By Dr. Adnan Bouzan

Introduction:
The state is one of the most complex and problematic political phenomena in human history—not merely because it is an institutional entity, but because it encapsulates within its structure the very essence of the relationship between power and society, between force and legitimacy, and between coercion and consent. From the moment of its initial formation, the state has never been a purely organizational framework for managing collective affairs; rather, it has always been a condensed expression of power relations, social conflicts, and patterns of domination that assume legal, symbolic, and ideological forms.

The central problem in the concept of the state does not lie in its technical definition or in enumerating its legal components as much as it lies in the fundamental question that accompanies its existence: Whom does the state belong to? Is it an instrument in the service of society, or an apparatus that stands above it, detached from it, reproducing domination in the name of order and law? This question has not lost its relevance over time; on the contrary, it has grown more acute with the development of the modern state, the expansion of its institutions, and the increasing capacity of its mechanisms of control, surveillance, and intervention in the most minute details of individual and collective life.

Classical political thought—from Plato and Aristotle through Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau—sought to provide different conceptions of the state, ranging from viewing it as a moral necessity for achieving the common good, to understanding it as a social contract guaranteeing security and freedom, or as an absolute authority justified by fear of chaos. Despite their differences, these perspectives shared a common tendency to treat the state as a solution to the problem of coexistence rather than as a problem in itself. In contrast, modern and contemporary critical approaches—from Marx to Gramsci, and from Weber to Foucault—have exposed the other face of the state: as an apparatus for managing class conflict, a legitimate monopoly over violence, or a complex network of power–knowledge mechanisms.

From this standpoint, the state cannot be approached as a neutral or natural entity. It must instead be understood as a historical product of social, economic, and cultural struggles, and as an institution whose functions and forms change with transformations in modes of production and social structures. The feudal state is not the bourgeois state; the latter is not the national state in the post-colonial phase; nor is it the same as the security state in contemporary authoritarian regimes. Each state has its own historical context, its own tools for producing legitimacy, and its own methods of enforcing obedience.

Here, the problem of legitimacy emerges as the cornerstone for understanding the state. Power, regardless of its magnitude, cannot endure for long through coercion alone. Consequently, the state resorts to producing legitimacy through law, constitutions, ideology, education, media, and sometimes through appeals to the sacred, the national, or the security imperative. Yet when this legitimacy becomes detached from the actual will of society, it turns into a formal façade for coercive authority, and the state becomes an apparatus for managing fear rather than managing consensus.

This problem becomes even more acute in Third World countries, where the modern state was often formed before the emergence of a political society, or was imposed—with its borders and institutions—from outside, within a colonial or post-colonial context. In such cases, the state frequently failed to transform into an inclusive framework for citizenship; instead, it often became a tool for monopolizing power and wealth, and a security apparatus that demands obedience without delivering rights. Here, the question of the state becomes an existential one: Are we living within a state in the political sense, or merely under an overgrown authority devoid of a genuine social contract?

This study, entitled “The Problematics of the State: An Analytical Study of Concept, Power, and Legitimacy,” aims to deconstruct the concept of the state rather than merely explain it. It seeks to interrogate the foundations of political authority, the mechanisms through which legitimacy is produced, and the limits of legitimate obedience. It also aspires to move beyond narrow legalistic approaches toward a critical analytical reading that links the state to its historical and social context and places it face to face with the society it claims to represent.

Accordingly, this research does not proceed from any prior assumption regarding the sanctity of the state or its absolute necessity. Instead, it treats the state as a political phenomenon open to critique and reassessment, and as a power structure that can serve as an instrument of organization and justice, just as it can turn into an instrument of repression and domination. Within this enduring tension between concept and reality, between power and legitimacy, the problematics of the state reveal themselves as one of the most complex issues in modern and contemporary political thought.

First: Defining the State

Defining the state is one of the most complex problematics in political and legal thought—not merely because the term itself is ambiguous, but because the state is not a fixed entity or a complete essence existing outside of time. Rather, it is a historical and evolving phenomenon whose structure, functions, and roles change with transformations in the social, economic, cultural, and political conditions within which it emerges. The state as experienced by humanity in ancient societies—as a personalized authority tied to a ruler or a dynasty—differs fundamentally from the modern state, which is based—at least theoretically—on the ideas of sovereignty, institutions, law, and political representation.

For this reason, the state cannot be reduced to a single, definitive definition, since every definition is necessarily the product of a specific historical and epistemological context and reflects a particular conception of power and of the relationship between ruler and ruled, and between the individual and society. The linguistic definition of the state, associated with the notion of circulation and alternation (the verb dāla, meaning to change or pass from one condition to another), suggests from the outset that the state is not a static condition, but an expression of the movement of power and its transfer, of dominance and shifts in balances of power. In legal doctrine, by contrast, the state is usually defined as a legal entity composed of three basic elements: a people, a territory, and a sovereign authority—an essentially technical definition that focuses on the legal form of the state more than on its social or political substance.

Political thought, however, approaches the state as an organization of power and an instrument for managing conflict within society—whether it is presented as an expression of the general will, as in Rousseau; an apparatus of class domination, as in Marxist analysis; or an institutional framework for regulating legitimate violence, as in Max Weber. The sociological approach, meanwhile, treats the state as the product of complex social relations in which power intersects with economy, identity, culture, and modes of production, such that the state cannot be separated from the social structure upon which it rests or from the forces that reproduce it.

Accordingly, approaching the concept of the state requires critical awareness of the multiplicity of definitions and their differing points of departure, and recognition that every definition is not a neutral description but an implicit intellectual and political position regarding the nature and limits of power, and the place of the individual within it. The state is not merely an administrative apparatus or a legal entity, but a space of conflict and negotiation—a field in which interests intersect and in which concepts of legitimacy, obedience, rights, and duties are continually redefined. Without this composite understanding, defining the state becomes a rigid formula incapable of explaining its crises or understanding its profound transformations in a world where traditional sovereignty is eroding and the relationship between power and society is constantly being reconfigured.

1. The Linguistic Definition of the State

In the Arabic language, the word dawla (state) derives from the triliteral root (d–w–l), a root rich in meanings related to movement, change, and circulation, and fundamentally distant from notions of permanence or stability. Classical Arabic dictionaries note: “dāla al-shay’” (the thing changed and moved from one condition to another), “dālat al-ayyām” (the days alternated and their conditions shifted), and “tadāwala al-qawm al-amr” (the matter circulated among people, not remaining in the hands of one, but subject to alternation, dominance, and change). Thus, the original linguistic meaning of the state directly refers to instability and to power as a mutable affair rather than a fixed reality or eternal essence.

Historically, the use of the term dawla in Arab and Islamic heritage was primarily associated with political authority and those who wielded it, rather than with society, land, or the people. The term denoted the “dominant state” or the “ruling state,” meaning a period during which a particular group, house, or dynasty controlled power. Hence expressions such as the Umayyad State, the Abbasid State, and the Fatimid State, where the term refers to a specific political era and ruling system rather than to a comprehensive legal or social entity. In this context, the state signifies rule and sovereignty, not a community of citizens.

This historical usage reveals an implicit understanding of power as something subject to circulation, governed by balances of force and dominance rather than by legal or institutional rules. Linguistically and historically, the state was not conceived as a neutral framework organizing social affairs, but as a definition of political dominance when it temporarily settles in the hands of a ruler or group. This explains why, in traditional Arab consciousness, the concept of the state is associated with notions such as kingship, sultanate, and conquest, rather than with citizenship or popular legitimacy.

