By Dr. Adnan Bozan

More than a decade after its outbreak, the war in Syria can no longer be understood as a mere internal conflict between rival local actors, nor as an arena for settling political scores between an authority and fragmented oppositions. It is no longer reducible to the narrative of “the state versus external threats” or “national unity versus secession.” Rather, the Syrian scene in its current phase has become a concentrated expression of the transformation of an internal crisis into an internationalized regional war, managed according to the interests of neighboring states and fought through local instruments—while peoples, foremost among them the Kurdish people, pay the direct price of this violent geopolitical positioning.

Describing the ongoing confrontation between the so-called “interim Damascus authority” and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as a purely Syrian–Syrian conflict is nothing more than a misleading political simplification. Its purpose is to strip the war of its regional dimension and to obscure the real actor that drives its trajectories, boundaries, and ceilings. This war does not stem primarily from internal disagreements over the form of governance, modes of administration, or the distribution of powers, but rather from a struggle over existence, identity, and role—a struggle that transcends Syrian geography and strikes at the very heart of the Kurdish question across the Middle East as a whole.

As a result of the structural collapse of the Syrian state, Syria has been transformed into an open arena for the redrawing of regional balances. Sovereignty has ceased to be a unifying national concept and has instead become a selective tool, wielded against some actors but not others, invoked only when it comes to aborting any political experiment that departs from prevailing authoritarian or nationalist models. Within this context, the Kurdish political project in North and East Syria—marked by democratic features, decentralization, and ethnic pluralism—has become a direct target of regional powers that view this model as a threat extending beyond Syria’s borders to their own internal structures and their very conception of the state and the nation.

A close examination of the military, media, and political escalation against the SDF reveals that what is taking place is neither the result of a transient administrative dispute nor a “misunderstanding” among partners in a single homeland. Rather, it is part of a long-term Turkish strategy aimed at undermining any organized Kurdish entity and hollowing out Kurdish geography of its political substance, through the management of an indirect war carried out by local hands and covered by nationalist or religious rhetoric that reproduces historical hatred toward the Kurds.

In this context, the dangerous role played by politicized Sunni Arab forces cannot be ignored—forces that have been ideologically mobilized and politically incited to stand at the forefront of this conflict, not as independent actors, but as functional instruments within a broader regional project. Instead of directing the compass of struggle toward authoritarianism, occupation, or the dismantling of the power structures that devastated Syria, it is redirected toward the Kurds, portrayed as the “other” most easily demonized and stripped simultaneously of legitimacy and humanity.

Thus, the real question that must be posed does not concern only the nature of the current conflict, but rather who manages it, why it is being fought, and in whose interest. Is what is unfolding truly an attempt to “restore the state,” or is it a new chapter in an open war on Kurdish existence—this time waged in the name of Syria, while its essence and objectives extend far beyond it?

This introduction does not seek to issue preconceived judgments, but rather to re-situate the conflict within its proper historical and regional context: as a war in which the interests of the Turkish state, the erosion of Syrian sovereignty, and the complicity of international silence intersect—at the expense of a people who continue to be pushed into the position of victim, simply because they dared to imagine a different Syria.

First: Deconstructing the Illusion of a “Syrian–Syrian Conflict”

The official discourse of the so-called Temporary Authority in Damascus insists on framing the confrontation with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as a “battle for sovereignty” or a “restoration of the state’s prestige,” in an attempt to reproduce the narrative of the centralized state presenting itself as a victim of internal fragmentation and external interference. However, once subjected to serious political scrutiny, this discourse reveals itself to be more of a defensive ideological construct than an accurate description of the nature of the conflict. It is built on obscuring the real actors involved and diverting attention away from the regional structures that govern the course, limits, and outcomes of the war.

Describing the confrontation as an internal Syrian conflict primarily serves to strip the SDF of political legitimacy and portray it as a force “outside the state,” rather than as part of a complex national equation imposed by years of war. This framing deliberately ignores the context in which this force emerged, the role it played in confronting terrorism, and its contribution to protecting entire regions from collapse and chaos.

