Human First: The Philosophy of Governance and State-Building — From Power to Meaning
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By Dr. Adnan Bouzan
Introduction
Since the emergence of the state as a political organization for managing collective affairs, a fundamental question has remained suspended at the heart of the human experience—sometimes concealed behind laws, and at other times surfacing forcefully in moments of crisis and collapse:
For whom does the state exist?
Is it established to protect the human being, or to administer and manage them?
Is it built for the human being, or erected above them, until they become a mere replaceable element within its rigid structure?
This question is not an abstract philosophical exercise. Rather, it is the key that determines the nature of governance, the meaning of power, and the boundaries of legitimacy. The state, regardless of its form or system, is never a neutral entity or a purely technical structure; it is always an expression of a particular conception of the human being—either as an end and a free subject, or as a means and an object of administration.
The history of governance, in its deepest essence, is nothing other than the history of the ambiguous relationship between power and the human being—a relationship that has never been definitively resolved in favor of either side. Instead, it has continually oscillated between protection and domination, between care and subjugation, between recognizing the human being and denying them. When the state is placed above the human being, politics is transformed from a unifying human practice into a technology of control, and the citizen is reduced from a political subject to an object of rule—from a partner in decision-making to an entity that is managed, monitored, and reshaped according to the logic of power.
In such a context, the state no longer functions as a framework for shared coexistence, but becomes an apparatus standing above society and detached from it, treating society as raw material for discipline, fear, or mobilization. Laws are transformed from instruments for protecting rights into mechanisms for organizing obedience, and citizenship is reduced to loyalty rather than participation, to compliance rather than freedom.
When the human being is placed at the center of political thought, however, the very meaning of the state undergoes a radical transformation. The state no longer appears as an end in itself, nor as an entity transcending society, but rather as an ethical and organizational means whose purpose is to protect human dignity, guarantee justice, and regulate difference within an inclusive framework. In this vision, the state is not measured by the strength of its institutions, but by the extent of its respect for the human being; its legitimacy is not tested by its capacity to repress, but by its ability to reduce human suffering, expand spaces of freedom, and realize the political meaning of justice.
From this perspective, the philosophy of “Human First” does not emerge as a soft humanitarian slogan or a cosmetic moral discourse, but as an epistemological and philosophical rupture with historical models of governance that were founded on the sanctification of power, the deification of the state, and the objectification of the human being. It is a philosophy that rejects the logic of sacrificing the human being in the name of the state, and deconstructs the narratives that have legitimized repression in the name of security, exclusion in the name of unity, and despotism in the name of stability.
Within this framework, the human being is neither a subordinate element within the structure of governance nor a negotiable entity in political bargaining. Rather, the human being is the standard by which the legitimacy of the state and the meaning of power are measured. A state that loses sight of this standard—regardless of the tools of control and force it possesses—builds its existence upon an ethical void that soon turns into a structural crisis, leading to a rupture between state and society, and ultimately to collapse, violence, or the reproduction of tragedy.
This study proceeds from a central assumption: that the crisis of the modern state—especially in contexts dominated by authoritarian patterns—is not an administrative or technical crisis of governance, but a crisis of meaning above all else: the meaning of power, the meaning of the state, and the meaning of the human being within the political structure. Thus, the transition from “power” to “meaning” does not signify a merely linguistic or moral shift, but rather a philosophical re-foundation of the very concept of governance.
Accordingly, this study does not seek to present a ready-made model of the state, nor to promote an idealized vision detached from reality. Instead, it aims to interrogate the philosophical foundations upon which governance has been built, and to re-raise the primary question that has so often been ignored or suppressed:
What value does the state have if it is not in the service of the human being?
And what meaning does power hold if it is not measured by the extent of its respect for the dignity of those it governs?
From this question, the study begins—not merely as an introductory inquiry, but as the organizing thread that runs through all that follows: in the analysis of power, in the critique of models of governance, and in the search for the possibility of building a state that does not begin with domination, but with the human being, and does not end with control, but with meaning.
First: The Philosophical Foundation — The Human Being as an Absolute Value
It is impossible to think about the state, power, or governance without starting from the most fundamental question in political philosophy: what is the position of the human being within the structure of political meaning?
Is the human being an end in themselves, or merely a means within a project that transcends them?
Does the value of the state derive from its ability to organize society, or from its capacity to protect the human being as a free being endowed with non-negotiable dignity?
Answering these questions is not a purely abstract moral exercise; rather, it constitutes the philosophical foundation upon which conceptions of governance are built and through which the legitimacy of power and its limits are defined. Every political theory—regardless of its claims to neutrality or realism—contains at its core a particular conception of the human being: either as an absolute value, or as an instrument within a hierarchy of higher ends.