At a deeper semantic level, the linguistic meaning of the word “state” discloses an important philosophical dimension in understanding the political phenomenon: the state is not a fixed or sacred entity, but a historical condition subject to change, transformation, and dissolution. Just as “days alternate,” so too do states rise and fall, expand and contract, flourish and collapse. This meaning stands in sharp contrast to ideological political discourse that seeks to present the state as an eternal entity or an absolute value above history, imbuing it with sanctity or portraying it as an everlasting necessity.

Accordingly, the linguistic definition of the state is not merely a terminological introduction, but a critical key to understanding the nature of power itself. It reminds us that the state is not an end in itself, but a temporary expression of power balances within society, and that its legitimacy—however stable it may claim to be—remains conditioned by its historical and political context. From this perspective, deconstructing the discourse that presents the state as a final or unquestionable entity becomes essential, since language itself reveals that the state, in its original meaning, is a transient and circulating phenomenon, not an eternal fate imposed upon societies.

2. The Legal Definition of the State

Constitutional law and international law define the state as an organized legal and political entity based on the existence of a set of essential elements without which statehood cannot be realized. Jurists of public law largely agree that these elements consist of a people, a territory, and a political authority, with sovereignty often added as a fundamental condition for the full legal personality of the state. According to this conception, the state is a public legal person, distinct from the natural persons who govern it, and its legal personality endures despite changes in rulers or regimes.

In the legal definition, the people are not understood necessarily as a cultural or ethnic group, but as the totality of individuals bound to the state by a legal bond—nationality—subject to its laws, entitled to its rights, and obligated by its duties. Territory represents the geographical space within which the state exercises its authority, including land, territorial waters, and airspace, and constitutes a decisive element distinguishing the state from non-territorial political entities. Political authority, meanwhile, refers to the body or bodies that exercise governance, possessing the capacity to issue binding rules and enforce them using legitimate coercive means in the name of law.

These elements are completed by sovereignty, which forms the cornerstone of the state’s legal structure. Internally, sovereignty signifies the supremacy of the state’s authority over all individuals and groups within its territory and its subordination to no higher power. Externally, it signifies the independence of the state from any foreign authority and its ability to manage its affairs and international relations freely. In this sense, the state becomes a fully constituted legal unit, capable of entering into international relations, concluding treaties, and bearing legal responsibility before the international community.

This legal definition is characterized by its procedural and organizational nature, focusing on form and structure more than on social or political substance. Its primary aim is to identify the conditions for the existence of the state from a legal perspective, provide clear criteria for its recognition in the international system, regulate its relations with other states, and define its relationship with individuals subject to its authority. Hence, this definition is indispensable for understanding the functioning of constitutional institutions, the organization of powers, the allocation of competencies, and the continuity of the state as a legal entity independent of daily political fluctuations.

However, despite its practical importance, this definition remains insufficient to capture the essence of the state as a complex political and social phenomenon. It treats political authority as a neutral element without questioning its actual nature: Is it representative or coercive? Democratic or authoritarian? Does it serve society as a whole, or a particular group, class, or elite? It also ignores the historical and social contexts in which the state emerged, as well as the economic and cultural conditions that shape the functioning of its institutions and delimit their effectiveness.

Moreover, the legal definition implicitly assumes that the mere existence of formal elements is sufficient to consider a state established and legitimate, even if authority is disconnected from society, based on repression, or devoid of any genuine representation of popular will. This opens the door to the existence of states that are “legal” in a formal sense, yet failed, authoritarian, or internally fragmented in political and social terms. Hence the necessity of moving beyond a purely legal definition and integrating it with critical political and sociological approaches that place legitimacy, the nature of power, and its relationship with society at the center of the definition of the state rather than at its margins.

3. The Political Definition of the State

From a political perspective, the state is understood as the highest organized authority within society and the framework through which political power is exercised in all its manifestations—legislation, execution, and adjudication—along with the monopoly over material and symbolic means of coercion in the name of public order. In this view, the state is not merely an administrative apparatus or a neutral legal entity, but the center of political decision-making and the arena in which the nature of rule, the form of authority, the mechanisms of power distribution, and the limits of obedience and opposition are determined.

Within this context, the state is defined as the structure through which social conflicts are managed—either by institutional settlement or by suppression through force—and within which decisive decisions regarding war and peace, the economy, identity, and foreign relations are made. Here, the state is not a spontaneous reflection of social consensus, but the product of continuous balances and struggles among diverse political and social forces, each seeking to impose its vision and interests within the public sphere.

Modern political thought offers several classical definitions that reflect this power-centered understanding of the state. Thomas Hobbes, for example, viewed the state as a necessary “Leviathan” to prevent chaos and perpetual conflict among individuals, granting it near-absolute authority in exchange for security and stability. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, by contrast, linked the state to the idea of the general will, considering it the political expression of the social contract and deriving its legitimacy from the agreement of free individuals to submit to laws they collectively create. Max Weber, however, offered a more pragmatic and realistic definition, arguing that the state is the entity that monopolizes the “legitimate use of violence” within a given territory, regardless of the moral or democratic foundations of its exercise.

Yet the political definition of the state opens the door to a fundamental problem concerning the nature of power itself: Is the state an expression of the general will or an instrument for imposing the will of a ruling elite? Does it function as a mediator organizing social relations, or does it become an apparatus of domination that imposes its vision by force and reproduces inequality? These questions cannot be separated from the nature of the prevailing political system or from the social and economic structure upon which the state rests.

In this regard, critical thought—particularly Marxist theory—offers a different reading of the state as an apparatus serving the interests of the dominant class and stabilizing existing relations of production through law, institutions, and ideology. From this perspective, the state is not an arbiter above society, but its class product and a tool for managing social conflict in a way that ensures the continuity of domination. Liberal approaches, on the other hand, maintain that despite its distortions, the state can function as a relatively neutral framework for organizing political pluralism and protecting rights and freedoms, provided it is subjected to democratic oversight and accountability.

Thus, the political definition reveals the state not as a simple or neutral entity, but as a complex power structure in which force, interest, and ideology intersect, shaped through an ongoing struggle between those who hold power and those who seek to limit or redistribute it. The state is neither merely a government ruling from above nor a purely legal embodiment of society, but an arena of struggle over legitimacy, the meaning of power, its limits, and who has the right to decide in the name of all. Without this critical understanding, the political definition of the state becomes a superficial description incapable of explaining authoritarianism or understanding the profound transformations the state undergoes during crises, revolutions, and major collapses.

4. The Sociological Definition: The State as a Legitimate Monopoly of Violence

The sociological definition proposed by the German sociologist Max Weber is among the most influential and profound in understanding the modern state, due to its realistic approach that distances itself from normative and moral conceptions and focuses instead on the essence of power as it is actually exercised. Weber defined the state as “a human community that successfully claims, within a given territory, the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.” The importance of this definition lies not in violence per se, but in its monopolization and organization, and in its transformation from chaotic practice into a centralized tool under a single recognized authority.

Weber begins from the basic assumption that every political order, regardless of its nature, ultimately rests on the possibility of resorting to force. Laws, administrative decisions, taxes, and sanctions derive their effectiveness from the state’s capacity for coercion. Unlike other forms of violence present in society, however, the state monopolizes violence and endows it with legitimacy, stripping it of arbitrariness and cloaking it in law and order. Violence thus becomes not an exceptional act, but a structural component of power.

