By Dr. Adnan Bouzan

Introduction:

In the fractured political geography of post-war Syria, the Kurdish file remains one of the most complex and burdensome issues on the table of national negotiations. Since the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, up until the formation of what came to be known as the “new authority in Damascus” led by Ahmad al-Shar’a (Abu Muhammad al-Jolani), a new map of influence has emerged, bringing with it radical shifts in the balance of power — not only in terms of regional and international alliances, but also in the redrawing of the political and social identities of many Syrian communities, with the Kurds at the forefront.

Kurdish presence in Syria has never been a foreign element in the body of the state; rather, it has always existed as a marginalized margin — expected to remain silent when grand national slogans are dictated, and summoned only when the regime needed an “ethnic maneuver” or a “political message” to the outside world. Since the Kurds adopted a distinct position during the revolution — a complex and flexible stance based on intersecting grievances rather than full alignment with any camp — attention began to shift toward this geographic and demographic bloc as a “future problem,” not as a “partner in rebuilding.”

The emergence of the Democratic Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria came in a moment of political and security vacuum. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its political front (the Autonomous Administration) seized this vacuum to build an unprecedented political model in Syrian history — one based on decentralization, pluralism, and gender participation. However, instead of being discussed as a viable national alternative, this model was met from the outset with suspicion by internal actors, hostility from the regional environment, and tactical exploitation by international powers.

Then came the recent transformations, foremost among them the violent political coup marked by the takeover of Damascus by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and the appointment of Ahmad al-Shar’a as head of the so-called “new government.” This development opened a new chapter of political bargains and shifting alliances, wherein some actors began to talk about “rewriting the Syrian social contract” — a discourse often infused with attempts to bypass the rights of entire components of the Syrian people, even to erase their history and existence with the stroke of a pen, all under the slogans of a “national conference” or “conditional decentralization.”

In this heated context, the Kurds find themselves trapped between impossible equations: a central authority that wants to return them to the pre-2011 status quo without any guarantees; an armed opposition that has morphed into a new ruling force carrying a legacy of crime, terrorism, and ideological exclusion; and international powers that play the Kurdish card without offering any serious roadmap for resolution.

This study poses critical questions: Are the Kurds today part of the foundational process of a new Syria — or merely a bargaining chip moved by foreign hands? Do the Kurds have the capacity to impose a unifying national discourse that transcends fragmented ethnic identities? And what is the future of the Autonomous Administration project amid these shifting variables?

The Kurdish file is not merely an ethnic issue; it is a mirror reflecting everything Syria has failed to achieve — from the absence of a civil state, to the chronic denial of pluralism, to the inability of elites to produce an inclusive social contract. Therefore, the fate of this file does not reflect the fate of the Kurds alone, but will ultimately determine the shape of the Syria to come — if it is ever to be reborn.

First: The Kurds and the Years of the Syrian Revolution

The Kurds did not play a secondary role in the Syrian revolution, as some exclusionary narratives attempt to portray. On the contrary, their presence from the very first moment was genuine and central to the dynamics of the popular uprising. In northeastern cities such as Afrin, Kobani, Qamishli, Amuda, and Derik, Kurdish voices rang out with the slogans of the Syrian revolution alongside other Syrians, demanding freedom and dignity, and calling for the overthrow of a regime of tyranny that spared no one from its brutality — Arabs, Kurds, Syriacs, and all other components alike.

However, the Kurds entered the revolution bearing a historical wound that went far beyond political opposition to the Baathist regime. They had long been deprived of their most basic national rights — such as learning their mother tongue, using Kurdish names, registering their births — and tens of thousands had been denied Syrian citizenship since the infamous 1962 census in Hasakah province, coupled with systemic demographic change in Kurdish regions. Thus, the revolution for the Kurds represented a dual opportunity: political liberation from authoritarianism and cultural liberation from nationalist assimilation policies.

Yet the revolutionary scene was neither simple nor unified. With the militarization of the uprising, and the rise of armed factions with overt Islamist or Arab nationalist leanings — supported and armed by various regional actors — the Kurds began to feel that the revolutionary discourse was veering away from its inclusive slogans and turning into yet another tool of ethnic exclusion. It is therefore no surprise that Kurdish presence declined in some key segments of the opposition — not due to “neutrality,” as some claim, but rather due to a deep feeling that the revolution was being hijacked from within.

During this period, the Democratic Union Party (PYD) emerged as a political and organizational force seeking to fill the vacuum in Kurdish areas following the gradual withdrawal of the Baathist regime — not through direct agreement, but due to security calculations specific to the regime itself. Soon after, the People’s Protection Units (YPG) were established, followed later by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as a multi-component alliance, with Kurds forming its backbone. This allowed them to defend their areas and impose a new form of civil administration, which later became known as the Democratic Autonomous Administration.

Despite its limitations and the heavy pressures it faced both regionally and internationally, this experience represented the first serious attempt by the Kurds to participate in reimagining Syria’s future — not as a mere minority seeking recognition, but as a national component offering a political and social project based on decentralization, identity pluralism, gender equality, and minority rights.

