By Dr. Adnan Bouzan

Introduction

Treating the January 29, 2026 agreement as a final solution or a sustainable settlement in the Syrian Kurdish trajectory reflects a methodologically imprecise approach that overlooks the nature of the political moment in which the agreement was produced. An analytical examination of the temporal and substantive context of its signing reveals that it is closer to a temporary formula for managing tensions and containing their immediate repercussions than to a foundational framework for long-term stability in Rojava. The agreement did not emerge from entrenched strategic consensuses among the relevant parties; rather, it resulted from coercive balances imposed by an exceptionally fluid regional and international moment.

This agreement took shape under compounded pressure arising from intertwined local, regional, and international factors that collectively imposed a specific political tempo on the course of events. At the local level, Kurdish popular mobilization and the declaration of general alert contributed to elevating pressure. Political support from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq provided additional backing, albeit within limits that stopped short of being decisive. Regionally and internationally, the agreement coincided with growing Israeli concern over the potential loss of control in the Syrian arena during a period of regional reconfiguration, and the attendant, difficult-to-contain security risks.

Within this framework, the January 29 agreement appears as an expression of crisis management rather than the product of a comprehensive solution-oriented vision. This helps explain its structural fragility and high susceptibility to erosion or collapse with any substantive shift in the balance of power. In essence, the agreement does not address the roots of the Kurdish political question so much as it postpones its eruption, leaving Rojava’s future in a state of prolonged suspension amid still-unsettled developments.

Misreading the Post-Regime Moment: From Surplus Power to a Declining Position

The decline in the political and military standing of the Kurdish actor in Syria after the fall of the Syrian regime cannot be explained solely by external pressures or shifts in international positions. It requires a critical deconstruction of how the moment of collapse itself was interpreted within Kurdish decision-making circles. A prevailing implicit assumption held that the regime’s collapse would automatically mark a transition from conflict to settlement, and that the pre-collapse balance of power would remain operative or exploitable at a similar pace—an assumption that events have proven inaccurate.

Analytically, the period between the March 10 agreement and the ceasefire announced on January 29 represents a phase of profound reconstitution of the Syrian conflict’s regional architecture. Alliances were no longer structured along previous lines of confrontation but were reconfigured according to shifting interests, cross-file bargaining, and the redistribution of roles among regional and international actors. These transformations, however, were not absorbed in a timely manner within the Kurdish approach, leading to a widening gap between a changing reality and the political and military tools being employed.

The central paradox lies in the fact that the pre-collapse phase—despite its violence and narrow security margins—afforded Rojava a more advanced negotiating position, as an actor that could not be bypassed in the equations of territorial control, counterterrorism, and geographic stabilization. The surplus power at the time derived from the convergence of three elements: international demand for a reliable local partner, the Kurds’ possession of organized military weight, and their capacity to manage the relative vacuum created by the retreat of the central state.

By contrast, the rapid and uncalculated transition to the post-collapse phase led to the depletion of this surplus without converting it into institutionalized political gains. Instead of anchoring the Kurdish position within clear transitional arrangements, the new reality was approached through a logic of continuity—as if the tools of the previous phase were still adequate for managing a fundamentally different landscape. This miscalculation enabled more organized regional actors, better equipped to capitalize on the vacuum, to fill the political spaces from which Kurdish forces gradually retreated.

Moreover, the absence of a precise reading of the shift in international priorities after the regime’s fall further narrowed Kurdish room for maneuver. Powers that had previously viewed the Kurds as a pillar of security stability began redefining their interests within a broader framework centered on preventing regional fragmentation—even at the expense of decentralization or self-rule projects. With this shift, the relative weight of the Kurdish actor in international priorities declined, from an indispensable field partner to a file susceptible to postponement or bargaining.

Accordingly, the setback affecting the Kurdish file cannot be attributed merely to a sudden reversal in the balance of power. Rather, it is the outcome of a compounded error in reading the historical transformation represented by the fall of the Syrian regime. The surplus power accumulated by Rojava during the conflict phase was not translated into a durable negotiating position; instead, it was expended in an unresolved transitional phase, ultimately leading to a contraction of influence and a diminished capacity to shape outcomes compared to what had previously been possible.

The Emergence of a New Regional Axis: Economy as a Tool for Redrawing Maps

The political transformations that followed the fall of the Syrian regime coincided with the emergence of a new regional axis composed of Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. Within a relatively short period, this axis succeeded in consolidating its presence as an influential actor in the reordering of regional priorities. Its significance derives not merely from its political character, but from the instruments it has employed—chief among them the economy as a means of pressure, negotiation, and strategic repositioning simultaneously.