Yet Weber does not reduce the state to mere violence, nor does he portray it as a purely repressive machine. The decisive element in his definition is “legitimacy.” Violence does not become state violence simply by possessing force, but by being exercised in the name of an order regarded as legitimate. Here, Weber links the existence and continuity of the state to the degree of social recognition of its authority—that is, the acceptance by individuals and groups subject to it of this monopoly, or at least their submission to it as natural or inevitable.

On this basis, Weber distinguished between different types of political legitimacy: traditional legitimacy, based on customs and inherited authority; charismatic legitimacy, derived from the exceptional qualities attributed to a leader; and legal-rational legitimacy, grounded in abstract rules, institutions, and procedures. The latter constitutes the foundation of the modern state, where obedience is owed not to the ruler as a person, but to the law, which is presumed to represent a rational and neutral order.

Weber’s definition reveals a crucial sociological dimension: the state is not merely a legal or political structure, but a social relationship based on obedience and discipline. The monopoly of legitimate violence is achieved not through force alone, but through a complex system of values, symbols, and institutions that convince society of the legitimacy of authority—or compel it to accept it. Without such acceptance, state violence becomes naked violence, facing constant resistance and ultimately leading to erosion or collapse.

Despite its analytical power, this definition is not without critical problems. On the one hand, it focuses on instruments of domination more than on the social or ethical purposes of the state; on the other, it may be used to justify any repressive practice so long as it is covered by claims of legitimacy. It also fails to adequately answer the question: Who determines what is “legitimate”? Is formal legality sufficient, or does genuine legitimacy require actual social participation and consent?

Accordingly, the sociological definition of the state as a legitimate monopoly of violence provides a key to understanding modern power, but it also necessitates linking this monopoly to democratic legitimacy and social justice. The state does not endure through violence alone, but through its ability to transform force into acceptance and coercion into relative voluntary obedience. When it fails to do so, its monopoly of violence becomes a source of disintegration rather than stability, and the state itself becomes an object of contestation and rejection—not merely as a legal authority, but as a social relationship that has lost the justifications for its existence.

5. The Philosophical and Critical Definition of the State

Political philosophy views the state as more than a mere governing apparatus or legal framework for organizing power; it understands it as the embodiment of a complex relationship between the individual and the collective, between freedom and necessity, and between private will and general will. At this level of analysis, the state is not only an institutional structure, but a philosophical idea reflecting deep conceptions of human nature, society, the meaning of authority, and the limits of obedience and freedom.

In Hegelian philosophy, the state occupies a central position as the highest manifestation of what Hegel calls “objective ethical reason.” For Hegel, the state is not the opposite of individual freedom, but its condition of realization. Freedom is not understood as absolute individual will or unrestrained subjective desire, but as conscious integration into a rational universal order embodied in laws and institutions. Thus, the state is the framework within which individual will reconciles with the social whole, and obedience to law is not coercive submission but an expression of rational freedom in which the individual recognizes that true self-interest is inseparable from the collective interest. Despite its philosophical depth, this conception has been widely criticized for its tendency to justify existing authority and grant the state a near-absolute status that risks marginalizing social conflict and sanctifying the prevailing political order.

Karl Marx, by contrast, offered a radically critical reading of the state, reversing the Hegelian perspective. For Marx, the state is not the embodiment of reason or ethics, but a historical product of specific material conditions and an instrument of the ruling class used to protect its economic interests and reproduce relations of class domination. Law, institutions, and administrative apparatuses are not neutral; they reflect the balance of forces within society. From this standpoint, the state cannot be understood apart from the economic structure and relations of production that determine who owns wealth and who holds power. The state is not an arbiter above society, but a concentrated expression of its class contradictions.

Later Marxist thought developed this critique further, especially in the work of Antonio Gramsci, who expanded the concept of the state to include civil society. Gramsci argued that domination is exercised not by coercion alone, but through the construction of social, moral, and cultural consensus that makes ruling-class dominance appear natural and acceptable. Here, the state ceases to be merely a repressive apparatus and becomes an integrated system of institutions and discourses that produce voluntary obedience and shape collective consciousness.

Contemporary philosophical and critical approaches have gone even further, moving beyond purely class-based analysis to view the state as a complex network of interwoven power relations not concentrated in a single institution or class, but dispersed across law, knowledge, discourse, and mechanisms of social discipline. Michel Foucault is among the most prominent thinkers to articulate this conceptual shift, arguing that modern power operates not only through direct repression, but through the organization of daily life, the regulation of bodies, the production of norms, and the shaping of thought and behavior. From this perspective, the state governs not only through police and armies, but through schools, hospitals, prisons, statistics, and scientific and legal discourse.

This critical understanding reveals that the state imposes its authority not through naked force alone, but through what may be called “symbolic violence”—by making certain ways of thinking and living appear natural, rational, and inevitable. Power becomes more effective when it is exercised invisibly, and when individuals internalize the rules imposed upon them and reproduce them voluntarily in everyday life.

Accordingly, the philosophical and critical definition of the state liberates the concept from narrow legal or political reductionism and reveals it as a complex historical, epistemic, and power-laden structure that changes with shifts in authority, discourse, and resistance. The state is not a fixed or neutral entity, but a permanent arena of struggle over the meaning of freedom, the limits of power, and who has the right to define the public interest. Without this critical awareness, thinking about the state becomes a theoretical justification of the existing order rather than a tool for understanding and transcending it.

6. Toward a Synthetic Definition of the State

Drawing on linguistic, legal, political, sociological, and critical philosophical approaches, it becomes clear that the state cannot be reduced to a single, closed, or final definition. The state is not merely a legal entity that fulfills conditions of international recognition, nor a neutral administrative apparatus managing public affairs, nor simply a coercive authority monopolizing violence. Rather, it is a complex historical–political structure formed through intricate interaction between power and society, law and force, legitimacy and conflict.

At its core, the state is an institutional framework for monopolizing authority and coercion in the name of legitimacy, while simultaneously remaining an open arena of continuous social and political contestation. It governs society through a system of laws and institutions, yet these laws and institutions are not necessarily neutral; they reflect— to varying degrees—prevailing balances of power and express the interests of particular groups, classes, or elites, even when cloaked in the language of public interest or legal rationality.

From this perspective, the state can be understood as a social relationship before being an institutional apparatus—that is, as a network of power relations that organize obedience, define what is permissible and forbidden, and regulate the distribution of resources, opportunities, and recognition. Its capacity to endure derives neither from violence alone nor from abstract law, but from its ability to transform force into legitimacy and coercion into relative social acceptance through discourse, institutions, education, media, and national symbols.

The state is also profoundly historical, with functions and forms that change across times and contexts. The liberal state is not the authoritarian state; the nation-state is not the imperial state; the rentier state is not the welfare state. Any attempt to define the state in isolation from the conditions of its emergence and development strips it of its dynamic character and turns it into a static concept incapable of explaining its crises, transformations, and ruptures.

Therefore, a synthetic definition of the state should not seek closure or finality, but openness and critique. The state is not an ultimate truth, but a continuous problematic that renews itself with every struggle over power, legitimacy, and freedom. Fixing its definition in a rigid formula serves not knowledge, but the concealment of its conflictual nature and the normalization of forms of domination exercised in the name of law, order, or public interest.

