By: Dr. Adnan Bozan

Syria has, for years, been witnessing profound and structural political transformations. Their impact has not been limited to reshaping the balance of power on the ground; rather, they have extended to reopening fundamental questions concerning the nature of the state, the meaning of political identity, the limits of authority, and the future relationship between the center and the peripheries. The Syrian crisis, which began as a political and social movement, has gradually evolved into a complex structure of conflict that has dismantled and incompletely reassembled the state. This has rendered the very notion of the “Syrian state” an open subject of debate, interpretation, and redefinition.

With the emergence of a new Syrian authority seeking to present itself as a transitional or foundational political framework for rebuilding the state after years of war, fragmentation, and regional and international interventions, debate has once again intensified regarding the future of northern and eastern Syria, known politically and geographically as “Rojava.” This region is no longer understood merely as a geographic margin, but as a political space in which a relatively different model of public governance has emerged—based on forms of self-administration, local pluralism, and attempts to redefine the relationship between society and authority outside the traditional central framework.

Within this context, the question of the relationship between Rojava and the new central authority in Damascus has emerged as one of the most sensitive and complex issues in Syria’s future. However, the importance of this question does not stem solely from its direct political implications, but from the fact that it reflects a deeper contradiction in the very conception of the Syrian state: is it a traditional centralized state that restores its authority by reuniting political and administrative decision-making? Or is it a state in the process of reconstitution, compelled to recognize the plurality imposed by years of war as a political reality that cannot be ignored?

The essence of the problem does not lie in administrative details or partial constitutional arrangements, however important they may be, but in the nature of the vision governing the concept of the state on both sides. The ongoing debate is not merely about the limits of authority, local governance structures, or resource distribution, but rather about a clash between two different models of state, society, and politics: one based on centralization as a guarantee of unity and stability, and another that sees expanded decentralization or political pluralism as a fundamental condition to prevent the recurrence of past collapse.

From here, the real question is not whether integration between Rojava and the new Syrian state is possible or impossible, but how this integration should be defined in the first place, and on what political and constitutional foundations it can be built. It also concerns the boundaries between the concept of “political partnership” as a balanced relationship among multiple actors within a single state, and the reproduction of patterns of “central dominance” that were, to a large extent, among the structural causes of the breakdown between the state and society over past decades, culminating in the explosion of crisis.

The Syrian experience over the past two decades—and more broadly the history of the modern state—demonstrates that the core problem was not diversity itself, but how this diversity was managed. The rigid centralist approach, which did not sufficiently recognize national, cultural, and political plurality, contributed to the creation of a widening gap between center and periphery. This gap was not resolved through security or administrative tools, but instead erupted during a moment of comprehensive political collapse. Hence, any attempt to rebuild the Syrian state without addressing this structural flaw risks reproducing the same crisis, albeit in different forms.

Conversely, the experience that emerged in Rojava during the war years was not merely an emergency condition or a circumstantial reaction. It developed into a political and administrative model with its own characteristics, institutions, and conceptions regarding the relationship between society and authority. This model—regardless of the degree of agreement or disagreement over it—has become part of the Syrian political reality and cannot be ignored or reduced without entering into a deeper question of political legitimacy concerning who has the right to define the “state,” “citizenship,” and “political representation” in the coming phase.

Here, the central dilemma becomes clear: if the goal is to rebuild a unified and sustainable Syrian state, this objective cannot be achieved by reimposing the old centralism, nor by dismantling all forms of local organization that emerged during the war. Rather, it requires the formulation of a new political equation based on mutual recognition and a clear constitutional redistribution of power that balances state unity on the one hand with the rights of components and regions in governance and participation on the other.

Any future settlement between Rojava and the new Syrian authority will remain dependent on the ability to move beyond the logic of “victory and defeat” toward the logic of a “political contract.” States in post-conflict phases are not built on political dominance alone, but on the capacity to transform contradictions into sustainable institutional arrangements. In the Syrian case, this transformation appears more urgent than ever, given the scale of political and social fragmentation produced by years of war.

Within this framework, the issue of integration between Rojava and Damascus becomes not merely an administrative question concerning the merging of institutions or unifying structures, but a foundational question about the very meaning of the state itself: is it a central instrument of control and domination? Or a comprehensive political framework that accommodates diversity and difference? And can sustainable political unity be built without recognizing difference as a structural component of Syrian society?

The answers to these questions will ultimately determine not only the form of the relationship between Rojava and the new Syrian authority, but also the future of the Syrian state as a whole—whether it will reproduce its previous crises, or redefine itself on new foundations capable of absorbing the realities produced by years of prolonged conflict.