This bloc managed to achieve qualitative breakthroughs in its relationship with the United States through cross-file and cross-arena understandings, translated into massive financial and investment deals estimated in the trillions of dollars. These arrangements were not detached from geopolitical calculations; rather, they contributed to reshaping Washington’s hierarchy of priorities, whereby “manageable stability” was elevated over complex political projects requiring long-term commitments—most notably models of decentralized governance.

In this context, the tripartite axis did not operate according to the logic of a traditional alliance based on ideological or security convergence. Instead, it adopted a pragmatic approach centered on buying time and redefining hot-button files, particularly the Iranian dossier. Rather than moving toward a high-cost open confrontation, the push was toward interim arrangements that contain tensions and defer escalation, thereby granting the axis greater room to reorganize other arenas, including Syria and Iraq.

Statements issued by American figures associated with these understandings acquire particular significance here, as they reflect a tangible shift in the U.S. strategic mood regarding state structures in the Middle East. Signals that downplay the region’s capacity to accommodate federal or decentralized models cannot be understood as isolated personal views, but rather as indicators of a broader trend within decision-making circles favoring centralized or semi-centralized governance structures—perceived from the U.S. perspective as less complex and easier to control.

This shift places the Kurdish project in a more vulnerable position—not because of inherent weakness, but because the international environment that previously allowed for the growth of autonomous governance models is no longer equally receptive. As economic and security stability rise to the top of the agenda, and willingness to bear the costs of long-term political projects declines, the Kurdish issue has increasingly been relegated to a file subject to postponement or bargaining, rather than one warranting direct international sponsorship.

Accordingly, the crystallization of this regional axis should not be viewed as a temporary alignment, but as one of the structural factors that have redrawn maps of influence in the region—using the economy as a central instrument to redefine conflicts and determine winners and losers in the post–regional repositioning phase.

Syria, Iraq, and Yemen: Interconnected Arenas, Not Separate Crises

The transformations unfolding in Syria cannot be approached in isolation from the Iraqi and Yemeni contexts. Developments across these arenas reveal a single regional logic that treats crises as an interconnected system rather than as separate files. Subsequent interactions have clearly demonstrated that the region is witnessing an organized effort to redistribute roles and influence across multiple arenas, employing diverse local tools but within a unified strategic vision aimed at recalibrating balances of power in line with international shifts.

Within this framework, Iraq stands out as the most fragile arena and the most susceptible to political and security reengineering. The coming phase appears open to highly dangerous scenarios, ranging from attempts to reshape internal balances through political and constitutional mechanisms to the risk of sliding into broad-scale civil conflict should these attempts fail or clash with existing power equilibria. The primary danger lies in the fact that such scenarios are not presented as accidental byproducts of chaos, but as calculated options within a wider regional struggle.

In this context fall hypotheses concerning the mobilization of Sunni tribes, or the detonation of latent contradictions among local security and military forces, as instruments of pressure designed to exhaust the Iraqi state and compel it into a coercive constitutional amendment process—or even a reversal of the existing federal system. This trajectory is framed in regional and international discourse under vague headings such as “enhancing stability” or “preventing fragmentation,” while in essence serving a central objective: dismantling any viable federal model in the region.

From this perspective, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is not viewed merely as an internal Iraqi case, but as a political model targeted for containment or dismantlement due to the implications it carries beyond Iraqi geography. Weakening or dismantling this model constitutes, in the view of certain regional powers, a necessary step to close the door on any similar Kurdish experience in Syria or elsewhere—consistent with Turkey’s longstanding demand to reject any Kurdish entity possessing independent decision-making capacity, even if pursued under the banner of reasserting central state authority.

As for Yemen, despite the differences in its political and social structure, it forms part of this interconnected regional system. Its arena is used to recalibrate balances among regional actors and to send indirect messages on other files, including Syria and Iraq. Treating Yemen as an additional pressure arena reflects the nature of the current conflict, which is no longer confined to a single geography but governed by a logic of interlinked arenas in which confrontation is managed sequentially rather than in parallel.

Thus, understanding what is unfolding in Syria requires recognizing this structural interconnection among the three arenas, where crises are not resolved within national borders but within a broader regional network that deploys local instruments to achieve transnational strategic objectives. Within this framework, the Kurdish project—both in Syria and Iraq—emerges as one of the most exposed files to pressure, not merely due to its internal position, but because it intersects with a wider regional struggle over the form of the state, the limits of decentralization, and the future of ethno-national pluralism in the Middle East.

