements of balance and stability.

5. From Hostility to Partnership – Federalism as a Framework for Transitional Justice

There can be no lasting peace in Syria without transitional justice: accountability for crimes, redress of harm, and rebuilding of trust. But such justice cannot be achieved within a centralized regime dominated by one side imposing its terms on the others.

Federalism allows each component to be a stakeholder in shaping the contours of transitional justice and participating in its institutions—from truth and reconciliation commissions to specialized courts to reintegration programs—as a part of the nation, not as a managed victim.

Thus, federalism becomes more than a political architecture; it becomes a psychological and social framework for healing wounds, addressing collective memory, and building a shared future.

Conclusion: Toward a Democratic Federalism That Saves the State from Itself

What is at stake today is not merely a form of governance, but the very existence of the state. Syria must either be reconstituted through a democratic federal contract that gives each component its fair share of representation and governance—or remain a theater of recurring conflicts and never-ending cold wars.

Federalism is not the end of the nation—it is its second beginning. It is not a threat to Syria’s unity—it is its last lifeline. It is not a gift from one side to another—but a new constitutional and political formula based on balance and mutual respect that guarantees for all: sovereignty, justice, and dignity.

In this light, it can be stated clearly: Federalism is the only guarantee for post-war unity in Syria—because it does not merely unify maps, it unifies wills.

Eighth: Is Syria Ready for Federalism? From a Fragmented Reality to the Necessity of a Federal Constitutional System

The question "Is Syria ready for federalism?" is posed as a political and legal dilemma in the post-war context. Yet behind this question lies a web of ideological fears and resistances, more than a realistic diagnosis of the Syrian moment. The issue is not about Syria’s “readiness” for federalism, but whether it has a viable alternative to it. In this light, federalism emerges not as a luxury or an externally imposed project, but as a historical necessity to regenerate legitimacy, stabilize civil peace, and rebuild the state on foundations that reflect reality rather than deny it.

1. Readiness Is Not a Prerequisite, but a Result

In comparative experience, federalism did not arise in homogeneous societies or stable states; rather, it was often born in the heart of crises and deep conflicts. The Federal Republic of Germany was established after a catastrophic division. Iraq entered federalism following occupation and the collapse of sovereignty. Bosnia and Herzegovina only came to know federalism after an ethnic genocide and the breakdown of state institutions. Thus, "readiness" is not a prerequisite for federalism but a result built gradually through institutional development, power-sharing, and the establishment of political and legal consensus within a unifying constitutional framework.

2. Fragmentation as an Undeniable Reality

A field reading of the Syrian reality clearly shows that federalism is no longer a deferred theoretical option but a possible legal description of a fragmented reality:

• In the northeast, the Syrian Democratic Forces, through the “Autonomous Administration,” run a relatively advanced model of governance based on an internal quasi-federal structure. It includes legislative, executive, judicial, and security institutions, applies advanced decentralization, and recognizes ethnic and gender diversity.
• In the northwest, opposition forces previously administered their areas through local councils and administrative governments with direct Turkish support, operating entirely outside the authority of the former and current Damascus regime. These entities establish an institutional status quo that trends toward independent local governance.
• In regime-held areas and the new centers of power, despite ongoing centralized rhetoric, the administrative structure reveals a clear state fragmentation: the growing influence of militias, the multiplicity of security agencies, inflated informal powers, and the erosion of central bureaucratic efficiency.
• Internationally, Syria resembles an "undeclared partition of sovereignty": regions under former Russian influence, others under U.S. protection, still others under Turkish control, and previously under complex Iranian presence. This has created a de facto plurality that cannot be overcome through the logic of a traditional centralized state.

3. Federalism as a Constitutional Tool to Contain Chaos

Without framing this political, administrative, and demographic plurality within a federal constitutional framework, the only alternative is more chaos, prolonged conflict, and the country’s slide into "fragmented sovereignty" or a "failed state."