First: From the Syrian Crisis to the Emergence of a New Political Experience

The Rojava experience did not emerge as an abstract theoretical project or an intellectual formulation detached from reality. Rather, it was formed within an extremely complex historical context shaped by the Syrian crisis since its outbreak. The gradual collapse of state institutions across large parts of Syrian territory, together with the declining capacity of the central authority to govern peripheral regions, created political, security, and administrative vacuums. These vacuums reopened space for new forms of social and political organization.

Within this context, various forms of local governance emerged in northern and eastern Syria. These were not merely temporary solutions for managing a security or humanitarian crisis; rather, they gradually evolved into a more complex political and administrative structure. This structure was based on concepts of democratic decentralization, the expansion of local participation, and the redefinition of the relationship between authority and society beyond the traditional framework of the centralized state.

During the years of war, Rojava came to be understood not merely as a geographical extension or a peripheral region within the Syrian state, but as a socio-political space embodying a different project in terms of state conception, governance, and mechanisms of political legitimacy. Within it emerged an experiment seeking to reformulate the relationship between diverse ethnic and cultural components, as well as between local society and its administrative institutions, on the basis of pluralism and partnership rather than political monopoly.

From here, a new political equation began to take shape within the Syrian context—one that goes beyond the traditional binary of “state and society” toward a more complex configuration. On the one hand, there exists a central authority seeking to restore state functions and recentralize political and administrative decision-making under its sovereignty. On the other hand, there is a political experience that emerged during the war, which argues that the Syrian crisis was not merely a contingent dysfunction in the structure of the state, but rather the result of a deeper structural flaw in the centralized model of governance itself. Consequently, overcoming the crisis cannot be achieved through the reproduction of that model, but rather through its fundamental redefinition or radical reformulation.

Between these two perspectives, the core of Syria’s future political conflict is defined: should the solution lie in rebuilding the state according to a restored form of traditional centralism? Or in formulating a new political contract that recognizes political and administrative pluralism as an integral component of the state’s structure, rather than an exception to it?

This divergence in vision does not merely reflect differences in policy or interests; it indicates a deeper disagreement over the very meaning of the state, the function of authority, the limits of the center, and the rights of the periphery. This is precisely what makes the Rojava experience a central element in the debate over the future of the Syrian state, rather than merely one file among many within the broader crisis.

Second: The Dilemma of Political Recognition

The issue of political recognition constitutes one of the most complex questions in the relationship between Rojava and the new Syrian authority. The problem here does not concern merely administrative arrangements, security understandings, or technical distribution of competencies between the center and the periphery. Rather, it touches at its core a deeper question regarding the recognition of a new political and social reality that emerged and crystallized during the years of war, becoming part of the de facto structure on the ground, regardless of the degree of political acceptance or rejection it receives.

The fundamental problem lies in the fact that “recognition” in the Syrian context is no longer solely a legal or constitutional matter; it has become a politically charged concept directly linked to the nature of the state itself. Is it a state that reproduces its traditional centralized model with minor formal adjustments? Or is it a state in a process of re-foundation, compelled to incorporate the transformations imposed by field realities and social change during years of conflict?

From the perspective of the Rojava experience, no genuine process of political integration can be envisaged without recognizing the institutions that have been established on the ground, the forms of local governance that have developed throughout the war years, and the cultural and ethnic particularities of the region’s components. This also includes recognition of the right of local communities to manage their own affairs within a unified national framework grounded in the principles of democracy, pluralism, and non-exclusion. In this view, recognition is not a political concession granted by the center, but rather a constitutive condition for building a stable relationship between the center and the regions.

Conversely, segments of central political forces view the recognition of such structures as an issue directly related to the concepts of sovereignty and state unity. From this standpoint, expanding recognition of existing local institutions may be interpreted as a precursor to a redistribution of power that could undermine the centralization of political decision-making, or open the door to governance models that do not conform to the traditional conception of the centralized state historically formed in Syria.

Herein lies the structural paradox of this relationship: while Rojava considers political recognition a necessary entry point for establishing a more stable and balanced national unity, certain circles within the central authority perceive this very recognition as carrying the risk of fragmenting the center or weakening its capacity to regulate the overall political space. Between these two opposing conceptions, the possibility of reaching a shared political formula capable of evolving into a stable and lasting contract becomes increasingly complex.

Thus, the dilemma of recognition appears not as a merely technical or administrative dispute, but as an expression of a deeper crisis in the definition of the Syrian state itself, and in the determination of the relationship between authority and plurality, between political unity and social diversity. This is precisely what renders this dilemma one of the most sensitive points of tension in Syria’s political future.