In authoritarian conceptions of governance, the human being is reduced to a function: a soldier in war, a worker in the machinery of production, a subordinate within the political hierarchy, or a number in administrative records. This reduction is not accidental; it is the direct outcome of a philosophical vision that treats the state as an end in itself and grants power the right to use human beings in the pursuit of its objectives. Thus, sacrificing the human being is legitimized in the name of security, violating dignity is justified in the name of the public interest, and the human being is redefined as a consumable political resource.
By contrast, the philosophical foundation of the idea of the human being as an absolute value represents a radical rupture with this instrumental logic. In this conception, the human being is not measured by their usefulness to the state, nor is their worth determined by their obedience to authority. Rather, dignity derives from being a rational, free being capable of action, choice, and moral responsibility. Consequently, the human being may not be treated as a means to any political end, regardless of how noble or necessary that end may appear.
Recognizing the human being as an absolute value imposes strict ethical constraints on power and redraws the boundaries and function of the state. Within this framework, the state does not own the human being, nor does it grant them dignity; instead, it is obligated to respect and protect it. Laws become instruments for safeguarding freedom rather than restricting it, and authority is transformed from a privilege into a responsibility, from a right to subjugate into a duty to serve.
This conception does not reduce the human being to an isolated individual, but understands them as a social being whose freedom is formed within the community, not against it. To affirm the human being as an absolute value does not mean denying society or the state; rather, it means reconstituting both on the basis of mutual recognition, where the relationship between the individual and authority is founded on rights and duties, not on fear and blind obedience.
Accordingly, treating the human being as an absolute value is not an idealistic moral stance, but a philosophical condition for the existence of a legitimate state. A state that does not proceed from this principle loses its ethical justification and, regardless of its degree of organization or power, becomes a coercive structure locked in permanent conflict with the society it governs.
Thus, this philosophical foundation constitutes the starting point for any serious inquiry into the philosophy of governance and state-building. Without it, discussions of justice, legitimacy, and rights devolve into empty slogans, and politics becomes a purely technical practice devoid of meaning. When the human being is restored as an absolute value, politics regains its human dimension, and the state becomes a space for producing meaning rather than coercively administering it.
1. From the Human-as-Instrument to the Human-as-End
Reducing the human being to a function within the apparatus of the state is not a fleeting political deviation, but the product of a long historical tradition of philosophies that placed authority at the center of political existence and elevated the state above the individual. Within this horizon, the human being is not regarded as an autonomous moral subject, but as a deployable resource: a soldier mobilized when needed, a worker consumed within the cycle of production, a number managed in statistical tables, or a subordinate whose consciousness is reshaped according to the requirements of the authoritarian hierarchy.
This transformation from the human-as-subject to the human-as-instrument is not a technical detail of governance, but a radical inversion of the very meaning of politics. When the state becomes an end in itself, the human being becomes a means for securing its survival, rather than the reason for its existence. Once the “interest of the state” is elevated to an absolute concept, it becomes an open justification for violating the body, freedom, and dignity—whether in the name of security, stability, unity, or even history and destiny.
In contrast, the philosophy of Human First begins with a clear rupture from this authoritarian legacy, establishing a radical principle: the human being is not an instrument within a political project, but the end by which the legitimacy of any project is measured. The human being ceases to be a “sovereign resource” and becomes an absolute value, irreducible and non-negotiable. Philosophically, this means that politics has no right to justify harm to the human being under any pretext, because the human being is not the object of politics, but its primary ethical condition.
This shift fundamentally alters the criteria of governance. Politics is no longer assessed solely by its efficiency or its capacity to impose order, but by the extent to which it respects its own ethical limits. Authority derives its legitimacy not from its ability to discipline and repress, but from its recognition that it has boundaries it must not transgress—because beyond those boundaries stands the human being as an end, not a means.
Here, the human being becomes the measure of the state, not the other way around. The state is transformed into an organizational framework serving human dignity, rather than an apparatus for managing or dominating it. Justice, accordingly, ceases to be an abstract legal concept and becomes the practical expression of recognizing the human being as an absolute value—one that is not measured by utility, reduced to function, or made conditional upon loyalty or obedience.
On this philosophical basis, governance moves from the logic of domination to the logic of meaning, and the state is transformed from a structure of power into an ethical project, in which the human being is not only the center of politics, but also its ultimate justification and limit.
2. Human Dignity as an Existential Condition of the State
Within the philosophy of governance, human dignity is not understood as a legal grant or a political privilege bestowed by the state at will and withdrawn at will. Rather, it is an ontological reality that precedes the state itself. The human being does not acquire dignity through political belonging or through recognition by authority, but simply by being human. Any state that fails to acknowledge this fundamental truth rests upon an ethical void, regardless of the coherence of its legal structure or the strength of its coercive institutions.
