By: Dr. Adnan Bouzan

The Kurdish dilemma does not lie solely in borders, but also in the political order that emerged in the aftermath of the First World War and in the way the region’s geographical and political space was divided without providing a just solution to the question of the peoples and national identities inhabiting it. From this perspective, reducing the Kurdish cause merely to demands for cultural or administrative rights within existing states may, however unintentionally, amount to addressing the consequences of the problem rather than questioning its roots. What is required is not to ignore the existing political reality, but to reconsider the foundations upon which the relationship between the state and the people was established, as well as the Kurds’ right to determine their political future within the framework of international law and the realities of political power.

Sykes–Picot was not the sole instrument that shaped the modern political map of the Middle East, and it would be historically and legally inaccurate to hold it alone responsible for the present situation. The 1916 agreement was part of a broader series of developments, agreements, and international arrangements that followed the First World War, including the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920, which contained provisions related to the Kurdish question, followed by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which reconfigured the international framework of the region without establishing an independent Kurdish state. Therefore, Sykes–Picot should be understood politically as a symbol of the system of partition and regional restructuring, rather than as the sole document that ultimately determined the region’s borders.

The problem is that a significant part of Kurdish political discourse has continued to begin with a limited question: What can we obtain from the states within whose present borders the Kurds live? The question should instead begin at a deeper level: How were these states formed? And how did modern political borders become the governing framework for peoples whose histories, languages, identities, and geographical connections extend beyond those borders? National rights are not privileges granted by the state to a majority or minority at its discretion. Rather, they are connected to broader principles of equality, non-discrimination, cultural and linguistic rights, political participation, and the right of peoples to determine their future in accordance with the principles and rules recognized by international law.

When we say that the Kurds must “dismantle Sykes–Picot,” this should not be understood as a call to abolish borders by force or to ignite new wars. Rather, it should be understood as a call to move beyond Sykes–Picot as a political and intellectual system. What must be dismantled is the notion that borders created under particular historical circumstances have become an eternal destiny, and that peoples must adapt to them regardless of the injustice or exclusion that may have resulted from them. Political transformation does not necessarily begin with changing borders. It may begin with transforming the nature of the state, redistributing political power, guaranteeing rights, and establishing constitutional arrangements that recognize national and cultural pluralism.

Accordingly, demands for national rights should not become the final ceiling of the Kurdish cause. Cultural, linguistic, administrative, and political rights may constitute necessary objectives and realistic stages, but they are not necessarily the end of the political project. Political realism does not mean abandoning historical rights and aspirations, just as national ambition does not mean disregarding the balance of power or international law. Mature politics lies in the ability to reconcile principle with reality, and strategic objectives with achievable means.

Despite the political division of their geography among several states, the Kurds are not merely disconnected communities without a historical bond. Their national, cultural, linguistic, and geographical existence is a historical reality. Yet transforming this reality into a successful political project requires a vision that goes beyond slogans. Here, a distinction must be made between national unity and a single state. National unity can be developed through political, cultural, economic, and scientific cooperation among the different parts of Kurdistan without necessarily requiring the immediate unification of political systems or institutions. As for a Kurdish state, it is a complex historical, political, and legal question that depends on domestic, regional, and international conditions and cannot be reduced to a slogan.

The greatest threat to the Kurdish cause is not external borders alone, but the transformation of those borders into boundaries within Kurdish political consciousness. When partisan and regional divisions become stronger than national interests, when one Kurdish faction uses a regional state against another Kurdish faction, and when political disagreements turn into conflicts that exhaust society, the system that imposed the division no longer needs to defend itself; division itself becomes part of the mechanisms that sustain it.

Therefore, dismantling Sykes–Picot begins from within: by building a shared Kurdish political consciousness, establishing a long-term strategy, developing institutions, coordinating political discourse on fundamental national issues, strengthening economic, cultural, media, and scientific cooperation among Kurds, and establishing research and legal centers capable of studying the Kurdish question in a modern language that can engage the international community. National causes are not advanced by slogans alone; they require knowledge, institutions, economic capacity, diplomacy, and the ability to produce independent political decisions.