Third: Integration or Annexation?

From a theoretical perspective, the concept of “integration” is considered one of the positive notions in political science and state-building theories. It presupposes a political relationship based on mutual participation among different components and actors within a single state framework, enabling the reconstruction of political unity not on the basis of exclusion, but through pluralism and the shared organization of power. In this sense, integration appears closer to a consensual arrangement aimed at reintegrating the political sphere into an inclusive institutional framework, without denying existing social, cultural, or administrative differences.

However, comparative historical experience demonstrates that integration is not always a neutral or balanced process. In certain political contexts, it may evolve into an asymmetric trajectory through which the relationship between the center and the periphery is reshaped in a manner that favors the more powerful party, whether at the level of the state or the prevailing power structure.

In such cases, the concept of integration gradually slips into what may be described as political annexation; that is, a process in which a political actor, region, or entity is reintegrated into an existing state structure without sufficient recognition of its political specificity, local institutions, or the historical gains it has achieved within a particular context. At this point, integration loses its original participatory meaning and becomes a mechanism for reproducing centralization—albeit in a more modernized or flexible form—without fundamentally altering the underlying hierarchical relationship between center and periphery.

In the Syrian case in particular, this concern is clearly reflected in ongoing debates regarding the future of the relationship between Rojava and the new Syrian authority. If integration is understood as the reintegration of local institutions into the Syrian state on the basis of a new constitutional contract that simultaneously guarantees administrative and cultural particularity and preserves local governance powers within a decentralized democratic framework, then it may constitute a foundation for genuine political partnership grounded in balance and mutual recognition.

However, if integration is understood as the dismantling of the political and institutional structures that emerged during the war and their complete absorption into a traditional centralized administrative model, without accounting for the political and social transformations that have taken place on the ground, then such a process cannot be accurately described as integration in the political sense. Rather, it would amount to political and administrative annexation, reproducing the logic of centralization and preserving the same structural contradiction that contributed to the deepening of the Syrian crisis rather than resolving it.

Fourth: The Limits of a Possible Partnership

Any conception of a political partnership between Rojava and the new Syrian authority cannot be based solely on the balance of power. Partnerships constructed on the logic of dominance or field superiority are, more often than not, fragile arrangements that remain vulnerable to political shifts or to the reconfiguration of influence. Power, regardless of how central it may appear at a given moment, is insufficient on its own to produce a stable political contract; at best, it generates provisional arrangements that conceal unresolved contradictions beneath the surface.

Accordingly, a sustainable partnership can only be grounded in a set of clear and reciprocal political foundations. Foremost among these is mutual recognition between the parties as partners within a single political entity, rather than as subordinate actors or entities absorbed into a centralized structure. This is further complemented by the necessity of building a degree of political trust—a particularly fragile element in post-conflict contexts, yet an indispensable condition for any transition from the logic of conflict to the logic of political coexistence.

A meaningful partnership also requires the existence of overlapping and shared interests, not in the narrow tactical sense, but in a structural sense that links the stability of the state to the participation of all its components in shaping its future. The absence of such convergence reduces the relationship to crisis management rather than the construction of a state project.

These foundations also include recognition of the ethnic and cultural plurality that constitutes one of the structural realities of Syrian society, as well as the guarantee of political, cultural, and constitutional rights for all components without exception. This would entrench the concept of equal citizenship in place of political or cultural hierarchy. It also necessitates the adoption of clear forms of democratic decentralization that enable local communities to manage their own affairs within the framework of the state, and to participate meaningfully in decision-making processes rather than being confined to a purely executive role.

In the same context, the success of any future partnership requires moving beyond the traditional security-based approach to political and social issues. Matters related to identity, representation, and rights cannot be reduced to security instruments or temporary administrative solutions, as their structural nature far exceeds such frameworks. Addressing them requires long-term political and constitutional approaches capable of transforming disagreement from a source of conflict into an institutionalized domain within the state.

Without these conditions, any prospective partnership will remain inherently unstable, as it will lack the political foundation necessary to transform temporary understandings into a durable contract capable of withstanding the ongoing internal and regional transformations that continue to reshape the entire Syrian landscape.

Fifth: The Kurdish Dimension in the Syrian Equation

The relationship between Rojava and the new Syrian authority cannot be separated from the broader context of the Kurdish question in Syria, which represents one of the most complex and enduring issues within the modern Syrian political structure. The Kurds constitute one of the country’s fundamental social and ethnic components, and their historical presence has been associated with a long trajectory of unstable political and constitutional relations, in which their demands for recognition, rights, and representation have remained a recurrent subject of political contention over successive decades.

