By: Dr. Adnan Bozan

The future of the Syrian Kurds should not be reduced to the question of whether a military force remains in existence or is integrated into the institutions of the state. The Kurdish issue in Syria predates all existing military formations and is far deeper than them, because at its core it is a political and constitutional issue concerning identity, rights, citizenship, and partnership within the state.

From this perspective, the presence of Syrian Kurds within the central authorities and state institutions, as partners in shaping the political system and constitution, is preferable to their remaining outside the centers of decision-making. However, this principle does not mean accepting symbolic participation or merely incorporating a number of Kurdish figures into state institutions. There is a fundamental difference between the representation of individual Kurds within the state and constitutional recognition of the Kurdish people and their national rights.

- The SDF Is Not the Kurdish Question

First, it is essential to distinguish between Syrian Kurds as an indigenous national component of Syrian society and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as a military and political formation that emerged under the particular circumstances of the Syrian war.

The SDF is not, in its composition, an exclusively Kurdish force, and neither legally nor politically can the Kurdish people be reduced to it. It includes various components, including Kurds, Arabs, Syriacs, Assyrians, and others, and was formed within a specific military context associated with the war against terrorist organizations and with the international and regional dynamics generated by the Syrian conflict.

It is true that Kurds constitute an important presence within its structure, particularly at the leadership level. However, this does not give any military formation an exclusive mandate to represent the Kurdish people.

The Kurdish people are not a military organization, and the Kurdish question is not a question of arms.

Therefore, the integration of any armed forces into the state's military institution does not, in itself, mean the integration of the Kurds or the disappearance of their cause. The issue is not whether there should be a single army, but rather the nature of the state to which that army belongs and the constitutional foundations governing the relationship between the state and its national components.

The principle of the state's monopoly over the use of force, and the exclusive responsibility of official military institutions for defending sovereignty and territorial integrity, is, in principle, one of the foundations of the modern state. However, this principle cannot substitute for a political solution. It is not possible to demand that communities relinquish their instruments of power without providing genuine constitutional and political guarantees that prevent the return of exclusion and authoritarianism.

Therefore, the question is not: Should the forces be integrated into the state's army?

Rather, it is: Is Syria moving toward building a state based on the rule of law and citizenship, or toward reproducing a political centralization that denies national diversity?

- Rights Are Not Granted by Administrative Decree

One of the most dangerous mistakes in addressing the Kurdish issue is the belief that appointing Kurdish officials, permitting the teaching of the Kurdish language, or issuing a decree recognizing the existence of Kurds can constitute a solution to the Kurdish question.

Such measures, even when positive, remain political or administrative measures that can be amended or repealed.

A decree is issued by the will of an authority and can be revoked by the will of another authority. A government decision does not, in a state governed by law, possess the same status as a constitutional provision.

For this reason, national rights should not remain hostage to the mood of the authorities or the will of the ruler.

A right that is not protected by the constitution remains vulnerable to reversal.

A serious solution to the Kurdish question begins with an explicit constitutional recognition that Kurds are an indigenous national component of Syria and that they have the right to preserve their language, identity, and culture, and to exercise their rights within the framework of the Syrian state and its unity.

Such recognition does not constitute a privilege granted by the majority to a minority. Rather, it represents a constitutional framework regulating the relationship between the state and its constituent communities on the basis of equality and non-discrimination.

Equal citizenship does not mean abolishing national particularities, just as the unity of the state does not mean imposing a single national identity upon all its citizens.

- Political Representation Does Not Equal National Recognition

Any government may include a Kurdish minister or a number of Kurdish officials, but this does not necessarily mean that the Kurdish question has been resolved.

Individual representation concerns individuals, whereas national rights concern a human community possessing its own language, identity, and historical presence.

Here lies the distinction between integrating individuals into the authorities and integrating the Kurdish cause into the state.

A Kurd who reaches a political position may represent himself, his party, or the institution in which he works. But no individual can substitute for a constitutional provision that defines the nature of the state and recognizes its national diversity.