Israel Between Caution and Strategic Repositioning

Israel’s stance toward the accelerating regional transformations should not be understood as withdrawal or retreat from influence, but rather as a calculated strategic repositioning dictated by the nature and complexity of the current phase. As a central security actor in the region, Israel rarely operates on the basis of rapid reaction alone; instead, it adopts an approach grounded in careful monitoring, risk management, and deferring direct intervention until a moment that ensures maximum gains at minimal cost.

In this context, Tel Aviv is closely and anxiously monitoring the rise of the Turkish role in the Syrian arena—not only because of its direct security implications, but also due to the potential disruption it poses to deterrence balances that had relatively stabilized in recent years. The expansion of Turkish influence in northern Syria, coupled with the decline of direct U.S. presence, compels Israel to reassess its strategy toward the northern front, particularly amid the growing interconnection between the Syrian, Iranian, and Lebanese files.

At the same time, Israel views developments in Yemen with caution, as the balance of power there gradually tilts in favor of a Saudi-led axis—entailing a reordering of roles within the camp of Israel’s traditional regional partners. These shifts are not assessed in isolation from their impact on maritime security, Red Sea balances, and indirect communication lines with the Gulf, rendering Yemen a strategic monitoring arena even if it appears geographically distant from the immediate conflict.

This Israeli caution, however, does not signal withdrawal from the scene or a loss of influence. Rather, it reflects the adoption of strategic patience and long-horizon conflict management. Israel recognizes that the current phase is marked by high fluidity in alliances, and that premature intervention could constrain future options. Its restraint, therefore, is best understood as an investment in political time rather than an abdication of role.

The meetings between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and U.S. President Donald Trump at the end of 2025 acquire particular significance in this regard, as they contributed to reopening previously deferred files and to re-coordinating perspectives on regional security priorities. These encounters signaled that Israel remains an active component in the U.S. decision-making equation, even if its presence appears less overt in certain arenas.

Accordingly, Israel’s conduct at this stage can be understood as an effort to reorder priorities, regulate the tempo of engagement, and await the crystallization of new balances before transitioning to a more active phase. Within this context, the Kurdish file—despite its relative absence from public discourse—remains one of the elements incorporated into Israel’s long-term strategic calculations, particularly with respect to regional balance and preventing the dominance of a single actor over the Syrian landscape.

Washington: Multiple Centers of Decision-Making and the Opportunity to Reinsert the Kurdish File

Contrary to many simplistic readings, the United States does not function as a political actor with a single, unified will. Rather, it constitutes a complex system of overlapping decision-making centers, distributed among the White House, both chambers of Congress, the security and military institutions, as well as think tanks and influential lobbying networks. This structural plurality represents one of the key factors limiting the ability of any regional axis to impose its vision in full or to pass arrangements without internal objection or review—particularly in sensitive files linked to Israel’s security or to international balances involving major powers such as China and Russia.

In this context, despite attempts by some regional actors to capitalize on executive channels within the U.S. administration, Congress has continued to retain a tangible margin of influence—whether through legislative tools, oversight mechanisms, or its impact on shaping the broader political discourse. This role becomes especially evident in issues touching on the strategic architecture of the Middle East, where Congress tends to adopt more cautious approaches toward rapid transformations or cross-file deals that may disrupt long-term balances.

Within this margin, the Kurdish file has re-emerged in certain U.S. decision-making circles—not as a central priority, but as a file that has not been closed and can be reactivated at moments of rebalancing. Influential figures within Congress, foremost among them Senator Lindsey Graham, have contributed to reinserting this file into discussions related to regional security and stability, drawing on networks of political relations and active lobbying efforts, particularly those connected to Israeli considerations.

This congressional activity has generated what may be described as a “relative executive vacuum,” in which the U.S. administration is neither able nor willing to manage the Kurdish file directly, yet at the same time has not fully delegated it to the emerging regional axis. Within this vacuum, the European role—especially that of France—has come to the fore as an alternative channel for managing the file, whether through direct political engagement with Kurdish leaderships or by acting as an internationally acceptable mediator in a highly sensitive phase.

Recent French moves—whether through visits to Erbil or meetings with Rojava’s leadership—reflect a growing European awareness that the Kurdish issue has not reached a point of resolution, but has merely been postponed within temporary arrangements imposed by competing priorities. France, which views the Middle East through the lens of long-term stability and the containment of transboundary chaos, sees the continued marginalization of the Kurdish file as a deferred instability factor rather than a resolved problem.

Accordingly, the multiplicity of decision-making centers within Washington, despite the confusion it sometimes generates in U.S. policy, simultaneously opens a limited yet significant window for Kurdish actors to reintroduce their cause within a broader international context—provided they possess a coherent political discourse, an ability to conduct organized diplomatic engagement, and a capacity to leverage divergences within the international system rather than becoming captive to a single axis or a one-dimensional reading of the American landscape.