Nevertheless, this path was not without its challenges. The Autonomous Administration was met with accusations from the traditional Syrian opposition of being “separatist,” even though all its official documents consistently affirmed the unity of Syrian territory and framed its project as nothing more than a democratic, decentralized solution within a unified Syria.

In the end, it can be said that the Kurdish position toward the Syrian revolution was not one of withdrawal, but rather a rational attempt to reposition within a complex map — one that, from the beginning, signaled the revolution’s descent into war, and warned that peoples not protected by clear discourse and strong organizational structures would pay the highest price.

Second: The Government of Ahmad al-Shar’a (al-Jolani) and the Rise of a New Discourse

In a political scene that not even the boldest observers could have predicted years ago, Ahmad al-Shar’a, known by his nom de guerre Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, has emerged from the rubble of the Syrian civil war. He transformed from the leader of a jihadist faction listed on international terrorism watchlists into the head of a de facto government in Damascus, filling the power vacuum left by the withdrawal of Russian and Iranian forces under international pressure and the Assad regime’s internal collapse.

These developments were not spontaneous, but rather the result of complex political engineering involving regional powers. These powers pushed to recycle armed opposition factions—chief among them Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—as part of a project aimed at localizing the Syrian solution within the geography of regional influence, in exchange for de-internationalizing the conflict and decoupling it from the Iranian file.

Under the slogan “Syria for Syrians,” Jolani’s government developed a new political discourse that sought to transcend HTS’s jihadist past and present itself as a national alternative to the Assad regime. It drew on a support base in certain regions, as well as on security and economic networks the group had built over the years. However, despite this rhetorical renewal, the discourse could not fully detach itself from its conservative Islamic ideological roots. At its core, it still relied on a religious interpretation of Syrian identity and on a nationalist-Islamist vision that blends the concepts of ummah and statehood in a subtly exclusionary framework.

Here lies the greatest paradox: while Jolani’s government raises slogans about national unity and institutional building, its ideological structure remains incapable of truly representing Syria’s non-Arab and non-Sunni components—foremost among them the Kurds. Over the past decade, the Kurds have built a comprehensive political and social project grounded in civic, secular, and rights-based values, emphasizing pluralism and decentralization not as a tactical phase but as a foundational principle.

This fundamental contrast between two visions—one conservative nationalist-Islamist, the other pluralistic, secular, and decentralized—renders any attempt to forge a political agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) on one side and Jolani’s government on the other fraught with tension and ambiguity. On the one hand, the Autonomous Administration fears that any negotiation may merely serve as a transitional phase before an attempt to dismantle their entire project—especially since Jolani has yet to express any public commitment to Kurdish cultural or political rights. On the other hand, Jolani’s camp fears that accepting the Autonomous Administration project, even symbolically, would delegitimize it in the eyes of its doctrinal base, which has been nurtured on a mono-identity ideology.

Although some behind-the-scenes initiatives have emerged, advocating for a "security understanding" or a temporary "administrative division" between the two parties, such efforts are often aborted—either due to mutual distrust, regional pressures (especially from Turkey, which rejects any recognition of the SDF or the Autonomous Administration), or fears of internal backlash if an unpopular agreement is publicly announced.

Jolani’s new discourse also faces an existential challenge: can it truly evolve from a transitional rhetoric into a comprehensive state-building program? Can it accommodate diversity and pluralism? Or will it end up reproducing a “Sunni” version of the Baathist state—but this time clothed in religious garb? If this emerging state views the Kurds as a “temporary anomaly” or “a problem to be domesticated,” it signals the onset of a new wave of conflict, no less dangerous than the early years of war.

In the end, the fall of Assad’s dictatorship alone is not enough for a true national order to be born. A genuine democratic state must be founded on explicit and unequivocal recognition of the rights of all components—first and foremost the Kurds—not merely as tactical allies in a transitional phase, but as an essential part of the country’s fabric and the vision of its future democratic state.> Third: The SDF and al-Jolani’s Government – Between Impossible Understanding and Deferred Confrontation

The potential relationship between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the government of Ahmad al-Shar’a (al-Jolani) can only be understood as the product of a fundamental contradiction between two projects that differ in vision, structure, and historical context. On one side, the SDF represents the military wing of the Autonomous Administration project, which emerged amidst the collapse of state institutions and has, since its inception, embraced a democratic, secular, and decentralized discourse. It champions “the brotherhood of peoples,” women's rights, and adopts the model of “democratic confederalism” as an alternative to the nation-state.

On the other side, al-Jolani’s government is the evolution of a conservative religious project born from the jihadist movement. It now seeks to transition from factional militancy to centralized state-building, but based on a specific conception of identity, religion, and the socio-political role of individuals and communities.

On the surface, there may appear to be a moment of “shared interests” between the two: both oppose the Assad regime, both operate outside traditional regional alliances (to varying degrees), and both seek to present themselves as viable political alternatives. Yet beneath these superficial alignments lie deep ideological and historical trenches, making even the idea of sitting at the same negotiation table fraught with mutual suspicion.