In this light, the state may be defined as a complex historical–political structure that monopolizes the means of power and coercion within a specific geographic domain, governs society through law and institutions, reproduces prevailing power relations, and at the same time remains an open field for resistance, change, and redefinition. The state is not the end of political history, but one of its central arenas, where coercion and legitimacy, domination and emancipation, stability and disintegration intersect. For this very reason, the concept of the state must always remain subject to critical interrogation, rather than consensus or sanctification.

Secondly: The Emergence of the State and Its Historical Development

The question of the emergence of the state and its historical development represents one of the most complex and controversial issues in political and social thought, as it is directly connected to the primordial question of power: How did the state arise? Why did human beings accept submission to it? Was the state a response to a social and organizational need, or the result of coercion, domination, and conflict? Examining the origins of the state does not mean tracing a single historical event or a clear founding moment; rather, it requires deconstructing a long trajectory of economic, social, cultural, and political transformations that gradually led to the formation of different patterns of authority and organization, culminating in what we today call “the state.”

The state did not emerge suddenly, nor did it arise as a fully formed institution with complete structures and functions. Instead, it was the outcome of a complex historical evolution that began with early human communities based on kinship and tribal ties, where authority was diffuse and non-centralized, often grounded in custom, tradition, and natural leadership rather than written law or administrative apparatuses. In such societies, there was no state in the modern sense, but rather primitive forms of social organization governed by collective solidarity, kinship, rituals, and limited, non-monopolized violence.

With the development of modes of production, human settlement, the emergence of agriculture, and the accumulation of economic surplus, new and more complex—and unequal—social relations began to take shape. Surplus required management, protection required organization, and competition over resources necessitated a central authority capable of regulation and coercion. From this point onward, authority began to differentiate itself from society, gradually transforming into a relatively autonomous apparatus that monopolized decision-making and violence, imposing order in the name of the sacred, custom, or sheer force. At this stage, the early features of the first states began to appear, intertwined with religion, myth, and military power.

Ancient history witnessed the rise of major imperial states in Mesopotamia, Ancient Egypt, China, and India, where the state was closely linked to the divine or semi-divine ruler, and authority was exercised as a heavenly destiny beyond question. Here, the state was not an expression of society, but a power standing above it, deriving its legitimacy from the sacred and enforcing obedience through both force and symbolism. Nevertheless, these states marked a qualitative step in the history of political organization, as they established, for the first time, centralized administration, law, standing armies, and taxation.

With the transition to the Middle Ages, the concept of the state underwent new transformations, particularly in the European context, where authority fragmented among feudal lords, the Church, and monarchs, and sovereignty was neither unified nor centralized. By contrast, the Islamic world developed a different model, in which the state was associated with the caliphate as a politico-religious authority, even though the concept of the state remained tied more to rule and dynasty than to society or territory. In both cases, the state had not yet separated from the person of the ruler or from religious legitimacy.

The radical transformation in the history of the state, however, was linked to the emergence of the modern state in Europe from the sixteenth century onward, with the rise of capitalism, the disintegration of the feudal system, and the outbreak of religious wars that imposed the need for a strong central authority capable of monopolizing violence and ending chaos. With the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the concept of territorial sovereignty crystallized, and the state came to be understood as an independent legal entity with defined borders and supreme authority within its territory—forming the theoretical and practical foundation of the modern nation-state.

With the bourgeois revolutions, especially the French Revolution, the state entered a new phase in which authority was redefined in the name of the people rather than the monarch or divine right. Concepts such as citizenship, the constitution, and the separation of powers emerged. Yet this transformation did not eliminate the authoritarian character of the state; rather, it reshaped it within new legal and institutional frameworks that sometimes concealed relations of domination behind the discourse of rights and freedom.

In the modern and contemporary eras, the state continued to transform under the pressures of globalization, the evolution of capitalism, the rise of the bureaucratic state, the welfare state, and eventually the security-oriented and neoliberal state. At every stage, the state redefined its functions and limits without relinquishing its core authoritarian essence based on monopolizing decision-making, violence, and legitimacy.

Accordingly, the study of the emergence of the state and its historical development does not aim at a neutral chronological narrative, but at understanding the state as the product of a long historical struggle in which authority was formed through violence, organization, and legitimacy. Through this process, the state evolved from a rudimentary instrument of control into a complex structure for managing and dominating society. Without this historical understanding, it is impossible to grasp the nature of the contemporary state, to deconstruct its crises, or to question its claims of neutrality and necessity. The state is not a natural given, but a historical construction subject to change, reconfiguration, and even disintegration.

1. The State in Ancient Societies

The emergence of the state in ancient societies represents a pivotal moment in the political history of humanity, marking the transition from simple forms of social organization based on kinship, tribe, and tradition to more complex patterns of centralized authority and institutional organization. The state appeared in major ancient civilizations such as Mesopotamia, Ancient Egypt, China, and India as a supreme central authority that monopolized decision-making and violence, imposed social order in the name of the sacred, and linked rule to the person of the king or divine ruler.

The rise of the ancient state was associated with profound transformations, foremost among them agricultural settlement, the emergence of economic surplus, urban growth, and the increasing complexity of the division of labor. Agricultural surplus required centralized management for irrigation, storage, and distribution, while protection of that surplus necessitated an apparatus capable of defending it from internal and external threats. Thus, political authority gradually separated from society and transformed into a relatively autonomous structure that imposed itself as an organizational and security necessity, soon acquiring a coercive and hegemonic character.

In Mesopotamian civilizations—Sumerian, Babylonian, and Assyrian—the state initially formed around the city-state, later developing into centralized states and expansionist empires. The king was presented as the representative of the gods on earth or as chosen by them, granting political authority a sacred religious character. Law, as embodied in codes such as the Code of Hammurabi, was not an expression of legal equality but a tool for organizing society according to rigid hierarchies that entrenched class differences and endowed them with legitimacy.

In Ancient Egypt, the relationship between state and religion reached its apex, as the state was embodied in the person of the Pharaoh, regarded as a living god or the son of a god who manifested cosmic order (Ma’at) on earth. The Egyptian state was highly centralized and cohesive, based on an advanced administrative and bureaucratic apparatus relying on scribes and officials, and exercising control over land, taxation, and forced labor. Despite its efficiency, this system rested on absolute despotism, where the distinction between ruler and state vanished and all authority was concentrated in the person of the Pharaoh.

In ancient China, the state was linked to the concept of the “Mandate of Heaven,” which granted the emperor legitimacy as long as he ensured harmony and order. Although this idea theoretically allowed for the withdrawal of legitimacy from a tyrannical ruler, in practice it functioned as an ideological framework justifying strict central authority. The Chinese state developed as an early bureaucratic state, relying on a hierarchical administrative system, strict laws, and intense social discipline, in which the individual was subject to the state as both a moral and organizational authority.

In ancient India, the state was intertwined with the complex religious–social structure of the caste (varna) system. Political authority was not separate from the religious order but part of a cosmic system that defined an individual’s status and duties from birth. The state was governed in the name of “dharma,” the cosmic moral order that justified social hierarchy and endowed it with sacred legitimacy. Here, the state was not merely an instrument of coercion but also a means of reproducing an unequal social order perceived as divinely ordained.