1. Absence of Independent Sovereign Will

The first point at which the “sovereignty” narrative collapses lies in the fact that the Temporary Authority in Damascus lacks an independent sovereign will—whether at the military or political level. Decisions of escalation or de-escalation are not made on the basis of an inclusive Syrian national interest, but rather within highly complex regional balances controlled by external powers, foremost among them Turkey.

The subordination of this authority to undeclared security arrangements and ad hoc deals renders claims of sovereignty little more than empty slogans, deployed only when politically expedient. Sovereignty, in its genuine political sense, presupposes independence of decision-making, consistency of standards, and the capacity to impose national will across the entire geography of the state—conditions that are entirely absent in the current Syrian context.

When decisions of war and peace become contingent on external signals, talk of “restoring the state” turns into a mere redistribution of roles within a system of regional tutelage, rather than a real recovery of sovereignty.

2. The Selective Use of the Concept of Sovereignty

The crisis of official discourse becomes even more apparent in its blatant selectivity regarding sovereignty. This sovereignty is invoked only when the opposing party is Kurdish, or when the issue concerns a decentralized political experiment in North and East Syria, while the direct Turkish occupation of large swathes of Syrian territory is entirely overlooked.

From Afrin to Serekaniye (Ras al-Ayn) and Girê Spî (Tell Abyad), Turkey exercises a clear military occupation, accompanied by demographic engineering, the imposition of subordinate administrations, and well-documented violations of the rights of the indigenous population. Yet the rhetoric of “sovereignty” is not raised with the same intensity, nor is there any serious action aimed at “restoring the state” in these areas.

This contradiction exposes sovereignty here not as a national principle, but as a selective political instrument wielded against a specific party—the Kurds—not because they threaten the unity of the country, but because they offer a political model incompatible with the authoritarian centralized state structure and with Turkish regional interests.

3. De Facto Alliances and the Synchronization of Escalation

The third point concerns the nature of the escalation itself, which neither occurs in a vacuum nor results from purely internal developments. Every political or military escalation against the SDF strikingly coincides with direct or indirect Turkish pressure, or aligns with Ankara’s security priorities—whether related to border issues, Turkish domestic elections, or the reconfiguration of influence in northern Syria.

This synchronization is no coincidence; it reflects the existence of de facto alliances managed behind the scenes, where certain Syrian actors are transformed into instruments for implementing regional projects in exchange for promises or short-term gains—often illusory or fleeting.

Within this framework, the interests of Syrians as a whole are neither measured nor prioritized, nor are the societal costs of war or the risks of igniting long-term ethnic and communal conflicts taken into account. Instead, decision-making is reduced to serving a regional security agenda at the expense of internal stability and the possibility of building a genuinely pluralistic state.

Conclusion

In light of the above, it becomes clear that portraying the current conflict as a Syrian civil war, or as a confrontation between the “state” and a “force outside it,” is nothing more than a deliberate political falsification. Its purpose is to conceal the regional character of the war, absolve the external actor—chiefly Turkey—of direct responsibility, and shift the burden of blame onto the victim.

Deconstructing the illusion of a “Syrian–Syrian conflict” is the first step toward understanding the essence of what is unfolding: a war managed from outside, fought on Syrian soil, targeting a Kurdish political project as the real threat—not to Syria’s unity, but to the prevailing systems of domination in the region.

Second: Turkey as a Central Actor in the War

Turkey is not an external actor merely “concerned” about security developments along its southern borders, as it attempts to portray itself in its official discourse, nor is it simply a state seeking to protect its national security from “cross-border threats.” The Turkish role in Syria—particularly in the conflict against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—goes far beyond the logic of preventive defense, reaching the level of actual leadership over the course and objectives of the war. What we are witnessing is a state that views Syrian geography as a direct extension of its structural conflict with the Kurdish question, and that treats Syria not as a sovereign state, but as an open arena for reproducing its own nationalist–security model.