1. Trust Gap and the Weight of History:

Much of the mutual wariness stems from the painful experiences the Kurds endured in their interactions with armed opposition factions during the war years. Kurdish regions were repeatedly attacked by groups affiliated with the Free Syrian Army, Jabhat al-Nusra, and ISIS—all of which espoused religious or ethno-nationalist discourses that excluded the Kurds. Despite al-Jolani’s recent attempts to rebrand himself as a statesman rather than a Salafist leader, the heavy legacy of this ideological current remains etched in Kurdish collective memory, casting doubt over any rapprochement.

2. The Regional Map and the Turkish Veto:

Any agreement between the SDF and al-Jolani faces the complex dynamics of regional geopolitics, especially Turkey's stance. Ankara views the SDF as an extension of the PKK and refuses to acknowledge any political or administrative arrangement involving the SDF or the Autonomous Administration. Turkey persistently pressures Syrian opposition forces to avoid engagement with the Kurds, even making severing ties with the SDF a prerequisite for any political or military support.

Conversely, al-Jolani’s government cannot operate entirely beyond the regionally sanctioned margins, even if it now enjoys more maneuverability following a partial distancing from Turkey. Thus, any understanding with the SDF could cost it valuable regional legitimacy—something it urgently needs at this juncture.

3. The Domestic Game: What Do the SDF and al-Jolani Want?

The SDF seeks to preserve the political and military gains accumulated over a decade of conflict and aims to secure recognition of its self-governance model in any future Syrian settlement—be it with the regime or the opposition. It is open to negotiation and possibly even participation in a new national framework, provided it acknowledges the uniqueness of Kurdish regions and the political identity of the Autonomous Administration.

Al-Jolani, meanwhile, aspires to expand his legitimacy by annexing new areas or absorbing other forces under his umbrella—but without undermining the conservative discourse that underpins his grassroots support. Therefore, any willingness on his part to engage in dialogue with the SDF is likely to be tactical rather than strategic—aimed at buying time or improving positioning.

4. Future Scenarios: Deferred Clash or Temporary Convergence?

Given these dynamics, the options available to both sides are limited:

• A strategic alliance is highly unlikely, as merging a secular, pluralist project with a conservative religious one would undermine the core identity of both.

• Military confrontation remains on the table, especially if al-Jolani’s government seeks a symbolic “national victory” to boost its image, or if it receives a regional green light to strike at the Autonomous Administration.

• The most realistic short-term scenario is a temporary coexistence or the management of frontlines through localized field agreements (as has occasionally occurred in Manbij and Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo). However, such arrangements are fragile and prone to collapse at any moment.

This intricate relationship remains suspended between irreconcilable visions and volatile political realities—making any stable understanding between the two not just unlikely, but structurally unsustainable.

IV. The New Authority’s Agreement with the SDF: Settlement or Truce?

Reports have emerged of secret negotiations between al-Jolani's government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which allegedly include:

1. Conditional recognition of the Autonomous Administration as an administrative—not political—entity.

2. Integration of the SDF into a "New Syrian Army" under special arrangements.

3. Symbolic Kurdish participation in a transitional government, in exchange for abandoning any federal or separatist aspirations.

However, these terms have not been officially announced, and more complex issues remain unresolved, such as:

1. The fate of Kurdish-language education.

2. Control over resources in the Jazira region.

3. Kurdish representation in a potential new constitution.

It resembles more of a “cold truce” than a real agreement.

V. The Constitutional Rights of Kurds in Syria: From Marginalization to Denial

Since the birth of the modern Syrian state following the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the drawing of artificial borders through colonial agreements, the Syrian state has reflected a narrow vision of national identity—one based solely on Arabism as the only recognized identity. In this context, the exclusion of the Kurds was not a mere "accidental omission," but a deliberate and institutionalized act aimed at building a homogenous Arab nation-state at the expense of the country’s deep-rooted ethnic and cultural pluralism.

1. Syrian Constitutions and the Erasure of the Kurds:

Starting with the 1950 Constitution, through those of 1962 and 1973, and even the 2012 Constitution, constitutional texts have maintained unified language that portrays Syria as an Arab homeland and the Syrian people as part of the "Arab nation." While this phrasing might seem merely rhetorical, it in fact served as the ideological umbrella for all forms of political, cultural, and linguistic exclusion practiced against Kurds and other non-Arabs in the country.

The 1973 Constitution, drafted under Baathist rule, entrenched “Arabism” as the sole identity of the state, clearly stated in Article 1 without even a symbolic reference to diversity or cultural pluralism. Article 8, which designated the Baath Party as the leader of state and society, granted full legitimacy to repressive policies and discriminatory practices against any voice diverging from the Arab nationalist framework.