Federalism in this context is not a political invention but a rational mechanism to legitimize the reality through:

• Transforming de facto authorities into constitutional entities (regions, administrations, states…) under the umbrella of national sovereignty.
• Establishing a balanced power distribution system between the center and components, wherein the center retains sovereign matters (defense, foreign policy, currency), while regions gain broad powers over internal affairs (local security, education, local legislation, civil judiciary).
• Creating a bicameral federal parliament, where regions are represented based on both population and equal representation principles, balancing demographic weight with regional rights.

4. The Debate on Federalism – Conceptual Confusion

Objections to federalism often arise from conceptual confusion or historical misunderstanding:

• Federalism is not confederalism: It does not grant regions the right to secede or maintain independent sovereignty but unites them within a single, multi-level state.
• Federalism is not division: It is the opposite of fragmentation because it preserves territorial unity and sovereignty, merely redefining the center-periphery relationship.
• Federalism is not sectarian quotas: It is based on political and geographic power-sharing, not on identity or sectarian divisions, unlike in Iraq or Lebanon.
• Federalism is not the end of the state: Rather, it is a way to re-establish the state on more just and realistic foundations, ensuring inclusive participation instead of domination.

5. From Federalism as a De Facto Necessity to a Foundational Choice

The fundamental question is: What kind of Syrian state can emerge after the war—one that builds lasting civil peace and regains the trust of its diverse components?

Given the accumulation of conflicts, multiplicity of identities, and entanglement of external influence, clinging to the rigid centralist model of the Baath era seems futile. Instead, there must be a move toward founding a new republic based on:

• A consensual federal constitution that acknowledges ethnic, religious, and cultural pluralism.
• A democratic, pluralistic political system that ensures power rotation and inclusive representation.
• A federal, decentralized administrative structure that redistributes power, wealth, and political representation.
• A transitional justice process that ends the legacy of repression and division, and rebuilds trust among national components.

Conclusion: Federalism Is Not a Privilege but a Right, Not a Choice but a Way Out

Syria today does not have the luxury of hesitation or evasion from the imperatives of structural transformation. The choice is not between federalism and centralism, but between a state and chaos.

Federalism, in this context, is not a foreign project but a constitutional translation of Syria’s pluralism, a logical outcome of the ongoing fragmentation, and a rational tool to prevent total collapse.

The real question is not: "Is Syria ready for federalism?"
But rather: "Can Syria survive without it?"

Does Abu Muhammad al-Julani (formerly) — Ahmad al-Shara (currently) realize that Syria will not pass peacefully?

In a political scene where authority fragments and multiple zones of influence emerge, the model of "Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham" stands out as a de facto power in northwest Syria. This authority is led by a single man whose name changed from "Abu Muhammad al-Julani" to "Ahmad al-Shara," but the authoritarian doctrine appears unchanged. The political practice, as embodied by the group, remains captive to a despotic mindset—monopolizing decision-making, excluding dissenters, and reproducing the Ba’athist state in a new guise—this time religious.

What "al-Shara" and his ilk fail to understand is that Syria no longer tolerates the domination of an individual or group under sacred titles, whether religious or revolutionary. The revolution that erupted in 2011 was not only against Assad but against an entire structure of exclusion, marginalization, and oppression. Any attempt to recycle this model—even if cloaked in the mantle of "jihad"—is doomed to fail. Legitimacy today is not granted by arms but through a social contract; it is not won by religious rhetoric but by just representation and guaranteed rights for all components.

Authority built on unilateral decision-making and monopolizing representation can only be fragile, temporary, and prone to explosion. Syria—with its ethnic, religious, and regional diversity—can no longer bear this kind of singular rule, whether it comes from Damascus or Idlib. Continuing to impose such realities with this mindset only paves the way for a new eruption, one likely to be more violent and widespread, potentially ending—with God forbid—the disintegration of the Syrian entity itself.

Syria today needs a structural transformation in the understanding of the state. It is no longer possible to build a future on the ruins of authoritarian pasts. What is required is not the “victory of a faction” but a comprehensive national consensus. What is needed is not temporary military rhetoric, but a consensual federal constitution that acknowledges ethnic, political, and religious plurality and affirms the legitimacy of decentralization and federalism as rational tools for managing diversity, guaranteeing rights, and distributing powers. This is the only guarantee for Syria’s survival, the restoration of civil peace, and the construction of a pluralistic democratic system that prevents the reemergence of tyranny—no matter its color or slogan.