Kurdish political actors should not repeat the mistake of becoming dependent on external powers. History has demonstrated that international and regional powers deal with national causes according to their own interests. They may support a cause at one stage and then retreat from it when their priorities change. Relying on external actors without building internal strength therefore turns the cause into a bargaining instrument in the hands of others. The true ally is not the one who promises the Kurds what they want, but rather the unity, institutions, and negotiating capacity that the Kurds themselves are able to build.

The illusion that the justice of a cause alone is sufficient to establish a state or transform a regional order must also be abandoned. International recognition is not based solely on moral justice; it is also influenced by political legitimacy, institutional capacity, stability, international and regional interests, and the balance of power. Therefore, the question must shift from “Who will grant us a state?” to a more serious question: “What have we done to build the political and institutional conditions that make our rights achievable and defensible?”

Accordingly, the Kurdish project should not be a project aimed at excluding others or reproducing injustice in reverse. If the Kurds have suffered from denial, repression, and attempts at forced assimilation, then the project they aspire to should be founded on democracy, pluralism, citizenship, equality, and human rights. The Kurdish cause becomes stronger when it presents itself as part of a broader project to rebuild the Middle East on the basis of recognition of national and cultural pluralism, rather than merely as a project to replace one form of domination with another.

Political decentralization, federalism, autonomy, guarantees of linguistic and cultural rights, political participation, power-sharing, and other constitutional arrangements can therefore serve as instruments within a multi-stage strategy. There is no single formula applicable to all parts of Kurdistan, as each part has its own constitutional, political, and regional circumstances. However, differences in political methods should not become differences in the recognition of Kurdish national existence and fundamental rights.

Moving beyond Sykes–Picot does not mean turning history backward, nor does it mean that the Kurds can redraw the map of the region through willpower alone. History does not move backward, but political systems change, borders are not necessarily eternal, constitutions can be rebuilt, and relations between peoples and states can be renegotiated. The issue, therefore, is not the restoration of a map from the past, but the creation of a future in which the Kurds are no longer prisoners of a map shaped by the transformations of the twentieth century.

Accordingly, the priority for the Kurdish political movement should not always be to begin by seeking recognition, but by building the conditions for political entitlement: unifying the vision, ending destructive divisions, protecting the Kurdish language and culture, developing the economy and education, building institutions, preparing legal and diplomatic expertise, and developing a democratic national discourse capable of addressing both domestic and international audiences.

Sykes–Picot has not existed as a stand-alone secret agreement for more than a century, but the effects of the regional order that emerged in the aftermath of the First World War remain present. The real struggle, therefore, is not against a historical document, but against a political legacy that continues to influence the present reality of the region. Dismantling that legacy does not begin with changing the map; it begins with changing the political mindset that regards the map as an irreversible destiny.

Before demanding any national right, the Kurdish cause must ask itself: Do we possess a unified vision? Do we have institutions capable of carrying that vision forward? Do we possess an economy and sufficient negotiating power? Can we transform political diversity into democratic competition rather than internal conflict? And can we present the world with a clear democratic and legal vision for the future of the Kurds?

If the answer remains incomplete, then this is where the beginning must be. The genuine dismantling of Sykes–Picot does not come through shouting against borders, but through overcoming their effects in political consciousness, building political, intellectual, and institutional unity, and then transforming that unity into negotiating and legal power capable of redefining the position of the Kurds in the Middle East.

Borders can divide the land, but they cannot erase a people, extinguish a language, or eliminate a historical memory. Unless the Kurdish presence is transformed from a social and historical reality into an organized political project, demands for rights will continue to operate within a framework designed by others. But when the Kurds possess a unified project, strong institutions, and a clear legal and political vision, moving beyond the legacy of Sykes–Picot becomes a transition from reacting to history to shaping the future.

The first struggle, therefore, is not against the map, but against the mindset that has turned the map into destiny. Nor does the beginning lie in declaring a state, but in building a people, institutions, and a political project capable of making statehood—or any political arrangement that genuinely realizes Kurdish national rights—a historically and politically attainable possibility. This is precisely where genuine Kurdish politics begins.

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