The Internal Kurdish Dilemma: Between Self-Critique and the Necessity of Transformation

The challenges facing the Kurdish file in the post–January 29 agreement phase cannot be approached in isolation from the internal structure of the Kurdish political movement itself. Alongside regional and international pressures, there has emerged an urgent need for a comprehensive reassessment of the preceding political and military experience—one that goes beyond justification and defensiveness toward a radical self-critique capable of redefining priorities and instruments alike.

The debate currently unfolding within the Kurdish arena constitutes a rare opportunity, if taken seriously, to move from emotional reactions and mobilizational slogans toward a rational evaluation grounded in facts rather than intentions. In comparative political experiences, major crises have often served as founding moments for qualitative transformations, not merely as episodes of rupture.

Within this framework, there is a pressing need to rebuild regional and international networks of relations on the basis of mutual interests rather than symbolic or moralistic discourse that finds little resonance within decision-making centers. Experience has demonstrated that reliance on international sympathy or abstract revolutionary narratives is insufficient to secure political protection or strategic guarantees in a deeply pragmatic regional environment.

In parallel, the revitalization of Kurdish national consciousness across Greater Kurdistan emerges as a necessity—not as a narrow mobilizational rhetoric, but as an inclusive framework that reconnects diverse Kurdish experiences within a shared vision of destiny and rights. Geographic and political fragmentation, when managed without a unifying national awareness, shifts from being an imposed reality to a source of self-inflicted weakness.

Equally unavoidable is addressing chronic party fragmentation, which has drained energies and weakened the negotiating position both internally and externally. What is required here are not superficial coordination formulas or temporary fronts, but genuine political mergers grounded in clear programs, shared decision-making mechanisms, and legitimate representation that reflects the real weight of different forces.

Moreover, the current international context necessitates abandoning ideological illusions that have failed to build sustainable alliances or gain acceptance among influential actors in the international system. Persisting in discursive models detached from global realities leads only to deeper political isolation, regardless of their moral or revolutionary motivations.

Finally, recalibrating the relationship between military leadership and political legitimacy stands out as one of the most sensitive issues. Historical experience shows that distortions in this relationship—whether through the militarization of political decision-making or the marginalization of civilian representation—ultimately erode legitimacy and weaken maneuverability. Thus, building a unified Kurdish political reference endowed with clear representative legitimacy, under which military instruments are subordinated within a comprehensive national framework, constitutes a fundamental prerequisite for any sustainable political project.

In sum, the true challenge confronting the Kurdish movement today lies not only in the magnitude of external pressures, but in its capacity to transform the current moment of disorientation into a launching point for a profound structural transformation—one that redefines the self, corrects the course, and lays the foundation for a more realistic and effective engagement with the region and the world.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the current phase does not represent a definitive historical defeat for the Kurds, nor can it be read as a deferred victory awaiting more favorable conditions. Rather, it is a complex transitional moment characterized by high fluidity and instability. Regional and international balances have yet to reach a point of consolidation, and political maps in Syria and Iraq remain in the making rather than settled—rendering the fate of the Kurdish question directly contingent upon the trajectories of the major conflicts unfolding in the region, not solely on the will of local actors.

The danger of this phase lies not only in external pressures, but in the risk of misreading it. Reliance on temporary agreements, shifting regional guarantees, or situational protection by a major power has historically proven to be a fragile wager, one that collapses with the first shift in interest calculations. Continuing to manage the Kurdish question through a reactive mindset or a logic of “damage limitation” serves only to entrench political marginalization and hollow out any previous gains of their strategic substance.

The real wager lies in transitioning from a politics of adaptation to a politics of action—
an action grounded in a precise reading of the international moment, a rational repositioning that balances political realism with the preservation of minimum national rights, and the construction of a clearly defined Kurdish political project that is internationally communicable and internally coherent. Such a project should neither be reduced to the military dimension nor be wholly dependent on external alliances, but rather rest on inclusive political legitimacy, unity of decision-making, and a discourse aligned with the logic of the international system rather than its ideological illusions.

Failure to articulate this transformation would, in the medium term, amount to implicit acceptance of maps drawn without the Kurds—and perhaps against them. Success, while not guaranteeing the fulfillment of maximal aspirations, would at least prevent total exclusion and affirm Kurdish presence as a political actor that cannot be bypassed in any future settlement.

Accordingly, this phase is not a moment of waiting, but a moment of historical testing:
either the reproduction of Kurdish political subjectivity in line with new power equations, or relegation to yet another postponed file in the archive of forgotten conflicts.

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