Even the 2012 Constitution, introduced after the Syrian uprising, merely softened the language without fundamentally changing the exclusionary framework. While it removed explicit references to Baath Party leadership and introduced generic terms like “national unity” and a “unified Syrian identity,” it still made no explicit recognition of other ethnic groups. Kurds—who comprise 15–20% of the population—remained entirely absent from the text: their name unmentioned, their language unrecognized, and their cultural or political rights unacknowledged.

2. Legal and Administrative Exclusion:

Manifestations of Denial> Marginalization was not limited to the constitutional level but translated into systematic policies on the ground, such as:

• The exceptional census of 1962, which stripped over 120,000 Kurds of their Syrian citizenship under the pretext of “illegally infiltrating from Turkey,” depriving generations of basic civil rights like education, employment, and property ownership.

• The “Arab Belt” project, implemented in the 1970s, which aimed to alter the demographic makeup of Kurdish regions by resettling Arab tribes in the Kurdish north (al-Jazira) and granting them lands historically owned by Kurdish farmers.

• The complete denial of the Kurdish language in any official or semi-official setting, banning its use in schools, media, and public documentation—part of a policy intended to sever the Kurdish collective memory from its cultural roots.

3. From Cultural Resistance to Constitutional Aspiration

Despite this long history of marginalization, Kurds never abandoned the dream of recognition and representation. Culture became a tool of resistance, with the Kurdish language passed down orally in homes, secretly taught in informal schools, and sung at weddings and community gatherings—acts of symbolic defiance.

Following the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011 and the liberation of some Kurdish regions from the grip of the Assad regime, the Autonomous Administration emerged as a political and administrative experiment proposing a new model of citizenship and belonging. Kurdish became a language of education, and Kurdish newspapers, radio stations, schools, and institutions began to flourish in an unprecedented moment of self-expression and identity.

However, this dream still lacks constitutional legitimacy at the national level. Neither the regime recognizes the Autonomous Administration, nor does the Syrian opposition—in most of its factions—accept integrating the Kurdish project into its vision for a future Syrian state, aside from a few timid initiatives that fall short of genuine political recognition.

4. Toward a New Constitution: Kurds as Partners, Not a “Problem”

Drafting a new constitution for post-war Syria cannot claim any legitimacy unless it reflects the pluralistic reality of the Syrian people. In this context, Kurds are not merely a “problem to be solved,” but an integral part of the solution itself. What is required is a constitution that acknowledges ethnic diversity, recognizes local languages, and grants communities the right to self-administration within a decentralized state grounded in rights and citizenship rather than denial and exclusion.

Exiting the tunnel of marginalization requires more than superficial recognition; it calls for an epistemological and political break from the discourse of “one identity,” and the construction of a new national narrative in which Kurds are partners in the homeland—not strangers to the geography.

Sixth: Attempts to Erase the Kurdish Entity... With the Stroke of a Pen

Efforts to marginalize the Kurds are far from absent in visions for Syria’s future. Constitutions and agreements are proposed with no explicit mention of Kurdish identity, as if their existence were a trivial footnote in the Syrian national narrative. This vision, which seeks to suppress Syria’s diversity under the guise of false unity, merely reproduces the same logic of a centralized nation-state that led Syria to its current catastrophe.

To erase a land with the stroke of a pen is not a literary metaphor here—it is a dangerous political practice. It is a deliberate undermining of a people’s collective memory, a deletion of a language, a culture, and an identity that has shaped Syria’s mosaic.

The threat to the Kurdish entity in Syria has not only come through military force or field pressures, but through a more insidious and deeply rooted weapon: the weapon of legal texts, political maps, official statements, and carefully crafted national dialogues designed to ignore, erase, or "neutralize" an entire component of Syria’s political and human geography. The Kurds are not always erased with bombs or blockades—but more dangerously, with deliberate deletion from grand narratives and foundational texts of the future state.

1. Deliberate Exclusion from Documents and Constitutions:

Whenever a draft constitution for Syria is presented—whether by the regime, the opposition, the new ruling powers, or even international actors—the same pattern recurs: Syria is defined as an "Arab state," its people as "part of the Arab nation," with no mention of the Kurdish people or the other languages and cultures that constitute the Syrian social fabric. This exclusion is not an oversight; it stems from an entrenched ideological mindset shared by both the regime and much of the opposition, which views Kurds either as "guests" or as "minorities" who must dissolve into the majority, rather than be recognized for their distinctiveness.

2. The Geography of Name Erasure… and the Redrawing of History:

Since the early days of Ba’athist rule, a systematic Arabization campaign targeted Kurdish place names—cities, villages, mountains, and rivers were stripped of their Kurdish identity and replaced with Arabic or Ba’athist names. "Kobani" became "Ayn al-Arab," "Qamishlo" became "al-Qamishli," and local histories were overwritten with centralized nationalist narratives that tied everything to the "history of the Syrian state," which begins and ends in Damascus.

Today, these attempts take on more modern but no less dangerous forms: maps are drawn without naming Kurdish regions, or in ways that geographically fragment them; "decentralization projects" are proposed that detach Kurdish areas from each other and link each to an Arab center—turning Rojava into an isolated archipelago, rather than a coherent political, geographic, and demographic entity.