Across these civilizations, the ancient state was fundamentally despotic: it monopolized authority, wealth, and violence, and derived its legitimacy from religion and myth rather than from society or the general will. The individual was not a citizen but a subject, and obedience was imposed as a religious and moral duty rather than a political choice. There was no clear distinction between the state and the ruler, nor between public authority and private interest; the state was embodied in the person of the king or emperor.

Nevertheless, the state in ancient societies should not be seen merely as a primitive apparatus of repression. It played a significant historical role in organizing social life, building cities, developing writing, law, and administration, and establishing the first forms of large-scale political organization. Yet this progressive role came at a high social cost, manifested in the entrenchment of despotism, hierarchy, and the absence of individual freedom.

Thus, the state in ancient societies represents a foundational stage in the history of power, where the ideas of centralized rule, legitimacy, and monopolized authority first took shape. At the same time, it reveals the deep roots of political despotism and the association of the state with coercion and the sacred—roots that would persist in various forms throughout subsequent stages of state development, even in its most modern and advanced manifestations.

2. The State in the Middle Ages

The Middle Ages represent a complex transitional phase in the history of the state, particularly in the European context, where the idea of centralized statehood declined markedly compared to the ancient empires and was replaced by a fragmented political order characterized by multiple centers of power. In medieval Europe, the state was not a unified sovereign entity or a supreme authority monopolizing decision-making and violence; rather, power was dispersed among kings, feudal nobles, and the Church within a complex network of overlapping loyalties, rights, and privileges.

Following the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, the political and administrative framework that had provided a degree of centralized authority disintegrated, and Europe entered a period marked by the absence of the state in its institutional sense. The feudal system rose as the dominant mode of organizing power and society, with land as the basis of political authority and social relations structured as personal bonds of dependency between lord and vassal, based on protection in exchange for obedience and labor. In this context, authority was not abstractly political but personal and local, exercised within limited geographical domains and grounded in private military force and custom rather than public law.

Under this system, the king—at best—was a supreme feudal lord rather than an absolute sovereign. His authority was constrained by the privileges of the nobility and their military and economic power, limiting his ability to impose his will across the entire territory. The Church, meanwhile, constituted a parallel—and at times superior—authority, wielding extensive spiritual and political influence and claiming to represent divine will, thereby possessing the power to legitimize or delegitimize kings. Sovereignty was thus neither unified nor centralized but fragmented between temporal and spiritual authorities competing for legitimacy and influence.

This fragmentation reflected the absence of the modern concept of the state based on territorial sovereignty and unified legal authority. There was no universal law applicable to all; instead, a patchwork of local laws and customs prevailed, varying from one feudal domain to another. Nor was there a national army or a centralized administrative apparatus, but rather private forces of the nobility and limited governance based on personal loyalty rather than allegiance to a collective political entity.

Yet the state was not entirely absent in the Middle Ages; it was in a slow and gradual process of transformation. The expansion of trade, the growth of cities, and the emergence of a nascent bourgeois class increased the need for a central authority capable of securing roads, protecting markets, and imposing order. Continuous conflicts between kings and nobles, and between temporal power and the Church, also contributed to the gradual articulation of the concept of sovereignty, albeit in a limited and contested form.

By contrast, the Islamic world during the Middle Ages exhibited a different model of statehood. Although political authority was fragmented in practice and multiple dynasties and states emerged, the caliphate retained—at least theoretically—the idea of political unity and religious legitimacy. Nevertheless, the concept of the state remained tied to rule and dynasty rather than to citizenship or modern territorial sovereignty, placing it within the broader framework of the pre-modern state.

Accordingly, the state in the Middle Ages—especially in Europe—was characterized by weak centralization, fragmented sovereignty, and the personalization of power, features that prevented the emergence of the state in its modern sense. Yet despite its fragmentation, this period was historically necessary, as it laid the groundwork for the major transformations that would later lead to the rise of the centralized modern state as a historical response to the crises, contradictions, and inadequacies of feudalism in managing an increasingly complex and expansive society.

3. The Modern State

The emergence of the modern state represents a radical transformation in the history of political organization, marking the shift from personalized, religious, or fragmented feudal authority to a centralized politico-legal entity based on sovereignty, territory, institutions, and international recognition. This transformation is historically associated with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which ended the religious wars in Europe and, for the first time, established the principle of national sovereignty as the foundation of interstate relations, linking the state to a defined territory and recognized borders rather than to church authority or divine right.

The Peace of Westphalia emerged from a turbulent European context marked by prolonged and devastating religious conflicts that exposed the inability of the feudal system and transnational religious authority to ensure stability. Consequently, the need arose for a strong central political authority capable of monopolizing decision-making and violence within its territory and ending the overlap between temporal and spiritual powers. The modern state thus emerged as a historical response to a comprehensive crisis rather than as a mere legal evolution.

With Westphalia, the concept of sovereignty crystallized as a foundational principle of the modern state. Internally, sovereignty signifies the supremacy of state authority over all forces within its territory and its monopoly over legislation and coercion; externally, it denotes complete independence from any supranational authority. The state thus became a relatively closed political unit with clear borders and supreme authority, engaging with other states on the basis of legal equality rather than religious or imperial subordination.

This transformation was accompanied by a profound historical process of power centralization and institution-building. The modern state dismantled feudal structures, disarmed the nobility, monopolized violence through a standing army, and constructed a centralized administrative and bureaucratic apparatus based on written laws and regular taxation. Authority was no longer exercised in the name of the ruler’s person but in the name of the state as an abstract and enduring entity that persisted despite changes in rulers and regimes.

In this context, modern political thought played a decisive role in framing the concept of the state. Thomas Hobbes viewed the state as a rational necessity to end chaos, granting it absolute authority to ensure security. John Locke saw the state as founded on a social contract aimed at protecting natural rights, with authority limited by the consent of the governed. Jean-Jacques Rousseau linked the legitimacy of the state to the general will, emphasizing that sovereignty is inalienable and resides with the people. Thus, debates about the state shifted from questions of domination and divine right to those of legitimacy, law, and representation.

Yet the modern state was not a purely emancipatory project. Alongside institution-building and rights, it strengthened mechanisms of control and surveillance, expanding its capacity to intervene in individuals’ lives through administration, statistics, education, conscription, and taxation. Its emergence was also tied to the rise of capitalism and the market’s need for a central authority to guarantee property rights, contracts, and the unification of the national market. Consequently, the modern state became simultaneously a framework for rights and an instrument for reproducing economic and social power relations.

In the nineteenth century, the nation-state crystallized as the state became intertwined with the nation, redefining political belonging in terms of national identity rather than personal or religious loyalty. While this fusion enhanced state legitimacy, it also paved the way for extreme nationalism, wars, and colonial expansion in the name of sovereignty and national interest.

Accordingly, the modern state is the product of a long historical process of struggle, centralization, and codification rather than a natural or final model of political organization. It is an independent legal entity within the international system, founded on sovereignty, territory, and institutions, yet always conditioned by internal and external power balances and by its capacity to produce legitimacy. Without understanding these complex historical roots, discussions of the modern state remain abstract, overlooking its structural contradictions and its dual role as both a framework for freedom and an instrument of control and domination.