Although perspectives within Kurdish society are neither monolithic nor uniform, but rather distributed across multiple political and organizational approaches that reflect the internal diversity of the Kurdish experience itself, there exists a broadly shared denominator. This common ground is expressed in the demand for constitutional recognition of the Kurdish presence, the guarantee of political, cultural, and linguistic rights, and the affirmation of meaningful participation in shaping the future of the Syrian state—not as a symbolic form of inclusion, but as an effective and substantive role within the structure of political decision-making.

From this perspective, the Kurdish question cannot be reduced to a set of sectoral or administrative demands. Rather, it should be understood as an integral component of the broader question of the Syrian state itself: what model of citizenship can be constructed? And what form of relationship between the state and its constituent communities can ensure stability without exclusion or marginalization?

Accordingly, any future political settlement in Syria that fails to take these demands into account, or treats them as secondary issues subject to postponement, will be incapable of producing long-term stability. Comparative experiences in multi-ethnic societies demonstrate that stability is not achieved through the temporary management of crises, but through addressing their structural and political roots in a comprehensive manner that redefines the relationship between state and society on more equitable and balanced foundations.

Sixth: Syria Between Centralization and Pluralism

The Rojava experience, at its core, reveals a deeper crisis concerning the nature of the Syrian state itself and how it defines its political and social function in the post-war period. The question at stake today is not limited to how Rojava might be integrated into the broader Syrian framework; it extends to a more foundational inquiry: what model of state will the new Syria adopt in the future?

Will Syria move toward the reproduction of the traditional centralized state model that governed its political structure for decades prior to the crisis, with its concentration of authority in the center and its regulation of center-periphery relations through conventional administrative and security logics? Or will it enter a deeper process of reconstitution based on the recognition of political, ethnic, and cultural pluralism as a structural reality of Syrian society that cannot be bypassed or reduced?

The choice between these two models is not a mere constitutional or administrative detail; it constitutes the core of the struggle over the future of the Syrian state itself. The centralized model, despite its promises of stability and unified decision-making, may carry the risk of reproducing the structural conditions that led to the previous collapse, should its foundations and its relationship with society remain unexamined. Conversely, the pluralistic democratic model, based on political partnership and broad decentralization, raises complex challenges regarding how to preserve state unity without falling into fragmentation or disintegration.

Within this context, Rojava becomes not merely an administrative case or a negotiating file, but a mirror reflecting the deep tension within the Syrian state structure between the logic of centralization and the logic of pluralism, and between the conception of the state as a unitary authority and its conception as an inclusive political framework encompassing multiple components.

The answer to this fundamental question—what kind of Syria is to be built?—will not only determine the future relationship between Damascus and Rojava, but will also define the trajectory of political stability across the entire country. A state that fails to redefine its relationship with its internal diversity will remain vulnerable to the reproduction of its own crises, whereas a state that succeeds in transforming this diversity into a source of political and institutional strength may open a different path—one that is more stable and sustainable.

Conclusion

The problem of integration between Rojava and the new Syrian authority cannot be reduced to a purely technical issue concerning the distribution of administrative powers or the reorganization of institutional structures. At its core, it expresses a deeper political and intellectual debate regarding the very meaning of the state, the nature of citizenship, and the foundations of political partnership in post-war Syria.

True integration is not built on the logic of exclusion, subordination, or forced assimilation into a closed centralized model. Rather, it rests on mutual recognition between political and social actors and on the formulation of a new political contract that redefines the relationship between the center and society. Such a contract must simultaneously ensure the political unity of the country and guarantee the rights of its ethnic, cultural, and administrative components within an inclusive framework.

Any attempt to reimpose unity through rigid centralist instruments, or to disregard the structural transformations produced by years of war—including the emergence of new political and administrative realities—will only lead to the reproduction of the same crises, albeit in different and more complex forms. This is because it addresses the symptoms rather than the underlying structural causes.

From this perspective, the future of the relationship between Rojava and Damascus will not be determined solely through political negotiations or provisional agreements. Rather, it will depend on the ability of the new Syrian state to achieve a qualitative transformation in its very conception of the state itself: from a logic of authority as an instrument of domination to a logic of partnership as an inclusive framework; from a culture of subordination to a culture of recognition; and from managing diversity as a political burden to constructing it as a foundational element in the architecture of a modern state capable of continuity and stability.

Add comment