3. The Pen as a Weapon: Media and Language:

In official media discourse, the term "Kurds" is rarely used, and when it is, it's often accompanied by labels like "foreign-backed," "separatist," or "illegal militias"—a strategy that strips symbolic and political legitimacy from the Kurdish presence. The Kurdish language is not recognized in national media, education, or administration, even though it is the mother tongue of millions of Syrians.

This linguistic denial is a form of symbolic violence: it denies a people the right to speak their name, to name things in their language, and to describe their world in their own tongue. Language here is not merely a tool of communication—it is the vessel of memory, identity, and history. Denying Kurds their language is an attempt to uproot them from their past and replant them in soil that only produces forgetfulness.

4. Self-Erasure Through "False Unity":

The mantra of "national unity" has long been wielded as a weapon against pluralism. Instead of being a voluntary contract among equal components, it has been used as a justification to melt everyone into a single identity—usually that of the cultural and religious majority. This false unity erases differences, marginalizes peripheral voices, and reproduces the structure of the classical nation-state which failed to maintain Syria’s delicate balances.

5. Kurdish Memory in the Face of Erasure:

Despite all these attempts, Kurdish collective memory refuses to be erased. Kurdish songs are still sung at weddings, grandmothers still tell tales of "Dersim," "Shengal," and "Qamishlo," and mothers still name their children "Arin," "Mazkin," and "Sharvan." Identity, when besieged, does not vanish—it becomes quiet resistance, and then transforms into overt political action.

It is now clear that erasing a land with the stroke of a pen is not just a metaphor—it is an ongoing political practice aimed at reshaping Syria to fit a narrow, exclusionary, and supremacist vision. But what is forgotten is that when Kurds take hold of the pen, it becomes an instrument of resistance—not of erasure. Books, archives, poetry, oral history—all these are tools against forgetting, redrawing geography not only in ink but, at times, in blood.

Seventh: The Future of the Kurds in Syria Amid Competing Projects

As Syria enters the post-war phase, three major projects intersect across Kurdish geography. These projects differ ideologically, contradict each other in their visions for Syria’s future, and exert direct pressure on Kurdish existence—politically, culturally, and geographically. The Kurds, who have endured decades of denial, now face an existential dilemma: how to safeguard their achievements amid struggles between forces greater than themselves, without becoming merely a tool or a bargaining chip?

1. The Islamist-Nationalist Project: The Jolani Government as a Model

The government of Ahmad al-Shara (Abu Muhammad al-Jolani), which took shape in Damascus after the collapse of the Ba'ath regime under internal and external pressure, represents a model of a “conservative Sunni” state with an Islamist-nationalist character. Despite its broad slogan “Syria for Syrians,” its cultural and political discourse leans toward religious centralization and lacks explicit recognition of ethnic pluralism—offering only vague promises of “integration and reconciliation.”

This project—despite its display of flexibility—is still viewed with suspicion by the Kurds, as it reproduces central dominance, albeit in a new guise. It does not explicitly recognize the Autonomous Administration and conditions the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into a unified national army under centralized authority. For the Kurds, this model signals a return to the security state, even if the rulers have changed.

2. The Turkish Project: Occupation Disguised as Security

Turkey is working to impose a so-called “safe zone” in northern Syria stretching from Afrin to Ras al-Ayn, which in essence is a demographic engineering project involving forced displacement and organized resettlement. It views the Autonomous Administration as a “national security threat” linked to the PKK and seeks to dismantle it politically and militarily.

The Turkish project does not recognize Kurdish identity in Syria, viewing it as an extension of its own internal Kurdish issue. It uses loyal Syrian factions as pressure tools and prevents any genuine national consensus that includes the Kurds. Its stance on federalism or decentralization is one of absolute rejection.

3. The American-European Project: Temporary Stabilization

In contrast, the international coalition led by the United States adopts a more pragmatic stance. It considers the SDF a reliable partner in the fight against terrorism and supports the Autonomous Administration within limited geographical boundaries. However, this support remains fragile and lacks a long-term strategic commitment.

The Kurds understand that Western protection is contingent upon shifting interests tied to political changes in Washington or Paris. As such, they remain in a gray area—neither fully accepted in the Syrian equation, nor guaranteed lasting external support.

4. Between Realism and Aspiration: Future Scenarios

Amid these competing projects, several potential scenarios emerge for the Kurdish future in Syria:

• Forced Integration: In this scenario, the SDF is dissolved and the Autonomous Administration dismantled within a new centralized Syrian state under Jolani’s government or another emerging authority. Vague promises of representation are given, without constitutional guarantees. This would undermine Kurdish gains and potentially reset the crisis.

• Actual Federalism: Syria adopts a genuine decentralized system that grants the Kurds constitutionally recognized self-administration while maintaining national territorial unity. This is the scenario advocated by most Kurdish political forces.