1. The Structural Kurdish Dilemma in the Turkish State

Since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the state has been built upon the denial of national and cultural pluralism, and upon the imposition of a rigid, monolithic identity that defines the “nation” as purely Turkish. In this context, the denial of Kurdish existence was not a transient policy, but a foundational pillar of the state’s very structure. Kurds were neither recognized as a nation nor even as a minority, but were instead labeled “Mountain Turks,” in a systematic attempt to erase identity, language, and history.

This structural dilemma has not been resolved over time; rather, it has been reproduced in various military, security, and political forms. As a result, any independent Kurdish expression—whether cultural or political—has come to be viewed as an existential threat to the state. Consequently, any successful Kurdish experience outside Turkey’s borders, especially if it is democratic, pluralistic, and sustainable, automatically becomes a strategic danger, because it exposes the falsity of the Turkish narrative that claims coexistence, decentralization, or national partnership to be impossible.

From Ankara’s perspective, the danger does not lie in weapons per se, but in the idea itself: the idea that Kurds are capable of self-administration and of building a different political model without leading to the disintegration of the state or the collapse of society.

2. The SDF as a Strategic Antithesis to the Turkish Project

Within this framework, the Syrian Democratic Forces represent more than a local military formation; they constitute the political and military embodiment of a model fundamentally opposed to the Turkish one. The SDF is neither a closed ethnic project nor a separatist movement, as is often claimed, but rather a multi-component framework that emerged under wartime conditions and carried with it the contours of an alternative political project—one that stands in essential contradiction to the centralized nation-state.

This project rests on foundations that amount to a strategic nightmare for Ankara, most notably:

• Grassroots democracy, rooted in local society rather than in an authoritarian center.

• National partnership, which recognizes multiple identities without imposing a dominant one.

• Women’s liberation, as a structural component of politics and society, not a cosmetic slogan.

• Political decentralization, which dismantles the monopoly of power and redistributes it horizontally.

The threat posed by this model, from the Turkish perspective, lies not in its alleged “separatism,” but in its viability, its reproducibility, and its potential for generalization—whether within Syria or across the wider region. The success of such an experience would undermine the historical pretext used to justify repression in the name of “state unity,” and would open the door to questioning the rigid nationalist model upon which the Turkish Republic was founded.

3. Proxy War: From Direct Intervention to Managed Eradication

After years of direct military intervention in northern Syria, and the accompanying political, security, and economic costs, Ankara came to recognize the limits and long-term risks of this option. It therefore shifted toward a more insidious and far more dangerous strategy: proxy warfare.

Turkey no longer needs to remain permanently in the foreground. Instead, it increasingly manages the conflict from behind the scenes through:

• Empowering and activating local forces politically and militarily.

• Providing political cover and logistical support.

• Injecting an inciting discourse that cloaks the war in “Syrian,” “national,” or “religious” narratives.

Under this strategy, the war against the SDF is transformed from a clear external aggression into a manufactured internal conflict, fought with Syrian tools but serving, in essence, the objectives of the Turkish state. Even more dangerously, this war does not merely target influence or control; in many of its manifestations, it tends toward policies of emptying, exclusion, and systematic destruction, bringing it closer to a war of political and geographical eradication than to a conventional military confrontation.

Conclusion

Understanding Turkey’s role as a central actor in the war is essential to understanding what is unfolding in Syria today. Turkey does not intervene because it fears chaos, but because it fears the model; and it does not fight the SDF because it is an armed force, but because it represents a political project that threatens the nationalist foundations upon which the Turkish state was built.

Without deconstructing this role, all readings that describe the conflict as a “Syrian internal dispute” or a mere “administrative disagreement” will remain incomplete—if not outright misleading—because they ignore the actor that holds the strings, manages the war, and sets its limits, while entire peoples continue to pay an open-ended price for this conflict.

Third: Weaponizing Hatred and Turning Sunni Arabs into an Instrument

If artillery and aircraft destroy geography, the most dangerous aspect of this war is what destroys consciousness. The conflict unfolding today is not waged by weapons alone; at its core, it is managed through the reproduction of genocidal discourse—through transforming hatred into a political tool and normalizing violence as a “legitimate act,” a “national duty,” or even a “religious obligation.” In this context, segments of Sunni Arabs are mobilized not as an ethnic or religious group, but as a politicized and ideologically conditioned audience within a conscious regional strategy.