The experience of al-Julani and his counterparts must be read carefully: from revolution to power, from the slogan of "toppling the regime" to representing it anew in a different form. But history has taught us that a de facto authority, if it does not transform into an inclusive political contract, is either toppled, exhausted, or turns into a de facto secessionist project. This is precisely the fate of anyone who chooses to rule in the name of God rather than in the name of the people and their will.

Therefore, the real question that must be asked today is not:
"Is Syria ready for federalism?"
but rather:
"Can Syria remain united without it?"

And the most important question of all:
"Does Ahmad al-Shara realize that, with his current mindset, he is leading the north toward political isolation, imminent fragmentation, and another explosion?"

Unfortunately, the answer does not seem encouraging so far.

Conclusion: Towards a New Federal Social Contract

Syria today stands at a decisive historical crossroads, where there is no room for half-measures or political maneuvers. It is either clinging to the mentality of centralization and the hierarchy of a unitary state—a mentality that has proven catastrophic, producing a revolution, then chaos, followed by collapse and multiple occupations; or it is a serious and responsible engagement in a comprehensive constitutional transformation project that establishes a new social contract based on recognition of diversity, power-sharing, and participation in national decision-making.

After all that has happened, it is no longer acceptable for Syria to be governed by a mentality of cancellation and monopoly. It is no longer conceivable to rebuild a post-war state without redefining its relationship with its ethnic, religious, political, and geographical components. The central state, whether in its former Ba’athist form or even in its traditional nationalist form, has exhausted its legitimacy. Any attempt to restore it from above or impose it on a fragmented social and political reality will only be a recipe for a coming explosion or a creeping division in fact.

In this context, federalism is not a theoretical luxury or an imported model, but a political and legal necessity imposed by the realities on the ground and motivated by the balance of power among Syria’s components. It is the only form through which the following can be achieved:

• Preserving the unity of the state without the center oppressing the periphery;
• Recognizing ethnic, religious, and political diversity without turning it into conflict;
• Building genuine democracy without reproducing majority dominance over minorities or one group over another;
• Formulating an inclusive national identity without undermining the particularities of cultural, ethnic, or religious identities;
• Ensuring balanced development and geographical justice instead of flooding the center with power and wealth while marginalizing the peripheries.

From a constitutional perspective, no social contract can acquire legitimacy unless it is a free, equal agreement based on mutual will rather than coercion. This is the essence of federalism: it is not a division of the country, but a distribution of power; it is not a negation of the center, but a redefinition of it as a non-centralized coordinating hub; and it is not an override of the constitution, but a reestablishment of it on new foundations that affirm that Kurdish, Arab, Assyrian, Turkmen, Alawite, Sunni, Christian, Yazidi, and Druze citizens—all of them—are equal in rights, dignity, and representation, with no group favored over another except by their commitment to the common national interest.

The time has come to move from the idea of “the state owning the people” to “the state owned by its people,” in all their diversity. This can only be achieved through a participatory, federal, consensual constitution that transcends the logic of domination and replaces it with the logic of partnership. A constitution that is not written behind closed doors nor imposed by a military or religious faction, but produced through an open national dialogue involving everyone—from displaced persons in the diaspora to residents of isolated villages, from war victims to peacebuilders.

The Syria of the future will not be built from the top down, but from the grassroots: from municipalities, local councils, and autonomous administrations; and from recognizing that the other is not an adversary to be overcome but a partner with whom understanding is essential. Federalism is the political name for this recognition, and the legal spirit of coexistence.

It is either this path, or continued bleeding, erosion, and slow disintegration of the state and society.

In the end, the question is no longer: “Do we want federalism?”
But rather: “Is there a rational, constitutional, and humane alternative to it?”

And so far, there appears to be no viable or realistic alternative except this path.

Add comment