Third: The Constituent Elements of the State

According to classical political and legal theory, the state is founded upon a set of essential elements without which its legal existence cannot be realized and its political meaning cannot be fulfilled. These elements, however, are not merely formal conditions or technical requirements to be met in order to declare the existence of a state; rather, they constitute the deep structure upon which the political entity rests as a historical and social organization of power. The state is not an abstract being or a purely legal construct isolated from reality, but the product of a long process of interaction and conflict between society and authority, between the internal and the external, and between law and force.

From this perspective, the constituent elements of the state express its core functions and fundamental roles in organizing society and regulating relations within it. They also define its geographical and political boundaries, the nature of the authority it exercises, and the basis upon which it claims obedience from individuals and recognition from other states. Each of these elements derives its meaning only in relation to the others and cannot be properly understood if isolated from them or detached from the historical and social context in which it emerged.

The importance of discussing the elements of the state lies in the fact that they provide a necessary entry point for understanding the major issues associated with the modern state, such as legitimacy, sovereignty, political representation, the limits of authority, and the relationship between the state and society. A defect or imbalance in any of these elements—or the hypertrophy of one at the expense of the others—does not merely weaken the state or render it fragile; it may transform it into an instrument of oppression, or into an entity incapable of performing its basic functions, or even lead to its collapse as a unifying framework for society.

Accordingly, the study of the constituent elements of the state should not be approached as a rigid theoretical exercise, but as a critical analysis of the very structure of power and of the conditions that render the state legitimate and capable of continuity. At its core, the state is not simply the sum of a people, a territory, an authority, and sovereignty, but a dynamic and evolving relationship among these elements, shaped by balances of power, levels of political consciousness, and the nature of the prevailing system. Any serious approach to the elements of the state therefore requires moving beyond textbook definitions and treating them as problematic concepts open to critique and rethinking, rather than as fixed truths outside of history.

1. The People

The people refers to the group of individuals who are bound to the state by a permanent legal and political bond known as nationality. In legal terms, the people is not defined on an ethnic, religious, or linguistic basis, but on the basis of legal belonging to a specific political entity and the rights and duties that arise from such belonging. In principle, the people are both the bearer of sovereignty and the object of authority, as power is exercised in their name and over them.

The concept of the people represents an important historical development, particularly with the emergence of the modern state, as it marked the transition from the notion of “subjects” subordinate to a ruler to that of “citizens” belonging to the state as a public entity. Yet in many contexts this transformation has remained largely formal, with the relationship between the state and the people continuing to be one of domination rather than genuine political partnership.

The notion of the people also raises profound problems in multinational, multireligious, or multicultural states, where the state is often reduced to a single dominant identity while other components of the people are politically or culturally marginalized. Here, the tension between the abstract legal concept of the people and the unequal social and political reality becomes evident, turning the element of the people itself into a field of struggle over representation, citizenship, and recognition.

2. Territory

Territory is the geographical space over which the state exercises its authority and sovereignty. It includes land, territorial waters, and airspace, as well as the natural resources associated with them. Territory is a decisive element in defining the modern state, as it determines the scope of authority and distinguishes the state from other non-territorial political entities.

The importance of territory is closely linked to the principle of territorial sovereignty, which means that the state enjoys exclusive authority within its borders and that no other state may interfere in its internal affairs. However, this concept—firmly established with the modern state—has increasingly come under challenge in the context of globalization, international interventions, and the declining capacity of some states to exercise effective control over their entire territory.

Territory is not a neutral space, but a field of political, economic, and symbolic struggle. Control over land entails control over resources, populations, memory, and identity. For this reason, territorial disputes have long been—and continue to be—among the most significant causes of conflict between states and one of the most prominent manifestations of the crisis of sovereignty in the contemporary world.

3. Political Authority

Political authority is the active element of the state: the apparatus responsible for managing public affairs, enacting and enforcing laws, adjudicating disputes, and monopolizing the use of force in the name of public order. It encompasses the various governing institutions, including legislative, executive, and judicial authorities, as well as security and military agencies.

Political authority, however, is not a neutral or technical entity; it reflects the nature of the prevailing political system and the balance of power within society. It may be a representative authority derived from the will of the people, or an authoritarian authority imposed by force, even when cloaked in legal and constitutional frameworks. Thus, the mere existence of political authority is insufficient to conclude that a just or legitimate state exists; one must ask how this authority is formed, in whose interests it operates, and by what means.

The monopoly of violence constitutes one of the most dangerous functions of political authority, as it grants the state the capacity to enforce obedience through coercion when necessary. Yet when this monopoly becomes detached from legitimacy and accountability, it turns into an instrument of repression, erodes the relationship between the state and society, and may ultimately lead to the collapse of the state itself.

4. Sovereignty

Sovereignty is the most complex and problematic element in the structure of the state, as it represents the supreme authority that is subject to no higher power within the territory and is not subordinated externally to any other entity. Internally, sovereignty signifies the supremacy of the state over all individuals and groups; externally, it denotes independence in international relations and legal equality with other states.

Sovereignty has been a cornerstone of the modern state since the Peace of Westphalia, yet it has never been a fixed or absolute concept. Even at the height of the nation-state, sovereignty was constrained by power balances and international economic and political relations. Today, sovereignty has become increasingly fragile under the impact of globalization, international institutions, and military and economic interventions, raising serious questions about the future of this traditional element.

Moreover, sovereignty is often invoked in many contexts as a pretext to justify authoritarianism and the suppression of freedoms in the name of “non-interference” and “national particularity,” revealing the contradiction between sovereignty as a legal principle and sovereignty as a political instrument in the hands of power.

In conclusion, the four constituent elements of the state—people, territory, political authority, and sovereignty—form the classical framework for understanding the state in political and legal theory. Yet they are not sufficient on their own to comprehend the state as a living and complex phenomenon. These elements do not operate in a vacuum, but within historical, social, and conflictual contexts that render the state a dynamic entity whose strength and legitimacy are determined by its internal balance and by the nature of its relationship with society, rather than by the mere fulfillment of rigid formal conditions.

Fourth: The Functions of the State

The state, as an organized political entity, is not limited to being a governing apparatus or an administrative authority that manages public affairs from a superior position. Rather, at its core, it performs a set of fundamental functions that constitute the historical justification for its existence and provide the practical basis for its legitimacy in the eyes of society. The state is not measured solely by the constitutional principles it proclaims or the political discourse it adopts, but by the actual roles it plays in people’s daily lives—roles that shape their relationship with authority and determine the extent to which they feel a sense of belonging to the political entity within which they live.

The functions of the state are the sphere in which authority is transformed from an abstract idea or legal texts into concrete practice, embodied in the security felt by citizens, the law that regulates their relationships, the economic policies that determine their standard of living, and the social services that safeguard their human dignity. From this perspective, studying the functions of the state opens the way to understanding its true nature: Is it a state in the service of society, or a society in the service of the state? Is authority exercised as an instrument of fair organization and regulation, or as a means of domination and subjugation?

Moreover, the functions of the state are neither fixed nor identical across time; they change with shifting historical, social, and economic contexts. The state has undergone profound transformations—from a “night-watchman” state whose tasks were limited to security and defense, to an interventionist state assuming broad economic and social roles, and finally to the neoliberal state that has redefined its functions and the limits of its intervention. These transformations reflect the nature of social conflicts, the balance of power among different classes and groups, and the level of political consciousness within society.