1. The Political and Religious Demonization of Kurds

The first stage of any exclusionary or genocidal project always begins with stripping the victim of humanity and legitimacy. This is precisely what is being systematically done to Kurds in prevailing political, media, and religious discourse. The Kurd is not presented as a Syrian citizen with political and cultural rights, but is redefined through three dangerous stereotypes:

• The “Separatist”:
  Any demand for decentralization or self-administration is portrayed as a project of partition, in deliberate disregard of the fundamental distinction between decentralization and secession, and between political partnership and the dismantling of the state.

• The “Infidel” or Religious Deviant:
  By linking the Kurdish project to narratives of atheism or “moral corruption,” and exploiting women’s liberation and intellectual pluralism to incite popular religious sentiment, political disagreement is transformed into a doctrinal conflict.

• The “Agent” or Foreign Tool:
  By stripping Kurds of any national character and portraying them as instruments of external powers, while conveniently overlooking the explicit subservience of other actors to regional states.

This discourse is not aimed at political critique, but at legitimizing violence, because turning the opponent into an “existential threat” or an “outsider to the community” is the primary condition for justifying their destruction without moral accountability.

2. Exploiting and Redirecting Sunni Grievance

The effectiveness of this discourse cannot be understood without acknowledging the real Sunni grievance accumulated under decades of Syrian authoritarianism. What is dangerous, however, is not the existence of this grievance, but the way it is politically instrumentalized. Instead of directing popular anger toward the structures of despotism that produced repression and devastation, or toward the multiple occupations that tore the country apart, this anger is redirected toward the Kurds, portrayed as the “nearest enemy” and the “easiest to demonize.”

In this sense, grievance is not used as an entry point to liberation or justice, but as fuel for producing a substitute enemy. A complex conflict is reduced to a false binary:
“We,” the oppressed, versus “they,” who allegedly usurped land or power—while completely ignoring the fact that Kurds have historically been among the foremost victims of oppression and marginalization.

This deliberate redirection of the compass serves two interlinked objectives:

• Draining popular anger of its emancipatory content.

• Channeling it into a horizontal conflict among victims, rather than a vertical struggle against structures of domination.

3. Reproducing the Logic of 1915, 1925, and 1963

What is happening today is not new in the region’s history; it is the reproduction of a tested mechanism of annihilation, whose tools have changed while its essence has remained constant. The same model is repeated:

• A regional state seeking to resolve its “national question” through force.

• A local instrument mobilized through religious, nationalist, or “patriotic” discourse.

• A Kurdish victim stripped of legitimacy and humanity.

• An international silence that justifies the crime under the pretexts of “stability” or “combating chaos.”

In 1915, genocide was not merely a decision, but a process of mobilization and incitement.
In 1925, Kurdish uprisings were crushed according to the same logic.
In 1963, exclusion was reproduced in a “modern” nationalist form.

Today, the same scenario is reenacted, but with contemporary tools: media outlets, digital platforms, religious fatwas, and packaged “sovereigntist” discourse.

4. From Community to Instrument: A Necessary Distinction

It is crucial here to emphasize a central ethical and political point: speaking of the “weaponization of Sunni Arabs” does not mean accusing an ethnic or religious group, but rather describing a process of systematic politicization that turns segments of society into instruments of execution in a project that does not serve their real interests.

Sunni Arabs, as a social component, are themselves victims of this conflict. Yet certain political and religious forces have succeeded in diverting their legitimate anger toward a war that serves only projects of regional domination, opening the door to long-term societal conflicts for which everyone will ultimately pay the price.

Conclusion

The most dangerous aspect of this war is not the number of victims, but the normalization of genocidal logic—the transformation of hatred into policy, and of difference into a pretext for erasure. When a society is convinced that its neighbor is its existential enemy, crime becomes possible, even justified.

Thus, the war shifts from a political conflict that could be resolved into an open-ended identity-based struggle, in which there are no winners except the forces that manage the scene from behind the curtain, while societies are drained and the possibility of building a shared اis systematically destroyed.