• Deferred Confederation: A flexible model in which Rojava maintains broad administrative autonomy without initial formal recognition, awaiting a ripening of constitutional negotiations. This resembles the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s experience in the 1990s.

• Disintegration and Retraction: The worst-case scenario, where the Autonomous Administration collapses under internal and external pressure, and its territories are divided among conflicting forces (Turkey, the Damascus government, pro-Turkish factions), leaving the Kurds in a more fragile state than before.

5. Conditions for Political Survival

To prevent the Kurdish future from being dependent on the whims of international players, Kurdish forces must:

• Unify their political discourse and establish a comprehensive reference body that speaks on behalf of all Syrian Kurds.

• Reach out to other Syrian components, moving beyond “defensive identity” rhetoric toward an inclusive national project.

• Invest in diplomatic representation, ensuring a strong presence in final settlement negotiations as an indispensable actor.

Eighth: Comparing the Kurdish Experience in Iraq – Lessons and Risks

Some may view the Kurdish experience in Iraq as an ideal model, where the Kurdistan Region enjoys recognized autonomy, its own parliament, an official language, and limited international relations. However, this model was not achieved easily, but rather through:

1. Long years of armed resistance.

2. Direct international support, especially after 1991.

3. A genuine political vacuum in the center (Baghdad).

When exploring future scenarios for the Kurds in Syria, the Kurdish experience in Iraq emerges as the closest model in terms of geographic context, cultural composition, and political history of resistance. Yet it is also a complex experience—balancing achievement and setback, autonomy and external dependency, internal unity and partisan division.

1. The Iraqi Model: Gains of Autonomy and Its Constraints

The Kurdistan Region of Iraq was effectively established after the 1991 uprising, when the no-fly zone imposed by the international coalition created a space for geographic and political independence from Baghdad’s authority. This partial independence gradually transformed into a constitutionally recognized reality after 2005, when the region’s status was enshrined in the Iraqi constitution, including:

• An elected local parliament.

• An executive government with broad powers.

• Local security forces (Peshmerga).

• Kurdish as an official language alongside Arabic.

• Relatively independent educational, cultural, and economic policies.

These gains were not simply the fruit of peaceful negotiation, but the result of decades of armed resistance led by Kurdish parties, direct international support (especially from the U.S.), and a major political vacuum in Baghdad following the collapse of the state after the 2003 American invasion.

2. Key Lessons for the Syrian Case: What Can Be Learned?

Despite the differences in context, there are lessons Syrian Kurdish forces can draw from Iraq’s experience when approaching the future of autonomy:

A. The importance of negotiation over confrontation

Although Iraqi Kurds fought bloody battles with Baghdad, the consolidation of autonomy ultimately came through constitutional processes. This suggests that long-term negotiations may lead to more sustainable outcomes than perpetual armed conflict.

B. Building strong institutions before demanding independence

Iraqi Kurds built real institutions (parliament, judiciary, media, education) that made autonomy viable—not just a political slogan. This is a central lesson for the Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria: self-rule is meaningless without trustworthy institutions that mirror a modern state.

C. Relations with the international community

Iraqi Kurds benefited from Western support at critical moments—something the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) partly lacked after the defeat of ISIS, when major powers appeared reluctant to endorse their political project fully. Despite their fragility, international alliances remain essential for the rise of any new entity.

3. Challenges of the Iraqi Experience: Early Warning Signs

The Kurdish experience in Iraq is far from ideal and currently faces internal threats that outweigh pressures from Baghdad:

A. Political and administrative corruption

Despite having institutions, weak transparency, the dominance of political families, and party control over resources have eroded public trust, especially in poor and neglected areas.

B. Partisan division

The conflict between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) has led to dual power structures and repeated internal armed clashes—particularly in regions like Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk—posing a constant threat to regional stability.

C. Ongoing disputes with Baghdad

Despite constitutional recognition, Baghdad continually seeks to reduce the region’s powers, especially over oil and the budget. This shows that legal recognition is insufficient without a real balance of power and influence.

4. The Risks of Blindly Replicating the Model

If Kurdish forces in Syria attempt to “replicate” the Iraqi model without accounting for the differences, it could lead to strategic disasters. Syria, unlike Iraq:

• Has not yet entered a clear constitutional phase post-war.

• Lacks explicit international support for Kurdish federalism, unlike Iraqi Kurds.

• Suffers from deeper societal and political fragmentation, especially with the presence of Islamist currents staunchly opposed to the Kurdish project.

• Has a less geographically homogeneous Kurdish demographic, making the self-rule project more complicated.

5. Summary of the Comparison: Awareness, Not Imitation

The Iraqi model offers a mirror that reflects what could happen if rights are recognized—but also what could happen if the Kurdish interior fails to manage that recognition. Syrian Kurdish forces should:

• Learn from the institution-building experience.

• Avoid the partisan divisions that weakened the Kurdish region.

• Keep their ambitions realistic and flexible.

• Build a project grounded in Syria’s complex reality and in partnership with other components.