Therefore, Kurdish participation in government must be accompanied by Kurdish participation in drafting the new constitutional contract. The constitution is what defines the form of the state, the limits of power, the nature of rights, and the guarantees protecting citizens and communities.

- From the Margins of Power to Partnership in Decision-Making

The continued exclusion of Kurds from central state institutions does not necessarily preserve their rights. On the contrary, it may lead to decisions concerning them continuing to be made without their participation.

The central authorities are responsible for drafting the constitution and general laws, managing foreign policy, determining the structure of sovereign institutions, and shaping economic, educational, and cultural policies at the national level.

Therefore, the absence of Kurds from the centers of decision-making leaves their cause vulnerable to negotiation among others.

Their presence within state institutions, by contrast, gives them the possibility of moving from being a question that is discussed to becoming a partner that participates in making decisions.

However, such participation must be based on a clear political and legal foundation, rather than temporary power-sharing arrangements or personal loyalties.

What is required is for Syrian Kurds to have independent political representation that expresses their interests within Syria, is grounded in their national reality, and participates in building the state as an authentic Syrian partner.

- The Unity of Syria and Recognition of Diversity

There is no legal or political contradiction between the unity of the Syrian state and recognition of its national diversity.

Indeed, political experience demonstrates that the most stable states are not those that deny the diversity of their societies, but those that organize this diversity within a fair constitutional framework.

Attempts to impose a single national identity as the sole identity of the state and society produce exclusion, whereas recognition of diversity transforms difference from a source of conflict into an element of stability.

The unity of the state does not mean the unity of the nation.

A state can be one, sovereignty can be one, and national institutions can be unified, while recognizing that society consists of multiple nationalities, cultures, and languages.

This is the essence of the modern state: a state of citizenship and law, not a state of imposed identity.

- The Syrian Decision Must Be Syrian

Building a stable state also requires ending the existence of multiple armed and political loyalties that extend beyond the country's borders.

Syria cannot fully restore its sovereignty as long as its territory remains an arena for regional and international conflicts, or as long as certain forces and organizations maintain organizational or military ties to decisions made outside its borders.

Therefore, the principle must be general and clear: all non-Syrian armed forces must be removed from Syrian territory, and any military or organizational dependency that makes national decision-making subordinate to centers outside the state must be ended.

This principle must apply to all forces and communities without exception.

For Syrian Kurds, however, the independence of their political decision-making does not mean abandoning their national identity or severing their cultural and historical ties with the other parts of Kurdistan. A distinction must nevertheless be made between legitimate national affiliation and organizational dependency.

A person can have a national identity while maintaining a Syrian political decision.

This distinction is essential for building a Syrian Kurdish political movement that possesses an independent national decision-making capacity, defends Kurdish rights within the Syrian state, and avoids turning Syrian Kurds into an organizational extension of political projects originating beyond Syria's borders.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the future of the Syrian Kurds should not be tied to the fate of a military force, nor should it be reduced to the appointment of a number of Kurdish figures within the authorities.

The issue is deeper than that: it is a question of constitutional recognition, political partnership, and legal guarantees.

For this reason, the presence of Kurds within the state and its institutions is better than their remaining outside them, provided that this presence is neither symbolic nor merely individual, but constitutes genuine participation in shaping Syria's future.

We do not need a temporary decree.

Nor symbolic representation.

Nor political promises that can later be reversed.

What Syrian Kurds need is a new constitutional contract that recognizes national diversity, affirms the unity of Syria on the basis of equal citizenship, and guarantees national, cultural, and linguistic rights within the framework of the state.

The alternative to exclusion is not separation, and the alternative to assimilation is not isolation.

The most realistic path is one Syrian state, one sovereignty, unified national institutions, and a constitution that recognizes all components of society and makes Kurds partners in the state rather than merely individuals within its authorities.

Only then will the presence of Kurds in Damascus represent a transition from the margins of decision-making to its center—from a position of demanding rights to a position of participating in shaping the state that protects those rights.

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