Fourth: Why Is the SDF the Target?

The persistent targeting of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) cannot be understood as the result of fleeting military balances or a temporary dispute over influence and geography. If the SDF were merely a local armed force, it could have been contained, neutralized, or dismantled through political deals, as happened with dozens of other formations in the Syrian landscape. What makes the SDF a permanent and central target, however, is that it goes beyond being a military actor to become the bearer of a political and social project that threatens the prevailing structures in Syria and the region alike.

1. The SDF as an Alternative Political Project

At its core, the SDF represents a rare attempt in the Syrian context to establish an alternative political project—one that does not rest on the logic of the security state, nor on the monopolization of power by a military, religious, or ethnic elite. This project emerged from the heart of war, yet it was not reduced to militarization alone; rather, it was accompanied by the building of civilian institutions, local governance structures, and mechanisms of political participation, despite the undeniable challenges they face.

The danger of this project, in the eyes of its adversaries, lies not in its perfection, but in its capacity for endurance and in the fact that it offers—even partially—a practical answer to a question that has haunted Syria for decades: Is it possible to build authority outside the logic of centralized authoritarianism? The mere posing of this question, coupled with a tangible experience on the ground, is enough to unsettle all forces whose legitimacy has been built on the denial of alternatives.

2. A Model for a Decentralized Syria

In contrast to the traditional Syrian model—based on a single center, a single decision-maker, and a single identity—the SDF, through its political experience, puts forward a vision of a decentralized Syria, in which local communities are governed according to their specificities within an inclusive national framework. This vision does not imply dismantling the state, but rather redefining it—from a coercive state to a state of partnership.

Yet decentralization, within the dominant authoritarian and nationalist imagination, is perceived as an existential threat, because it strips the center of its monopoly over power, wealth, and decision-making. Hence, the war on the SDF is, in one of its dimensions, a war on the very idea of decentralization, as a potential alternative to the totalizing state that ruled Syria for decades.

3. A Genuine Experience of Coexistence, Not a Mere Slogan

Unlike many discourses that raise the banner of “national unity” without any practical substance, the regions of North and East Syria have offered a relative experience of coexistence among multiple ethnic and religious components—Kurds, Arabs, Syriacs, Assyrians, Chechens, and others. Despite all the shortcomings and legitimate criticisms, this experience has practically shattered the narrative of the impossibility of coexistence, long used to justify repression or domination.

The success of any coexistence experience, even if partial, constitutes a direct threat to forces whose projects are built on fueling division—whether in the name of exclusionary Arab nationalism or political Islam. Coexistence is not merely a moral value, but a political instrument that undermines rigid polarization and opens the way for constructing a composite national identity that does not reduce the citizen to ethnicity or sect.

4. Breaking the Monopoly of Arab Nationalism and Political Islam

Perhaps the most threatening aspect of the SDF, in the eyes of its opponents, is that it simultaneously breaks two historical monopolies over power and legitimacy in Syria and the region: the monopoly of Arab nationalism on the one hand, and that of political Islam on the other.

Exclusionary Arab nationalism has long treated Kurds as “outsiders” or as “minorities to be forcibly assimilated,” while political Islam views any pluralistic civil project as a threat to its doctrinal and political dominance. The SDF, with its civil discourse, ethnic pluralism, and active feminist presence, stands in direct opposition to both projects at once.

This convergence between two historical adversaries—exclusionary nationalism and political Islam—around hostility toward the SDF is not coincidental; it is evidence that the project the SDF represents strikes at the foundations of legitimacy upon which both rely.

Conclusion

Targeting the SDF is not an attack on a military force, but on a political possibility. It is an attempt to abort the idea of a different Syria: a Syria not governed from a single center, not built on exclusion, and not reduced to a single identity or a single discourse.

In this sense, defending the SDF—or its right to political existence—is inseparable from defending the right of all Syrians to imagine a future different from the past that destroyed them. When the alternative itself is targeted, the struggle is no longer over influence, but over political imagination itself: will Syria be allowed to become something other than what it has been, or will it be condemned to reproducing the same catastrophe, with different tools?

Add comment