Ninth: What is the Future of the Kurds in Syria? A Question of Identity, Place, and the Right to Remain

The question that floats above the ashes of the Syrian war and echoes through the corridors of regional and international politics is not merely a geographic or legal inquiry, but an existential one: Do the Kurds have a place in the new Syria?

And what kind of place would that be? A fragile cultural niche where language and memory are trampled? A flexible political entity that survives the storm in a middle-ground formula? Or, as some dream, an integral part of a multiethnic, multicultural state?

1. Kurds Between Experience and History: From Denial to Representation

For over a century of the forced formation of the Syrian state, Kurds were unrecognized—in language, education, or political structure. They were always physically present but symbolically absent: speaking Kurdish at home, educating their children in Arabic, celebrating Newroz in secret while publicly demanding recognition. In the 1962 census, many were classified merely as “foreign residents” in their own homeland.

But after the Syrian revolution in 2011, for the first time, the Kurds moved from the margins of discourse to the center of events—from marginalized victims to political and military actors with their own project: the Democratic Autonomous Administration. This radical transition is not just a political achievement but a historical turning point that raises a critical challenge: How can the Kurds ensure their active presence in a country that still avoids acknowledging its diversity?

2. Three Scenarios: Between Dissolution, Fragility, and Recognition

A. Scenario of “Forced Dissolution”: If Jolani’s Government Takes Over Completely

If Ahmad al-Shara’s (Jolani) government—a new version of a central religious-nationalist state—succeeds in imposing full control over Syrian territory, the Autonomous Administration will be forced to assimilate into an authoritarian structure that reintroduces repression, this time in religious language.

In this scenario, the Kurds would not be erased but reshaped within an “Islamic unity” that hides diversity under the guise of a “single Ummah.” The Kurdish language would again face marginalization, and local governance tools would be stripped away. Kurds would become part of a "religious state" that does not recognize civic values, plurality, or the right to difference.

B. Scenario of “Fragile Coexistence”: Continuation of Geographical Decentralization

If the current geographical fragmentation continues, with the Autonomous Administration governing its regions without official recognition, we’ll witness a model of an incomplete political entity surviving more on international balances than national legitimacy.

In this scenario, the Kurdish-administered areas remain vulnerable to:

• International powers (the U.S. as a supporter, Russia as a mediator, Turkey as a constant threat),

• And domestic actors (tribes, local councils, opposition forces).

The Kurdish entity would persist, but as a fragile “shadow republic”—one with institutions, plans, and ambitions, but lacking constitutional coverage or sovereign recognition. The Kurds here would be like people living atop a political volcano, uncertain when it might erupt.

C. Scenario of a “Pluralistic State”: If the Dream of a Democratic Constitution Comes True

This is the most noble, yet least likely scenario in the current moment: a new, decentralized state that recognizes Kurds as a foundational component, acknowledges their language, and guarantees autonomy within a national framework—transcending the binary of “unity or separation.”

In this model, Kurds become partners, not marginal actors—integrated into parliament, the constitution, and the economy not as token figures but as a historical right. This scenario requires deep national consensus and a redefinition of “Syria” not as an Arab state alone, but as a shared space for multiple ethnicities, each with the right to exist and be represented.

3. Determining Factors: Between Internal and External Dynamics

The fate of the Kurds in Syria will not be decided by the Kurds alone, but by the interplay of four key factors:

• Regional transformations: How Turkey, Iran, and Iraq align on the Syrian Kurdish issue.

• The roles of the U.S. and Russia: Will Washington remain a protector of a “realistic federalism,” or retreat under diplomatic pressure?

• The stance of the opposition and future regime: Will both sides lean toward centralization or a participatory pluralistic system?

• Kurdish self-awareness: The ability of Kurds to overcome party divisions and form a unified discourse that bridges the civil-military and local-global dimensions.

4. The Kurds and the Future of Syria: From the Margins to the Center

The Kurds will not have a guaranteed future in Syria unless the concept of the state itself transforms—from a “closed national state” to a “multiethnic and multicultural state.” It is not enough to say “Syria is for all Syrians” unless the constitution explicitly recognizes Kurdish linguistic, cultural, and political distinctiveness—not as a threat to unity, but as a guarantee of the state’s survival.

The Kurds are not asking for a new nation-state, but for the right to be themselves within a state spacious enough for everyone. This right is not a favor from anyone, but a human, political, and moral necessity.

Tenth: The International Role in Shaping the Kurdish Fate: Between a Bargaining Chip and a Suspended Bet

One cannot speak of the future of the Kurds in Syria without addressing the heavy external hands shaping the fate of the country. The Kurdish issue has long ceased to be a purely internal matter; it has turned into a pressure and bargaining card in the hands of major international powers. Yet this card is often not used to empower the Kurds, but rather as a means to blackmail other parties and achieve strategic gains.

1. The United States: Conditional Support Without Guarantees

Since its intervention in Syria under the framework of the "Global Coalition Against ISIS," the United States has found in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) an effective partner on the ground. Washington has provided significant military and logistical support, but it has refrained from offering any political recognition to the Autonomous Administration.