Accordingly, the functions of the state cannot be viewed as neutral technical tasks, but rather as political and ideological choices that express a particular vision of the relationship between the state and society. Every expansion or contraction of a state function has a direct impact on the distribution of power and wealth, the level of social justice, and the nature of the prevailing social contract. Thus, the study of state functions becomes a critical entry point for understanding the crises of the contemporary state, the limits of its legitimacy, and the possibility of its transformation from an instrument of control into an inclusive framework that guarantees both freedom and justice.

1. The Security Function

The security function is one of the oldest functions of the state and among those most closely linked to the idea of its emergence. In one of its most essential roles, the state claims the monopoly over the legitimate use of force in order to protect the territory and maintain internal order. This includes defending borders against external aggression, ensuring the unity and integrity of the territory, as well as preserving security within society and preventing chaos and unlawful violence.

However, the security function is not confined to the military or policing dimension alone; it also concerns ensuring general stability that enables society to pursue its economic, social, and political activities. Security here is not an end in itself, but a prerequisite for the performance of other functions. Nonetheless, a fundamental problem arises when the security function shifts from protecting society to controlling it, as authoritarian states tend to inflate the security dimension at the expense of freedoms and justify repression in the name of stability and order. Hence, the legitimacy of the security function is measured by the extent of its subordination to the law and by whether it serves society rather than standing above it.

2. The Legal Function

The legal function of the state consists in enacting laws and regulating relations among individuals, and between them and institutions, in a manner that ensures a minimum level of order and justice. Through this function, the state transforms force into law and replaces the logic of individual revenge with the logic of institutional justice, thereby enabling disputes to be resolved within a general and abstract legal framework.

The legal function goes beyond the mere issuance of legislative texts to include the equal application of the law to all without discrimination, the independence of the judiciary, and the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. In the modern state, the law is not supposed to be an instrument in the hands of authority, but rather a framework that regulates and constrains it. Yet reality shows that the law can, in many contexts, become a tool for legitimizing domination when legislation is tailored to fit the ruling power or applied selectively. Therefore, the true value of the legal function is measured by the extent to which the state itself is subject to the law, not merely by its ability to impose it on society.

3. The Economic Function

The economic function of the state has become increasingly prominent with the development of capitalism and the growing complexity of economic relations, as it has become impossible to leave the market to operate independently of state intervention. This function involves regulating economic activity, providing essential infrastructure, and formulating fiscal and monetary policies in a way that ensures economic stability and achieves a minimum level of social justice.

This does not necessarily mean that the state manages all sectors of the economy, but rather that it assumes the role of regulator and guarantor of general balances, particularly with regard to wealth distribution, the protection of vulnerable groups, and the prevention of monopolies. Yet this function also reveals the class character of the state, as economic policies often reflect the balance of power within society, serving the interests of certain groups at the expense of others. Consequently, the state becomes either an instrument for reproducing inequality or a means of reducing it, depending on the nature of the prevailing political and social system.

4. The Social Function

The social function of the state lies in providing basic services that cannot be left to market logic alone, such as education, healthcare, social welfare, housing, and ensuring a minimum standard of decent living for citizens. Historically, this role has been associated with the rise of the welfare state, which sought to achieve a degree of social justice and solidarity, especially in the aftermath of major crises and wars.

The social function acquires a profound political and ethical dimension because it expresses the state’s view of its citizens: are they merely subjects or labor power, or partners in the political community? A state that neglects this role turns into a purely authoritarian apparatus, gradually losing its social legitimacy. Moreover, the reduction of the social function under the pretext of economic efficiency or austerity often leads to the fragmentation of social bonds and a widening gap between the state and society.

In conclusion, the functions of the state are neither neutral nor fixed; they are historically shaped according to the nature of power and the balance of social forces. Therefore, evaluating the state cannot be limited to its constitutional form or political rhetoric, but must be based on how it performs its fundamental functions and the extent to which these functions express the interests of society as a whole, rather than those of a narrow elite.

Fifth: Types of the State

The state does not assume a single fixed form in organizing and distributing power; rather, its types vary according to the nature of society, its national or cultural composition, the size of its territory, its historical experience, and the balance of political forces that accompanied its formation. The type of state is one of the key lenses through which the exercise of power can be understood, including the limits of central authority and the degree of participation of local units or regions in decision-making. Choosing a particular state type is not a purely administrative matter, but a political–constitutional choice that reflects a specific vision for managing diversity and resolving the tension between unity and plurality.

From this perspective, types of the state express different answers to a fundamental question: how is sovereignty exercised? Is it fully concentrated in a single center, or distributed across multiple levels? Does political unity necessarily require rigid centralization, or can it be achieved through more flexible arrangements? In this context, three principal types of the state can be distinguished: the simple (unitary) state, the federal state, and the confederal state.

1. The Simple (Unitary) State

The simple state is characterized by the concentration of political and legal authority in a single central government that exercises full sovereignty over the entire territory, without the existence of political entities enjoying autonomous sovereignty. In this type, laws are enacted by a central legislative authority and applied uniformly across all parts of the state, while local authorities, if they exist, remain subject to central oversight and do not possess genuine political independence.

This model has traditionally been viewed as the most capable of achieving political unity and state cohesion, particularly in relatively homogeneous societies. However, in certain contexts, the unitary state can become an instrument for entrenching excessive centralization, excluding peripheral regions, and marginalizing local and cultural particularities. When governed with an authoritarian mindset, the unitary state tends to reduce the state to the central authority itself, generating structural tensions that may threaten long-term stability.

2. The Federal State

The federal state is based on the distribution of power between a central government and regions or states that enjoy constitutionally defined powers which cannot be withdrawn or altered unilaterally by the center. This model rests on a federal constitution that clearly delineates the competencies of each level of government and guarantees the participation of the regions in central authority, often through a federal council or a second chamber of parliament.

Federalism is considered a political and constitutional response to national, linguistic, or geographical diversity, and an attempt to reconcile the unity of the state with the right of regions to manage their own affairs. However, federalism is not a ready-made formula for success; it can become a source of conflict if democracy is absent, if the balance between the center and the regions is disrupted, or if it is used as a mechanism to reproduce central domination in a legal form. Therefore, the success of a federal state depends on the presence of a democratic political culture, strong institutions, and mutual respect among the components of the federation.

3. The Confederal State

Confederalism represents the weakest form of political union. It is based on a coordinating association among fully sovereign independent states that unite through a treaty to achieve specific objectives, often in the fields of defense, economics, or foreign policy. In this type, member states retain their sovereignty and the right to withdraw from the union, while any central authority that exists is limited in its powers and weak in influence.

A confederation is not a state in the strict legal sense, but rather a cooperative framework among existing states, and it is often a transitional phase either toward a deeper union (as occurred in some historical experiences) or toward fragmentation and separation. Confederations reflect a desire for coordination without relinquishing sovereignty, yet they also suffer from structural fragility resulting from the absence of a central authority capable of enforcing collective decisions.

In conclusion, types of the state are not merely theoretical classifications, but expressions of profound political choices related to the management of power, diversity, and unity. No type can be judged in isolation from the context in which it emerged, for the success or failure of a state is not determined by its form alone, but by the nature of its political system, the level of democracy, and the state’s ability to achieve justice and balanced participation among all components of society.