In this sense, the state is not the source of dignity, but its guardian. When it shifts from guardian to violator, it loses its philosophical justification before it loses its political legitimacy. A state that refuses to recognize that human dignity precedes it, stands above it, and limits its authority, transforms from a framework for organizing shared life into a structure of domination that reproduces violence under various labels: law, sovereignty, security, or even the “public interest.”
Any system of governance that permits systematic humiliation, legitimizes torture as a security instrument, justifies political or social exclusion on ideological or identity-based grounds, or accepts degrading economic and social inequality that undermines human worth, is not merely corrupt or authoritarian. It is a system that acts against the existential foundation of the state itself. It destroys the ethical condition that makes obedience possible without fear, compliance possible without coercion, and belonging possible without humiliation.
Dignity, therefore, is not an auxiliary moral value added to governance; it is the invisible infrastructure of any authority capable of endurance. Without it, the relationship between ruler and ruled ceases to be a political contract and becomes a naked power relation. At this point, law is transformed into an instrument of control rather than justice, and institutions become formal façades concealing domination that recognizes the human being only insofar as they obey.
In this context, the legitimacy of the state is not measured by procedural elections, revolutionary history, or claimed religious authority, but by its capacity to protect human dignity as an inviolable limit. When dignity is violated, it is not only individual rights that collapse, but the very meaning upon which the state is founded. A state cannot demand loyalty from a humiliated citizen, build lasting stability upon accumulated fear, or establish national unity on exclusion and discrimination.
Accordingly, the philosophy of Human First does not treat dignity as an additional ethical clause within the discourse of governance, but as its primary existential condition. A state that protects human dignity justifies its existence on a daily basis; a state that violates it condemns itself—sooner or later—to internal disintegration, regardless of the apparent longevity of its rule.
3. The State Between Legitimacy and Coercion: From Enforced Obedience to Ethical Consent
At the surface level, the state rests upon obedience. The decisive philosophical question, however, does not concern the existence of obedience itself, but its nature:
Does the human being obey because they are convinced of the justice of the system?
Or because coercion precedes conviction, and fear precedes meaning?
Here lies the fundamental distinction between a state grounded in legitimacy and one that relies solely on coercion. Legitimacy is not a purely legal matter, nor is it reducible to constitutional texts or governing procedures. It is an invisible ethical relationship between authority and the human being—one grounded in recognition, acceptance, and the sense that governance, despite its flaws, does not violate the core of human dignity.
In a legitimate state, authority is exercised not merely because it can be, but because society recognizes its right to rule. In a coercive state, power is exercised because it possesses the instruments of violence, not because it possesses meaning. Obedience thus shifts from a conscious political act to an instinctive response to fear, and the citizen is transformed from a partner in the social contract into a monitored, governed entity contained within a disciplinary system.
Coercion, in this sense, is not a sign of the strength of the state, but evidence of its profound fragility. The more a regime must multiply its instruments of repression, the more its legitimacy has eroded from within. A state that persuades does not need excessive repression; a state that terrorizes cannot persuade. Political violence, therefore, is not a substitute for legitimacy, but an implicit admission of its failure.
Enforced obedience does not produce stability; it merely postpones explosion. It accumulates silence rather than consent, and compliance rather than belonging. Over time, fear turns into alienation, and the state becomes an external entity vis-à-vis society—perceived as a hostile apparatus rather than an inclusive framework. At this point, the state loses its capacity to embody shared meaning and becomes a power unto itself, detached from the human beings it claims to govern.
By contrast, ethical consent rests on a deeper foundation than obedience: it emerges from a sense of justice and from recognition that authority—however powerful—is bound by inviolable human limits. Ethical consent does not imply the absence of critique or protest; rather, it means that political struggle unfolds within the framework of the state rather than against it, because the state is not reduced to an apparatus of coercion but is understood as a public space open to reform.
Here, the political philosophy of Human First emerges as a radical redefinition of the source of obedience:
The human being does not obey because the state commands, but because the state ethically justifies its authority.
True legitimacy does not emerge from the barrel of a gun, from mobilizing rhetoric, or from exhausted revolutionary claims. It arises from the capacity of governance to respect the human being as an end, not a means. The closer the state moves toward the human being, the less it relies on coercion; the farther it moves away, the more its apparatus of violence expands to compensate for the absence of meaning.
The transition from enforced obedience to ethical consent is not merely a matter of administrative reform or constitutional amendment. It is a transformation in the philosophy of governance itself: from a state that views the human being as a threat to be controlled, to a state that recognizes the human being as a value to be protected; from an authority that fears society, to a state that derives its existence from it.
Without this transformation, the state remains a structure sustained by force rather than right, by domination rather than legitimacy, and by postponed time rather than historical continuity.
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