The U.S. maintains its relationship with the SDF as a bargaining chip against the former regime, the new ruling powers, Russia, and Iran. At the same time, it tries to reassure Turkey that it does not support “Kurdish secessionism.” This duplicity places the Kurds in a fragile position: temporary partners in a battlefield, not permanent allies in politics.

2. Russia: The Eternal Barterer

Russia has played the role of “godfather” in previous negotiations between Damascus and the Autonomous Administration. It pushed the Kurds to hand over their areas to the Ba'athist regime in exchange for vague promises of autonomy or decentralization—without any written commitment or clear timeline.

Now, while appearing to have withdrawn from the Syrian scene, Russia is secretly coordinating with the U.S. to barter the Kurds in Syria for concessions in Ukraine.

Moscow views the Kurds as a pressure card against Turkey but is willing to abandon them the moment a greater deal with Ankara or Damascus presents itself. Thus, Russia is less a reliable ally and more a political broker balancing between all sides.

3. Turkey: The Perpetual Foe of the Kurdish Project

Turkey perceives any Kurdish entity in Syria as an existential threat, directly linking it to the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party). For this reason, Ankara has launched several military operations to sever the geographic continuity of Kurdish areas and has occupied cities such as Afrin, Serekaniye (Ras al-Ain), and Tell Abyad.

Turkey’s position is clear and unequivocal: no Kurdish entity in Syria, no autonomy, and no Kurdish language in official schools. Regardless of which government rules Damascus, Turkey will continue to combat any Kurdish project as if it were a front within its own borders.

4. Europe: Sympathy Without Leverage

Some European countries have expressed sympathy with the Kurdish plight, especially after the fight against ISIS. However, this sympathy has remained mostly symbolic and rhetorical. No European state has launched a concrete political initiative to address the Kurdish question in Syria—they have settled for observation and statements.

In the end, Europe lacks real leverage in the Syrian file, making its role more symbolic than influential.

Conclusion

The Kurdish file in Syria is not merely an ethnic detail in the map of war—it is a central knot in understanding the future of the Syrian state. Between the de facto authority in Damascus, a political experiment in the northeast, and overlapping international pressures, the fate of the Kurds remains suspended in a delicate balance.

But the inevitable existential question remains:

Are constitutions written to reproduce power... or to recognize the human being?

Conclusion:

The Kurds in Syria are not a minority seeking pity, but a people striving for recognition and equality in a homeland they helped build and for which they have paid a heavy price for its freedom. Temporary agreements and political maneuvers will not serve as a substitute for a true national vision that redefines Syria as a homeland for all its components, not a project for one group at the expense of others.

The Kurds in Syria have never been just a number in unjust statistics, nor a "minority" in the legal sense that categorizes them as groups in need of special protection, nor a "file" on a negotiation table that opens and closes depending on passing interests. They are a people rooted in history, extending across geography, active in shaping the present, and aspiring with dignity to be an integral part of the future.

We are not just dealing with a human rights issue, nor even a political representation matter. We are facing a major symbolic battle over the very identity of the Syrian homeland: Is it a homeland for one group, one language, and one center? Or is it an entity open to a mosaic of peoples, written in the languages of its children and breathing through its institutions from its diversity, not from forced unity?

The struggle of the Syrian Kurds, from the beginning of the Syrian state's formation to the 2004 uprising in Qamishli, to the revolution’s stages in Qamishli, Kobani, Afrin, and to the heart of Zor Afa in Damascus, to the experience of self-administration, is not a separatist struggle as some have promoted, but a struggle for survival within the homeland... but with dignity.

All the partial agreements, all the political maneuvers, all the "compromise solutions" that do not openly acknowledge the Kurdish language, Kurdish identity, and the right to representation, are nothing more than postponing the conflict rather than solving it. Erasing a country with a stroke of the pen, as it has been said, is not a poetic metaphor, but an existential threat to a people still resisting being marginalized.

If the new political elites in Damascus—regardless of their form or affiliation—intend to rebuild the Syrian state, they must begin by redefining the "homeland" itself: not as a space where the victor imposes his culture on everyone, but as a new social contract that recognizes the other not as an adversary, but as a partner.

The experience of the Kurds in Syria is also a test for the entire Syrian society: Can it transform from a post-colonial entity that has collapsed upon itself, to a pluralistic democratic homeland that recognizes that identities are not erased in the name of unity, but rather preserved and honed through coexistence?

Ultimately, we cannot write a constitution for a new Syria without first learning that a homeland is only built through all its languages, all its dreams, and its peoples who have never asked for more than to be seen and to have their story told in the open, not in the shadows.

The most important question that must be placed on the table of every negotiator, and on the conscience of everyone speaking on behalf of Syria’s future, is not the question of division, centralization, or the form of governance, but the question of existence:> Do you want a true homeland, or just a map with no people, no memory, no Kurds?

  13 April  2025