Sixth: The State and Legitimacy

Legitimacy constitutes the foundational pillar upon which the modern state rests. It is the decisive factor that distinguishes the state, as an accepted and recognized authority, from a mere apparatus of coercion that imposes itself by force. Legitimacy is not derived solely from the ability to control or from monopolizing the means of coercion, but from broad social acceptance that grants the state the right to rule and renders its orders and laws the object of voluntary obedience, rather than constant compliance driven by fear of punishment. Without such acceptance, the state loses its political meaning and becomes a structure detached from society, surviving through violence instead of consensus.

The legitimacy of the state is grounded, first and foremost, in the popular will, whether this will is expressed through free elections, effective political participation, or mechanisms of representation that allow society to influence public decision-making. The people are not merely a formal pillar of the state, but the source of authority and its ultimate reference. The wider the gap between the state and the will of society, the more legitimacy erodes, even if the state continues to exist in a legal or military sense.

Alongside popular acceptance, the constitution constitutes a central framework of legitimacy, as the political contract that defines the form of the state, regulates relations among the branches of power, and constrains the exercise of authority by law. A constitution does not derive its legitimacy merely from being a written text, but from its actual observance and from being an expression of social and political consensus, rather than an instrument imposed from above. When a constitution becomes a purely formal façade whose provisions are continually violated, the state loses one of its most important sources of legitimacy, even if it retains its official institutions.

State legitimacy is also closely linked to the extent to which it respects fundamental rights and freedoms, as the practical expression of human dignity within the political community. A state that violates the rights of its citizens or discriminates among them on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or political affiliation undermines its legitimacy from within, regardless of how many national or legal slogans it proclaims. Legitimacy is not measured by the strength of rhetoric, but by the degree to which individuals feel security, justice, and belonging under the state.

Conversely, as these foundations of legitimacy weaken, the state tends to compensate by inflating the instruments of coercion and violence, transforming from a state governed by law into a security authority, and from an inclusive framework into an apparatus of subjugation. Herein lies the fundamental paradox: the state that loses its legitimacy requires more force to survive, yet in doing so it accelerates the erosion of whatever social acceptance remains. Accordingly, the stability and continuity of the state are not achieved through coercion, but through the continual renewal of legitimacy—by expanding participation, respecting the rule of law, and guaranteeing rights as the true foundations of any viable political authority.

Seventh: Crises of the State in the Modern Era

In the modern era, the state faces a set of profound structural crises that go beyond weak performance or policy failures to touch the very essence of the state itself—its function and the meaning of its existence in a rapidly changing world. The state, historically constituted as the supreme framework of authority and sovereignty, now confronts unprecedented challenges arising from internal transformations related to the structure of society and power, as well as external pressures imposed by globalization, economic interdependence, and the declining capacity of the state to exercise full control over its political and economic destiny.

1. The Crisis of Legitimacy

The crisis of legitimacy is among the most dangerous challenges confronting the contemporary state. It manifests in the erosion of popular acceptance and the widening gap between the state and society. In many countries, authority is no longer perceived as a representative of the general will, but rather as a detached apparatus serving the interests of a narrow elite. This crisis stems from multiple factors, including the absence of genuine political participation, the manipulation of popular will, and violations of rights and freedoms, all of which lead citizens to lose trust in institutions and to question the legitimacy of laws and decisions.

When the state proves incapable of renewing its legitimacy through political reform, it often resorts to compensating with force: security apparatuses expand, the logic of law recedes, and the state enters a vicious cycle of repression and resistance that threatens its stability and survival.

2. The Crisis of Identity

The crisis of identity is linked to the state’s inability to accommodate national, religious, or cultural diversity within society, and its imposition of a single identity as the official identity of the state. In this context, the state shifts from being an inclusive framework to an instrument of exclusion, generating feelings of marginalization and alienation among broad segments of the population. This crisis is particularly acute in states that emerged from the ruins of imperial entities, or in those whose borders were drawn without regard for social and historical structures.

The crisis of identity leads to the fragmentation of national belonging and the rise of sub-identities as alternatives to the state—whether sectarian, ethnic, or regional—thereby threatening state unity and weakening its ability to perform its core functions.

3. The Crisis of Social Justice

The crisis of social justice is embodied in the widening gap between rich and poor, the erosion of the middle class, and the declining capacity of the state to provide a minimum standard of decent living for its citizens. This crisis has intensified with the rise of neoliberal policies that have reduced the state’s social role, privatized public services, and withdrawn protections for vulnerable groups.

This crisis is not limited to its economic dimension, but extends to its political implications as well. The absence of justice generates a sense of injustice, undermines trust in the state, and drives either protest or political disengagement. A state that fails to achieve a reasonable degree of justice loses one of the most important sources of its legitimacy and stability.

4. Globalization and the Erosion of Sovereignty

Globalization has posed profound challenges to the concept of the state and sovereignty, as the state is no longer able to exercise full control over its economy, borders, or policies independently of global forces. Financial markets, transnational corporations, and international institutions have become influential actors that constrain state decisions and shape its economic and social policies.

Moreover, the digital revolution and the flow of information have weakened the state’s monopoly over knowledge and communication, transforming the very nature of power. In this context, the state has not disappeared, but it is no longer the sole or absolute actor; rather, it has become part of a complex network of local and international actors.

In conclusion, the crises of the state in the modern era are neither incidental nor temporary, but rather expressions of a profound transformation in the structure of power and social relations. These crises cannot be overcome through security or administrative solutions alone, but through a rethinking of the role of the state, the renewal of its social contract, and the construction of legitimacy based on participation, justice, and the recognition of diversity—thereby enabling the state to remain a viable framework in a changing world.

Conclusion

The state is not a fixed entity or a structure that has reached a final, complete form; rather, it is a historical project open to continuous transformation, shaped and reshaped by the development of societies, the balance of power within them, and the nature of the political, economic, and intellectual conflicts they experience. At its core, the state is not an end in itself, but a tool for organizing collective life, managing difference, and achieving a degree of stability that allows individuals and groups to develop their lives within an inclusive legal and political framework.

This study has shown that the state is not merely a legal entity or an administrative apparatus, but a complex structure in which power, law, legitimacy, economy, and society intersect. It monopolizes coercion in the name of legitimacy and governs society through institutions and laws, yet it remains vulnerable to crises whenever it becomes detached from society, fails to express its aspirations, or falls short of achieving a minimum level of justice and equality. Accordingly, the strength of the state is not measured by its capacity for repression or control, but by its ability to generate voluntary obedience grounded in trust and mutual recognition between the state and its citizens.

The true value of the state ultimately depends on its ability to strike a delicate balance between the demands of authority and the imperatives of freedom, between the need for order and the guarantee of justice, and between the protection of sovereignty and the respect for human rights. A state that inflates authority at the expense of freedom slides toward authoritarianism; a state that neglects social justice loses its moral foundation; and a state that compromises human rights undermines its legitimacy from within, regardless of the power it possesses.

In a world marked by accelerating transformations and the ongoing redefinition of sovereignty, legitimacy, and identity, the state is called upon to redefine itself and its functions—not as a power standing above society, but as a contractual framework in its service. Without such a transformation, the state loses its political and ethical meaning, turning from an instrument of protection and organization into an apparatus of domination and repression, and from an inclusive public space into a crisis-ridden structure that threatens social stability rather than safeguarding it.

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• Norberto Bobbio, State, Government, and Society: A Critical Introduction to Political Philosophy, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1989.
• Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1996.
• David Held, Models of Democracy, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2006.
• Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, Academic Press, New York, 1974.

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